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1 Introduction
This thesis consists of four essays about responsible and honest behavior in dif-
ferent economic contexts. Classic economic theory neither considers honesty nor
responsibility. The “homo oeconomicus” would be honest if and only if it is mone-
tary benefiting and only has preferences over final monetary outcomes. Procedures
itself do not matter.
Recent studies, however, show that subjects are generally sensitive not only to
the final payoff allocation, but also to the procedure that produced the allocation
(Frey, Benz, & Stutzer, 2004; Frey & Stutzer, 2005; Bolton, Brandts, & Ockenfels,
2005). Subjects treated unfair punish those who are “responsible” (Bartling &
Fischbacher, 2012) and responsibility attribution in form of punishment can be
reduced by avoiding direct interaction with the person affected (Coffman, 2011;
Oexl & Grossman, 2013). Decision makers prefer not to be responsible or not to
be perceived as responsible for unfair outcomes even when there is no threat of
punishment (Dana, Cain, & Dawes, 2006; Hamman, Loewenstein, & Weber, 2010).
The meaning of the term “responsibility” differs between different environments.
From an organizational perspective responsibility can be defined as “power to
decide”. The first essay in Chapter 2 uses this interpretation of responsibility.
Here, we analyze non-strategic delegation as a device to shift responsibility for
unfair outcomes.
A more general and ethical perspective might interpret “responsible behavior”
as the consideration of all possible consequences of the own actions. Chapters 3
and 4 investigate consumer social responsibility, which is defined as “the conscious
and deliberate choice to make certain consumption choices based on personal and
moral beliefs”, which may show up as “expressed activity in terms of purchasing
or non-purchasing behavior” (Devinney, Auger, Eckhardt, & Birtchnell, 2006, p.
32). The research focus is whether consumers take responsibility for the indirect
1
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consequences of their purchasing decisions and, if so, which market conditions
promote consumers’ responsibility.
While in Chapter 3, the proxy for consumer social responsibility is the wage of
a powerless worker, the scope of consumer social responsibility is extended to hon-
est procedures within the firm in Chapter 4. Various studies show that subjects
have a preference for honesty and are averse to lying (see, for example, Gneezy,
2005; Lundquist, Ellingsen, Gribbe, & Johannesson, 2009; Gneezy, Rockenbach,
& Serra-Garcia, 2013). The propensity to lie, however, depends on the monetary
consequences of lying and is highly heterogeneous among subjects (Gibson, Tan-
ner, & Wagner, 2013). While a fraction of subjects is “pure” lying averse and is
reluctant to lie at all, many subjects lie the more, the more they can gain from
it and the lower the possible negative consequences for others are (see, for exam-
ple, Erat & Gneezy, 2012; López-Pérez & Spiegelman, 2013; Abeler, Becker, &
Falk, 2014). Subjects even punish liars if they are not affected (Ohtsubo, Masuda,
Watanabe, & Masuchi, 2010). The research question here is, whether honest or
dishonest procedures matter for consumers and whether purchasing decisions may
promote honesty in firms.
The economic literature on dishonesty focused on individual behavior so far. In
Chapter 5, we investigate dishonest behavior in a teamwork setting where team-
mates submit self-reports about own productive efforts towards the joint team
output. While there are many papers investigating lying, the literature on lying
in team context is scarce. The study contributes to the growing experimental
literature on lying, especially to unethical behavior in the workplace.
In the following, the four essays are outlined in more detail.
Chapter 2 studies non-strategic delegation as a device to avoid negative images
by shifting responsibility to an agent. A principal may decide between an equal
distribution and an unfair distribution, where she gains more at the expense of
two receivers. Alternatively, the decision right can be delegated to an agent. We
observe that a significant share of principals delegates. This indicates a preference
for not being (seen as) responsible for unfair outcomes. Purely outcome-based
preference models would not predict delegation. We provide a simple behavioral
model incorporating social preferences and image concerns in this chapter, which
is consistent with the experimental results.
2
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Chapter 3 is joint work with Bettina Rockenbach and investigates the emer-
gence of socially responsible production through consumer decisions. Although
consumers regularly state that they would honor socially responsible or environ-
mentally friendly production, even by paying higher prices (Carrigan & Attalla,
2001; Devinney, Auger, & Eckhardt, 2010; Öberseder, Schlegelmilch, & Gruber,
2011), the market for those goods is relatively small. We test whether this is
a market failure or whether consumers just prefer to appear as socially respon-
sible rather than really take responsibility through their consumption decisions.
In a controlled laboratory experiment we study the repeated interaction of firms
and consumers in a market. In every firm a worker produces a homogenous good
which has a fixed monetary value to the consumer. The manager of a firm pays
the worker and offers the good for a certain price on the market. In every market
period the consumer may buy one unit of the good. Here, consumer responsibility
means to take the wage into account when making purchasing decisions.
The experimental treatments vary the market conditions in two dimensions –
competitiveness and opaqueness of wages. We find that consumers in a monop-
olistic market are predominantly interested in buying cheap. Consumers with
little market power do not care for socially responsible production, irrespective
of the information condition. Consequently, socially responsible production re-
duces a monopolistic supplier’s profit and the chances of consumer induced so-
cially responsible production are rather low. With supplier competition, when
consumers have market power, socially responsible production positively influ-
ences consumers’ buying decisions and suppliers offering socially responsible prod-
ucts achieve significantly higher profits, as long as their surcharge is not too high.
In this case, already imperfect wage information suffices to achieve significantly
higher wages than no wage information. Our results yield valuable insights into the
possibilities and limitations of promoting socially responsible production through
consumer behavior, and provide evidence for positive effects of competition on
fostering social responsibility. The results are in line with Bartling, Weber, and
Yao (2015), for example, and opposed to Falk and Szech (2013), who find that
competition causes moral behavior to vanish.
A questionnaire study of O’Connor and Meister (2008) asks subjects to rank-
order different measures commonly found in corporate social responsibility com-
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munication and identifies honesty as the most important attribute of a corporation.
Consequently, in Chapter 4 we extend the notion of socially responsible produc-
tion to honest procedures within a firm. This chapter is also joint work with
Bettina Rockenbach. Here, firms in a competitive market may save overall pro-
duction costs by being dishonest to their workers. Workers have either a high or a
low ability for the production process. High ability workers entail low production
costs and “deserve” a high wage and vice versa. The worker’s ability is observed
by the firm, but not by the worker. The firm communicates the ability and the
resulting wage to the worker. This communication does not have to be truthful.
The research question is whether consumers honor honesty of the firm towards
her worker. The experimental results show that increased observability increases
producers’ honesty as well as wages. If consumers have full information about a
firm’s honesty it becomes a significant purchasing criterion. In this case, honesty
provides a competitive advantage and honest firms make higher profits by selling
more units, albeit not at higher prices.
When the notion of social responsibility exceeds the scope of distributional fair-
ness, it is not predicted by outcome-based models of social preferences, for exam-
ple, inequity aversion as modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). A simple model of
consumer choices shows that, apart from allocative preferences, preferences over
honest procedures are necessary for consumer responsibility to occur. The results
of this chapter are qualitatively consistent with the model proposed.
Chapter 5 is based on Gürerk, Lauer, and Pigors (2015) and analyses dishonest
behavior in a teamwork setting. It is very common that firms pay performance
based salaries (Boyle, 2001). However, evaluating individual performance accu-
rately is difficult or even impossible in team production. Therefore, performance
measures often rely on individuals’ self-reports. We experimentally study team
production with a supervisor whose task it is to distribute bonuses among team-
mates. The treatments vary, on the one hand, the information of the supervisor,
who either knows the true individual efforts or receives self-reports, which might
not be true. On the other hand, the supervisor can freely distribute bonuses or
has to follow a fixed ex-ante known distribution scheme. The research interest
are the effects of the supervisor’s reward power on teammates’ self-reported ef-
fort information and on overall team performance. The results show that subjects
4
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lie (exaggerate their own efforts) when they provide self-reports. However, they
do so less if the supervisor has the power to allocate individual payments at her
own discretion. A supervisor with reward power induces more truthful behav-
ior. Consequently, the detrimental effects of exaggerations in self-reports on team
performance are less pronounced if the supervisor has reward power.
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Image Concerns and Delegation
2.1 Introduction
Delegation is the assignment of a decision right to an agent. The following rationale
for delegation is proposed by classical principal-agent theory: an agent might be
an expert with more experience, skills and information to solve a special task, or
the hiring of a special type of agent could serve as a commitment device (for an
overview see, for example, Laffont & Martimort, 2009). In recent years, however,
different experimental papers observe delegation in situations where the principal
and the agent possess the same information and skills. In these cases, principals
may strategically use delegation to avoid possible negative consequences from being
responsible for undertaking morally questionable actions.
Bartling and Fischbacher (2012) use a four person dictator game setting with
one “fair” and one “unfair” option to examine effects of delegation on perceived
responsibility. The dictator is able to delegate the decision right to an agent who
has exactly the same payoff function. After the dictator or the agent implemented
an outcome, two recipients have the possibility to assign costly punishment points
to all three other players. The experiment shows that a dictator can successfully
shift the assigned punishment points (the “blame”) to the agent, when the latter
chooses the unfair option. Delegation is the ex-post profit maximizing strategy.
Dictators anticipate this and delegate significantly more often in the treatments
where punishment is possible. In addition, the paper provides a formal measure of
responsibility of the unfair outcome, which works well in predicting the observed
punishment patterns. It is evaluated ex-post and “assigns most responsibility [for
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the unfair outcome] to the player whose action had the largest impact on the
probability that unfair allocation results” (Bartling & Fischbacher, 2012, p. 74).
Oexl and Grossman (2013) replicate the observation that punishment can be
shifted by delegating to an intermediary, even when the intermediary’s action
set is bounded to unfair options.1 This challenges the responsibility measure by
Bartling and Fischbacher, since a bounded intermediary cannot increase the prob-
ability that an unfair outcome occurs.2 A study by Coffman (2011) also questions
the responsibility measure. Here, intermediation reduces third party punishment
although the principal’s responsibility is not decreased. Punishment is decreased
because the use of an intermediary avoids direct interaction with the receiver. Re-
markably, even punishers who are aware of the fact that intermediation is used
to avoid punishment and that intermediation results in an lower outcome for the
receiver punish intermediation less than the comparable direct action.
In the studies mentioned above, delegation (or intermediation) is strategically
used to avoid punishment for being seen as responsible for the unfair outcome.
The research question of this study is whether the dictator herself prefers not to
be responsible for negative outcomes. In the original experiment of Bartling and
Fischbacher (2012), 17% of the principals delegate the decision in a control treat-
ment without punishment option for the receivers. Bartling and Fischbacher argue
that a principal potentially delegates to avoid “psychological costs” or “cognitive
dissonance”. Another explanation is, however, that subjects have image concerns
and prefer not be perceived as unfair persons (compare, for example, Andreoni &
Bernheim, 2009). Principals with such preferences use delegation as device to shift
the responsibility for unfair outcomes to the agent.
We experimentally test this hypothesis using the Bartling and Fischbacher de-
sign and implement delegation as an “exit-option” (Dana et al., 2006) to rule out
other explanations for delegation. The decision between distribution choice and
delegation choice is splitted into two steps, so that the principal is not informed
about the delegation option when choosing one of the two distributions. After
1Oexl and Grossman use the term “intermediation”. It is a “weak” delegation – the agent might
not get the full decision right (compare Coffman, 2011).
2This is in line with the results of Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), who show that the pure
presence of an agent (without responsibility) is sufficient to raise the dictators payoff and
decrease punishment or rejection rates, respectively.
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the principal has chosen distribution 1 or distribution 2, she is asked whether the
choice is to be implemented or whether the whole decision should be delegated
to the agent. In this manner, delegation cannot serve as a device to avoid deci-
sion making in general and the psychological cost of solving the dilemma between
self-interest and fairness are already sunk. We provide a simple behavioral model
incorporating social preferences and image concerns that are influenced by respon-
sibility attribution. The model predicts no delegation when principals only have
preferences over monetary outcomes. With image concerns, however, delegation
can be the optimal choice. The results show that still almost one fifth of the
principals delegate after they have made a distribution choice. This indicates the
existence of image concerns. Moreover, subjects only delegate when they expect
the agents to choose the unfair distribution.
2.2 Related literature
The avoidance of responsibility absent any strategic reasons is observed in different
experimental settings. Dana et al. (2006) study an exit option in a dictator game.
After deciding about the share of money (between 0$ and 10$) they send to the
receiver, dictators can choose an exit option in a second stage leading to a (9$,
0$) distribution. By choosing this costly and Pareto-dominated exit option it is
ensured that the receiver never gets to know that a dictator game has been played.
28% of the dictators take the exit option. Outcome-based preferences cannot
explain such behavior. A purely selfish dictator would not send money leading to
the (10$, 0$)-distribution and any dictator with other-regarding preferences would
at least prefer (9$, 1$) over (9$, 0$). In another treatment the exit option is almost
never chosen when the receivers do not learn that a dictator game is played at all.
Here, the exit option is not able to change receivers’ beliefs and their attribution
of responsibility on the final outcome.
In a related paper Dana, Weber, and Kuang (2007) find evidence that observed
fair behavior displays an “illusionary preference for fairness”. Their study uses
different dictator game settings allowing decision makers to “exploit the moral
wiggle room”. Dictators can do this by remaining ignorant about the receiver’s
payoff consequences, although uncovering the receiver’s payoff is costless. A dic-
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tator avoids full information (and the possibility to implement her most preferred
outcome) to hide his intentions and responsibility for the receiver’s payoff behind
chance.3
Erat (2013) reports an experiment about lying and delegation. A sender can
send a signal to a receiver or delegate the task to an agent. The final payoff for
all players is determined by the receiver’s choice. Since the receiver is uninformed
about the payoff consequences, the principal sends the potentially false signal and
might lie to gain a higher payoff at the expanse of the receiver. Erat finds that
principals use agents to avoid lying themselves. The higher the potential harm
from lying towards the receiver, the more they delegate.
Hamman et al. (2010) study non-strategic delegation in a repeated dictator
game. Dictators can choose whether or not to hire an agent and if so which agent
to hire. Even when the agents communicate via cheap-talk how much they are
going to give, dictators hire agents giving less than they would give on their own.
The results show that dictators do not think they act immorally by just hiring
agents and that they do not feel responsible for the final outcome when doing so.
Consequently, delegation results in “unfairer” outcomes – the share given to the
receiver decreases when an agent decides on the behalf of the dictator.
The experiments show that subjects do not only have preferences over final
outcomes, but take the beliefs and perceptions of others into account.4 Delegation
works as an device to avoid a negative self and social image of being an unfair
person, or being responsible for an unfair outcome, respectively (Bénabou & Tirole,
2006; Andreoni & Bernheim, 2009).
2.3 Experimental design
Our experiment modifies the experimental game of Bartling and Fischbacher by
implementing the delegation choice as an exit option (Dana et al., 2006). The
principal’s distribution and delegation decision are split into two stages. The
3This does not shift responsibility in the sense of Bartling and Fischbacher, since “chance”
cannot take responsibility.
4In psychological games (Geanakoplos, Pearce, & Stacchetti, 1989) players’ payoffs depend on
what they think that every player believes.
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details of the game are as follows. There is a group of four players: one principal
(participant A), one agent (B) and two receivers (C). The principal has to decide
how to distribute 20e . She could choose between two possible distributions (see
Table 2.1), an unfair one (called distribution 1) and a fair one (distribution 2).5
After this choice, the principal can choose whether her decision is implemented
or the decision is delegated to the agent. The principal does not know about the
delegation option when choosing one of the distributions. Receivers do not make
decisions.
Table 2.1: Monetary payoffs for the two distributions
Payment ine A B C C
Distribution 1 9 9 1 1
Distribution 2 5 5 5 5
In the experiment, the two stage design was implemented in the following way. In
the general part of the instructions, subjects were told that either participant A or
participant B will decide between the two distributions. In the private instructions,
participant A was asked to decide between the two options. At this moment, player
A did not know that delegation was possible. In the next stage, participant A could
decide whether the former decision should be implemented or whether she wants to
delegate the decision to participant B, who is informed about the delegation option.
In the latter case her first decision would be neglected and no other player would
be informed about the former distribution decision. Simultaneously players B and
C were informed that participant A has the choice between the implementation
of one of the two allocations and delegating the decision to participant B. B was
asked to decide between the two allocations in case of delegation. Supplementally,
beliefs about the expected average behavior of the participants of the other types
were elicited. Subjects were asked about reasons for and against delegation and
had to answer some demographic questions. After the experiment was finished, all
players were informed about the final allocation and who made it (delegation or no
delegation) and received their payments. See Section 2.7 for an English translation
5We prefer the labels “equal” and “unequal” instead of “unfair” and “fair” as in Bartling and
Fischbacher.
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of the instructions. Instructions carefully prevented any form of deception and
decisions were made on a special form to implement the stage by stage design.
We conducted the experiment in pen and paper form at the University of Erfurt
in June 2011. There were two sessions in two different undergraduate statistics
courses. In total, 133 students of economics and social sciences participated in
session 1, where session 2 consisted of 93 students of educational sciences. By
the different study programs we can assume that no subject participated in both
sessions. The experiment lasted about 30 minutes and took place at the beginning
of the particular lecture and had not been announced before the lecture started.
The general instructions were distributed and read out loud. Then, types were
randomly assigned by the distribution of sealed envelopes with a type depend-
ing experiment form. Once everybody finished, the envelopes were collected and
groups were randomly matched. After the lecture was finished, everybody pri-
vately got an information sheet with the decisions and payments in the matching
group.6 The average payment was 5e.
2.4 Social preferences and image concerns
In this section we provide a simple model where principals are assumed to have
preferences over monetary outcomes and have image concerns that result from
an outcome and the responsibility therefor. In the game considered we assume
that choosing the equal distribution is “the right thing to do” from a normative
perspective and therefore results in a positive image. Choosing the unequal dis-
tribution, on the other side, results in a negative image. Not being responsible
(in case of delegation) results in no image change.7 The model is in the spirit of
Grossman (2012), Grossman and van der Weele (2013), respectively, and does not
argue whether such image concerns are about self- or social image.8 The image is
6There were leftovers of types B and C, where no group matching was possible, due to the
random distribution of envelopes. Participant of type B were paid according to their decision
and participants of type C were randomly matched to one leftover B and paid accordingly.
7Here, one is simply responsible or not. Bartling and Fischbacher (2012) use a more elabo-
rate responsibility measure with more than three states depending on beliefs about average
behavior.
8The image might be manifested in an observer, who might be the receivers (social-image) or
interpreted as a dual-self (self-image), see Grossman and van der Weele (2013).
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manifested when the outcome is implemented. For example, choosing distribution
1 in stage 1 will not result in a negative self-image, when one delegates in stage
2. Only the final responsibility for the outcome influences the image. Principals
have the following utility function
u(x, τ, λ) = M(x, τ) + λ · I(x), (2.1)
where M(x, τ) is the utility from monetary income dependent on action x. The
parameter τ ∈ R+ reflects social-preferences. I(x) is the image utility that results
from action x. Image concerns are weighted with λ ∈ R+. The principal chooses
x ∈ {1, 2, 3}, where 1 represents distribution 1, 2 represents distribution 2 and
3 represents delegation, and believes that the agent will choose option A with
probability 0 < b < 1.9 The monetary utility in our experimental model is
M(x, τ) =

9− τ if x = 1
5 if x = 2
b(9− τ) + (1− b)5 if x = 3
(2.2)
A principal with type τ = 0 has standard selfish preferences. Any τ > 0
mirrors social preferences like inequity-aversion (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton
& Ockenfels, 2000) or maximin-preferences (Charness & Rabin, 2002). While
there is no disutility from inequity in the equal distribution 2, there is disutility
from advantageous inequity in distribution 1 according to the Fehr and Schmidt
model.10 In the Bolton and Ockenfels model the unequal distribution 1 causes
disutility from having more than the average of 5. In the Charness and Rabin
model τ is the disutility caused by the receivers getting less in distribution 1 than
in distribution 2.
The image concerns are as stated above. Choosing the unequal distribution 1
results in a negative image of being an unfair person, so I(1) = −1. Choosing the
equal distribution 2 results in a positive image of being a fair person, so I(2) = 1.
9We do not provide an equilibrium analysis where beliefs have to be consistent with actions.
The principal has belief about average agent behavior as elicited in the experiment as the the
share of agents that choose allocation 1 in case of delegation.
10Distribution 1 gives the principal 8 more than both receivers and the same payoff as the agent,
so τ = 163 β in the Fehr and Schmidt model.
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Delegation does not influence the image, so I(3) = 0. Than, the complete utility
function is given by
u(x, τ, λ) =

9− τ − λ if x = 1
5 + λ if x = 2
b(9− τ) + (1− b)5 if x = 3
(2.3)
In stage 1 the principal has to decide between distribution 1 and distribution 2.
He strictly prefers distribution 1 over distribution 2 if τ < 4− 2λ, strictly prefers
distribution 2 over distribution 1 if τ > 4− 2λ and is indifferent if τ = 4− 2λ. In
stage 2 the principal has to decide between delegation and the decision of stage
1. A principal who has chosen distribution 1 in stage 1, will delegate if and only
if τ > 4 − λ1−b and a principal who has chosen distribution 2 will delegate if and
only if τ < 4− λ
b
.11 We derive
Proposition 2.1. A principal without image concerns does not delegate.
Proof. Suppose no image concerns, so that λ = 0. Case 1: τ < 4. The principal
chooses distribution 1 in stage 1 and prefers to keep distribution 1 over delegation
in stage 2. Case 2: τ > 4. The principal chooses distribution 2 in stage 1 and
prefers to keep distribution 2 over delegation in stage 2. Case 3: τ = 4. The
principal is indifferent between distribution 1 and distribution 2 in stage 1 and
prefers to keep either option over delegation in stage 2.
Proposition 2.2. A principal, who believes the probability of the agent choosing
distribution 1 in case of delegation is lower or equal than one half, does not delegate.
Proof. Consider a principal who delegates in stage 2, so that λ > 0 (Proposition
2.1). Case 1: The principal had chosen distribution 1 and delegates in stage 2. It
follows 4− 2λ ≥ τ > 4− λ1−b . Therefore b > 12 . Case 2: The principal had chosen
distribution 2 and delegates in stage 2. It follows 4− 2λ ≤ τ < 4− λ
b
. Therefore
b > 12 .
Figure 2.1 shows the possible actions of the principals and the according ranges of
τ . The model predicts the following: First, purely outcome-based models of social
11Thereby, we assume a weak preference to keep the decision of stage 1 to remove indifference
in the delegation decision. An interpretation would be risk aversion.
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Figure 2.1: Principals actions depending on τ with λ > 0 and b > 12
preferences do not predict any form of delegation, unless a subject is completely
indifferent between the two distributions.12 Second, the higher the disutility from
a negative image or the higher the weight of that image, the higher the likelihood
to choose distribution 2 in stage 1 and to delegate in stage 2. In this sense, the
model predicts an “illusory preference for fairness” (Dana et al., 2007). A share
of principals would like the unequal distribution to be implemented, but does
not want to be responsible, so that the distribution 2 is chosen in the first place
and delegation when offered.13 Third, the higher the belief about the the agent
choosing the unequal distribution 1, the more likely is delegation. A principal
who is willing to implement the unequal distribution 1 in stage 1 also might shift
responsibility to the agent, and loose the negative image. The principal lets the
agent choose the unequal distribution, when she believes that he will do so. We
derive the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2.1. A significant share of principals delegates in stage 2, after choos-
ing distribution 1 or distribution 2 in stage 1.
Hypothesis 2.2. Principals delegate if they belief that the probability that the
agent will choose the unequal distribution 1 is high (b > 12).
The model above derives predictions for the behavior of the principals. Agents
might behave differently. Some studies show a certain kind of commitment of
12This requires very strong social preferences, for example an advantageous inequity parameter
β = 0.75 (τ = 4) in the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model.
13The data of the two punishment-free treatments of Bartling and Fischbacher’s experiment
support this conjecture, see the more detailed results in the working paper (Bartling &
Fischbacher, 2008). Comparing the two treatments, we see that the share of unfair principals,
who choose the unequal distribution, is constant independent of whether delegation is possible
or not, whereas the share of dictators choosing distribution 2 is halved in benefit of delegation.
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Table 2.2: Delegation decisions
Principals Agents
no delegation delegation overall overall
Distribution 1 15 6 21 28
Distribution 2 29 4 33 31
Sum 44 10 54 59
the agents for “their” principals in such relationships (for example, Bartling &
Fischbacher, 2012; Hamman et al., 2010). Given Proposition 2.2 and Hypothesis
2.2, the agent has to believe that the principal believes that the agent will choose
distribution 1, so that choosing distribution 1 will not result in a negative image
for the agent as he is expected to do so.14 These considerations lead to
Hypothesis 2.3. The share of agents choosing the unequal distribution is higher
than the share of principals choosing the unequal distribution.
2.5 Results
Table 2.2 shows the distribution and delegation decisions of principals and agents.
About 34% (21/54) of the principals choose the unequal distribution 1 in the first
stage. Overall, 19% (10/54) of the principals delegate.15 The principals choosing
distribution 1 delegate more often (29% vs 12%), but not significantly (Fisher’s
exact test, one-sided: p=0.162). Thus, Hypothesis 2.1 cannot be rejected.
Result 2.1. A significant share of both types of principals delegates.
Figure 2.2 displays the principals’ beliefs about the agents’ behavior depending
on the delegation decision.16 We see that principals who delegate believe that a
higher share of agents chooses distribution 1, but the difference is not significant
14This is similar to models of guilt aversion (Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006), where choosing
distribution 2 would cause feelings of guilt for the agent since the principal expected to get
the higher payoff from distribution 1.
15This share is significantly higher than a random delegation with 10% probability, (Binomial
test, one-sided: p=0.040.)
16All beliefs are population averages and were not incentivised.
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Figure 2.2: Principals’ beliefs about agents choosing distribution 1
(64% vs. 53%, Mann-Whitney U test: p=0.102). In both cases, however, the
beliefs are (weakly) significantly higher than the actual share of agents choosing
distribution 1, which is 47% (Wilcoxon signed rank test: p=0.096 for no delegation,
p=0.028 for delegation). Regarding Proposition 2.2, eight of the ten subjects
who delegate belief that more than 50% of agents will choose distribution 1. A
more detailed look at the different types of principals reveals some differences.
Principals choosing distribution 2 and delegation believe that 60% of the agents
choose distribution 1, while the ones who do not delegate believe that only 46% of
the agents will do so, whereas there is no difference for the principals who choose
the unequal distribution.17 Overall, Hypothesis 2.2 cannot be rejected.
Result 2.2. Principals, especially those who delegate, overrate the unfairness of
agents.
28 out of 59 agents (47%) choose distribution 1, while only 21 out of 54 (39%)
of the principals do so in stage 1. Nevertheless this difference is not significant
(Fisher’s exact test, one-sided: p=0.233). There does not seem to be a difference
in the behavior of principals and agents (compare Hypothesis 2.3).
Result 2.3. There is no difference in the distribution choice between principals
and agents.
17The differences for principals choosing distribution 2 is not significant, since there are only
four observations of delegation.
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Finally, it is important to mention that we observe significant differences in
behavior between the two sessions. Principals in session 2 (educational science) are
much “fairer” than principals in session 1 (economics and social sciences). While
17 of 31 (55%) principals of session 1 choose distribution 1 in stage 1, only 4 of 23
(17%) do so in session 2 (Fisher’s exact test, two sided: p=0.010). Interestingly,
the behavioral differences do not hold for agents who choose distribution 1 in half
of the cases (47% in session 1, 48% in session 2).
2.6 Conclusion
We use a two stage dictator game with delegation opportunity to study the avoid-
ance of negative images through the shifting of responsibility. We find that one
fifth of the principals delegates the decision right after making the distribution
choice. The results indicate a preference for not being (seen as) responsible for un-
fair outcomes – subjects have preferences over images. A simple behavioral model
incorporating social preferences and image concerns is consistent with our observa-
tions, while purely outcome-based preference models would predict no delegation
at all. Moreover, as the model predicts, subjects delegate when they expect that
the agents will choose the unequal distribution. Finally, the results also show “an
illusionary preferences for fairness”.
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2.7 Appendix
In this section we present the instructions of the experiment. The original instruc-
tions were in German and the ones listed below are translations into English.
General Instructions for Participants
We cordially welcome you to this economic experiment and we thank you for your participa-
tion.
It is very important that you read the following instructions carefully. In this experiment,
you can earn money - depending on your decisions and the decisions of the other participants. If
you have any questions, please direct them to us. During the experiment, it is not allowed to
talk to the other participants. Non-compliance with this rule will result in exclusion from
the experiment and from all payments. In the experiment, we will not speak of Euros but
of points. Your entire income will thus first be calculated in points. The total number of points
scored during the experiment will be converted into Euros in the end, with
1 Point = 1 Euro.
To conduct the experiment, you will receive an experimental sheet on which you will give all
answers in written form. After the experiment and the lecture, you will receive an answer sheet
with the results of your group from us and the number of points you earned in the experiment
will be paid to you in cash.
The Experiment
In the experiment, you and three other persons are randomly assigned to a group.
You do not learn the identity of these three persons, neither during the experiment, nor after-
wards. The three persons assigned to you do not learn anything about your identity, either. In
this experiment, there are three types of participants: One participant A and one participant
B, as well as two participants C. The assignment of types is also random. In this experiment,
either participant A or participant B decides, how 20 points are divided between the four
participants. In the course of the experiment, you will learn who of the two participants decides.
Both participants C cannot make a decision in this experiment.
Participant A or B has to decide between two possible allocations:
• Distribution 1: Participant A and participant B each receive 9 points and both participants
C receive 1 point, respectively.
• Distribution 2: Participant A, participant B and both participants C receive 5 points each.
The following table again gives you an overview over the two distributions, between participant
A or participant B has to decide.
Points of Points of Points of one Points of th other
participant A participant B participant C participant C
Distribution 1 9 9 1 1
Distribution 2 5 5 5 5
Important Notes
• Only use pens, fineliners or the like (no pencils) on the experimental sheet.
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• Think carefully before you decide and make an entry. Corrections – of any kind – are not
possible and cannot be considered.
• Moving backwards through the pages or opening the sheet ahead of time is not allowed.
Non-compliance with these rules will lead to exclusion from the experiment and
from all payments.
If you have any remaining questions, please ask one of the experimenters now.
Question Form Type A
[Stage 1]
You are participant A
You take the decision. Please choose now between allocation 1 and allocation 2.
A B C1 C2 Your choice
Distribution 1: 9 9 1 1 r
Distribution 2: 5 5 5 5 r
[Stage 2]
You can now choose if the allocation decision you just made shall be implemented or if you
want to delegate the decision to participant B. Participant B knows that you have the opportunity
to delegate to him/her. He/she decides just like you between allocation 1 and allocation 2 in case
you want to delegate. Both participants C also know that you have the opportunity to delegate.
You now have the following alternatives:
Maintain the decision Delegate the decision
. . .the allocation chosen in the last step will
be implemented.
. . .participant B and participants C will
learn that you have decided and will learn
the final allocation.
. . .all participants will learn that you dele-
gated to participant B. No participant will
learn your previous choice.
. . .all participants will learn that participant
B has decided and will learn the final alloca-
tion.
Maintain the decision: r Delegate the decision: r
[Stage 3]
What do you think
How large is the share of participants B who decide for allocation 1 or allocation 2, respectively,
in case it is delegated to him/her?
Please enter your expectations. Please consider that the percentages have to add up to 100.
A B C1 C2 Share in percent
Distribution 1: 9 9 1 1
Distribution 2: 5 5 5 5
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Which arguments speak in favor of delegation?
Which arguments speak against delegation?
Question Form Type B
[Stage 1]
You are participant B
Participant A takes the decision initially. Participant A can either decide between allocation
1 and allocation 2 him-/herself or he/she can delegate the decision to you. If participant A
does not delegate, his/her decision determines the payoffs. If participant A delegates, then your
decision determines the payoffs.
Please choose now either allocation 1 or allocation 2 in case participant A delegates to you.
A B C1 C2 Your choice
Distribution 1: 9 9 1 1 r
Distribution 2: 5 5 5 5 r
[Stage 2]
What do you think
How large is the share of participants A who decide for allocation 1, allocation 2, or delegation,
respectively?
Please enter your expectations. Please consider that the percentages have to add up to 100.
A B C1 C2 Share in percent
Distribution 1: 9 9 1 1
Distribution 2: 5 5 5 5
[Stage 3]
What do you think
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From the point of view of participant A, which arguments speak in favor of delegation?
Which arguments speak against delegation?
Question Form Type C
[Stage 1]
You are a participant C
Participant A takes the decision initially. Participant A can either decide between allocation 1
and allocation 2 him-/herself or he/she can delegate the decision to participant B. If participant
A does not delegate the decision between allocation 1 and 2, participant A takes the decision.
If participant A delegates the decision between allocation 1 and 2, participant B takes the
decision.
Participant B chooses between allocation 1 and 2. He/she knows that his/her decision will
only be implemented in case of a delegation.
Which behavior do you expect from participant A and participant B? Please enter your answers
on the next page.
[Stage 2]
What do you think
How large is the share of participants A who decide for allocation 1, allocation 2, or delegation,
respectively?
Please enter your expectations. Please consider that the percentages have to add up to 100.
A B C1 C2 Share in percent
Distribution 1: 9 9 1 1
Distribution 2: 5 5 5 5
How large is the share of participants B who decide for allocation 1 or allocation 2, respectively,
in case it is delegated to him/her?
Please enter your expectations. Please consider that the percentages have to add up to 100.
A B C1 C2 Share in percent
Distribution 1: 9 9 1 1
Distribution 2: 5 5 5 5
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[Stage 3]
What do you think
From the point of view of participant A, which arguments speak in favor of delegation?
Which arguments speak against delegation?
Questionaire all Types
Questionaire
Finally, please answer the following three questions.
Age:
Sex: female r male r
Did you ever participate in an economic experiment yet?
Yes r No r
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3.1 Introduction
Socially responsible (SR1) production is not a new topic. Poor working conditions
and insufficient wages were already debated during times of industrial revolution
more than a century ago. The new facet in today’s discussion is that increased
globalization and highly decentralized production processes have added more com-
plexity to the problem. Recently, insufficient SR in production was prominently
discussed when Apple Inc. was accused of the poor working conditions in the
factories of Foxconn leading to workers’ suicides2, or when fires in garment fac-
tories in Pakistan and Bangladesh which produced for western companies killed
hundreds of workers3. “Fair” prices for coffee, cocoa and bananas or the usage
of child-labor in production (for example, rugs, soccer balls or cocoa, see Burke,
2012) are recurrent discussions in recent decades. In reaction, the public as well
as politicians call for stronger regulations on the producer side.
But what about the other market side? Do consumers care about SR production
and if so do they try to influence the social dimension of production through their
consumption decisions? Although stated preferences in questionnaires and hypo-
thetical consumption decisions indicate that a substantial fraction of consumers
would honor socially responsible or environmental friendly production, even by
paying higher prices (Carrigan & Attalla, 2001; Devinney et al., 2010; Öberseder
et al., 2011), the market for those goods is relatively small. Is this a market fail-
ure or do consumers not put their money where their mouth is? Understanding
1Depending on context, we use SR both for “socially responsible” and “social responsibility”.
2Light and death. A series of deaths expose a big computer-maker to unaccustomed scrutiny,
Economist 2010.
3A “distinctly South Asian” tragedy, Economist 2012.
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the causes of this discrepancy is essential for efficiently using consumers’ social
responsibility in production.
The literature offers four predominant explanations for the differences between
stated preferences and actual consumption decisions. One explanation lies in the
opaqueness of the production process: Consumers do not know whether the mark-
up for SR products actually reaches the intended addressees or whether the money
dissipates on the way (Balineau & Dufeu, 2010; Enste, Knelsen, & Neumann,
2012). Eckhardt, Belk, and Devinney (2010) conduct in-depth interviews across
eight countries and offer three other (not mutually exclusive) explanations: Eco-
nomic rationalization (consumers want to get the most value for their money,
regardless of their ethical beliefs), Institutional dependency (consumers believe
that institutions such as the government are responsible to ethically regulate what
products can be sold), and finally Developmental realism (consumers believe that
some unethical behaviors on the part of corporations must exist in order for macro
level economic development to occur).
Although this already helps shedding light on the discrepancy between stated
preferences and actual consumption behavior, the impact of each explanation and
their possible interactions remain unclear. Consequently, Eckhardt et al. (2010)
state that their study “reinforces the need for non-survey-based research to un-
derstand nuanced consumer reactions and behaviors in ethical consumerism” (p.
427). Our study aims at filling this gap by examining small economies with both
production and consumption decisions involving real monetary consequences un-
der controlled conditions. Our setup allows for investigating the effects of various
market characteristics on SR consumption decisions and thus for disentangling
the proposed causes and their interactions. The novelty of our approach lies in
analyzing SR consumption in a variety of relevant market settings by focusing on
consumers as well as producers.
In our laboratory experiment, consumers and firms interact in a market. Firms
offer a good with a fixed induced monetary value to the consumers. Next to the
good’s price, the only other attribute is the wage, which is paid to the firm’s
worker for producing the good. The wage is our proxy for SR. The experimental
treatments vary this basic design in two (orthogonal) dimensions. One dimension
varies the opaqueness of the SR in the production process, i.e., the availability
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and precision of the wage information to the consumer. In this dimension we have
five different treatment variations. In the Baseline treatment consumers have no
information on the worker’s wage and are not able to acquire this info. In the
Full Info treatment the wage is fully transparent. Moreover, we conduct three
treatments with an endogenous information transmission. In treatment Choice ex
ante uninformed consumers choose whether they acquire information on the wage
or whether they remain ignorant. In treatment Label firms have the possibility
to acquire a label which assures that the firm follows minimal standards in SR
production, i.e., a minimum wage. Hence, in this treatment imperfect wage infor-
mation can be transmitted by the firms. Finally, in treatment Face, workers can
signal wage information to the consumers by showing their satisfaction with the
wage to the consumers. This condition mirrors cases in which workers use mass
media to call attention to their poor working conditions, as happened at Ama-
zon or Foxconn, or stitch SOS notes in clothes, as reported to has happened at
Primark.
Our second treatment dimension studies how the competitiveness of the market
influences consumers’ SR behavior. We compare all five information treatments
described above for a monopolistic supplier (No Competition) and for suppliers in
Bertrand duopoly (Competition). By studying SR consumption decisions in the 10
treatment conditions (5 information × 2 competitiveness conditions), we are able
to draw an elaborate picture on the determinants of consumer social responsibility.
In the laboratory experiment we cannot tackle the explanation of developmental
realism. But we ask whether consumers indeed always go for the lowest price or
whether they – and if so under which conditions – take the SR in the production
into account (economic realization). Additionally we ask whether consumers take
responsibility for the kind of products on the market by banning products not
produced in a socially responsible way, thus tackling the question of institutional
dependency. Moreover, we can determine how the opaqueness of the information
on SR and the way in which this information is transmitted influences consumption
decisions and in which way these factors interact with the competitiveness of the
market. By doing so, we provide the first study systematically varying conditions
for consumer social responsibility.
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Our findings are striking. In the absence of competition consumers are predom-
inantly interested in buying cheap and do not care for SR production, irrespective
of the information on SR. Consequently, SR production significantly reduces the
profit of monopolistic suppliers. This seems to indicate that with a monopolistic
supplier the chances of consumer induced SR production are rather low. When
suppliers compete, however, we find that consumers take SR in production as a
decision criterion and go for the SR-produced good whenever the price premium
for SR is not too high. Interestingly, not only full wage information, but also im-
perfect wage information (in treatment Face) or the possibility of acquiring wage
information (in treatment Choice) suffices to achieve significantly higher wages
than without any wage information. Accordingly, in competitive settings suppli-
ers with higher levels of SR even achieve significantly higher profits, as long their
price is not higher. Our results show a positive effect of competition on SR, but at
the same time demonstrate that a regulatory focus on the producers is necessary
to increase the overall level of SR in production.
3.2 Related literature
To overcome the problem of non-incentivized questionnaire studies, several field
experiments on consumption decisions study consumers’ preferences for labeled
products manipulating the supply side. Arnot, Boxall, and Cash (2006), for ex-
ample, manipulate the prices of fair-trade and conventional coffee in a university
campus cafeteria and study the consumption behavior. Fair-trade-coffee demand
in a U.S. grocery store is analyzed by Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Sequeira (2014).
Hiscox, Broukhim, Litwin, andWoloski (2011), as well as Hiscox and Smyth (2011),
analyze the effects of labels certifying fair working conditions on the sales of polo
shirts on eBay, respectively on candles, towels, and dolls in a store in New York.
These studies conclude that there is a fraction of consumers with rather low price
sensitivity which is willing to pay for SR produced goods, while another fraction
of consumers is very price sensitive. Auger, Devinney, Louviere, and Burke (2008,
2010) experimentally examine how consumers value specific social attributes on
different products. The former study measures the price premium consumers are
willing to pay for ethical features on products (shoes and soap). The willingness
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to pay such a premium is much higher when there is no dilemma between the
ethical and a “normal” product feature. The latter, a multi-country compara-
tive study, shows that social attributes are more important in developed countries
than in emerging ones. Tagbata and Lucie (2008) measure consumers’ willingness
to pay for organic and fair trade products using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak
mechanism (1964) with real consumption consequences. They show that for a
specific cluster of consumers labels increase consumers’ willingness to pay. The
advantage of these studies is that decisions with real monetary consequences close
the attitude-behavior gap between questionnaires and real markets, but they only
analyze one market side.
Laboratory experiments studying SR production in competitive markets ad-
dress this issue. Rode, Hogarth, and Le Menestrel (2008) experimentally analyze
tripolistic markets with ethical differentiation. While two firms set prices for a
homogeneous good, the third producer bears an extra cost. For every unit sold
the cost difference is donated to an NGO fighting child labor. They find that many
consumers are willing to pay higher prices to buy the product with the extra cost.
Remarkably, the price premium is higher than the extra cost. Though the experi-
ment has the advantage of modeling both market sides, producers cannot compete
in social responsibility. Its degree is experimenter imposed and randomly attached
to one of the three producers. This problem is partially solved by Etilé and Teyssier
(2012) as well as Feicht, Grimm, and Seebauer (2014) by endogenizing the level
of the donation to an NGO. The treatments vary the credibility of signals on do-
nations. Results show that SR behavior demands credible signals and offering SR
products does not increase firms’ profits. Also in these two experiments, however,
SR is only indirectly attached to the production process by donations to a third
party, not involved in production.
In the experiments mentioned so far, donations are made per unit sold. When
consumers “punish” socially less-responsible producers by refusing to buy their
products, they automatically reduce the social benefits. This may induce con-
sumers to refuse from punishing non-SR producers. Similar effects are reported
in Danz, Engelmann, and Kübler (2012). They study the effect of minimal wage
standards on consumers’ SR. In their experimental duopoly market, a consumer
buys up to ten units of a good. The two producers pay a piece wage to their
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assigned worker for producing an otherwise identical good. Consumers often just
split their demand equally between both firms in order to support both workers
even when prices and wages differ.
Bartling et al. (2015) analyze SR in competitive markets where each producer
can offer one unit of two possible products: a “normal” one and one with lower
production cost that reduces the payoff of a third person. The visibility of the
goods’ impact on the third party is varied between treatments. SR is measured
as the share of products without negative impact. In their experiment producers
offer the costly normal goods and consumers accept a price premium for these
goods. Although increased firm competition (8 instead of 6 firms) lowers prices, SR
behavior is not affected. Also in this experiment the negative externality towards
the third party only occurs when the good is traded. Bartling et al. interpret this
as a negative externality that arises by consumption or as “production on demand”.
It is very likely, however, that consumers of soccer balls or shirts do not consider
the situation in this way. The good is already produced and by refusing to buy
the offered good, a consumer may at best affect future working conditions.
With our design, we aim at closing important gaps in the literature on SR pro-
duction by combining the following characteristics: First, we study both market
sides (consumers and producers) in an experimental market with real monetary
consequences. Second, the production process is transparent and there is no un-
certainty as to who is affected by SR production. Third, by affecting another
participant the SR is directly connected to the production process, independent of
whether or not the good is actually traded. This implies that workers cannot be
used as a “hostage”, as they receive their wage irrespective of the good being sold.
Consumers can only honor or punish the managers with their purchase decisions.
3.3 The market model
In our experiment we study a simple market environment. Firms offer a good on
the market, and consumers may purchase at most one unit of the good. Each
firm has one manager and one worker. Each manager determines the wage w ∈
{0, 1, . . . , 30} of her worker and the price p ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 30} of the good. Managers
can neither condition the wage on sales nor can they price-discriminate between
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consumers. The worker receives the wage and produces the units of the good at
zero costs. Consumers’ valuation of the good is 30. Thus, trade generates a surplus
of 30 and payoffs are:
ΠManager = −w + p · number of units sold (3.1)
ΠWorker = +w (3.2)
ΠConsumer =
 30− p if consumer buys one unit of the good0 if consumer does not buy the good (3.3)
The wage paid to the worker will be our proxy for SR in production. To serve our
research focus we vary the competition environment as well as the information on
the SR of production.
3.3.1 The competition environments
We study two competition environments. The non-competitive market is a bilat-
eral monopoly, consisting of one firm and one consumer. The competitive market
is a Bertrand duopoly with two firms and two consumers, where each firm may
serve both consumers. First, both firms decide simultaneously (on wage and price)
and then consumers decide simultaneously on whether, and if so at which firm to
buy. Focusing on these two conditions seems appealing both from a theoretical
and an applied perspective. Under standard preferences these two environments
yield extreme predictions: While in monopoly the firms receive the entire gains
from trade, the consumers have the market power in duopoly. In practice, some of
the goods in the focus of SR production (like trendy smart phones or fashionable
sneakers) seem to be produced in monopoly-like situations while other products
(like coffee or basic shirts) seem to be produced in Bertrand-like markets. More-
over, the consequences resulting from “punishing” a non SR-producer are different
for the consumer. While in monopoly the consumer can only punish by not buying
at all resulting in zero payoff, in duopoly the consumer may just buy at the other
firm.
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3.3.2 The information on the SR of production
In addition to varying the competitiveness of the market environment, we vary the
observability of the social responsibility of production (i.e., the worker’s wage) in
the following way:
In treatment Baseline (No Info) the worker’s wage is private information of the
manager and the worker of the firm. Neither the consumer nor the other firm (in
duopoly) are or can be informed on the wage.
In Full Info the consumers are fully informed about the wage(s) when making
the buying decision. In the other conditions information is subject to choice and
in two conditions it is even imperfect.
In Choice, the consumer is a priori not informed about the wage(s), but may
acquire this information at no cost. This condition mirrors the situation of unin-
formed consumers who may surf the web for details about the firms’ SR policies or
may decide to remain ignorant. Firms are not informed whether or not consumers
acquire information.
In Label the firm decides whether or not to acquire a label (in duopoly both firms
decide simultaneously) prior to setting the wage. A firm acquiring a label agrees to
pay an exogenously defined minimum wage of wmin to the worker. The consumers
receive the information whether or not a firm has a label together with the firm’s
price for the good. Thus the label signals that the firm is following a minimum
requirement, but does not reveal the exact wage of the worker. This condition
mirrors the case of SR labels. To reflect the costs of certification, acquiring a label
incurs costs of clabel for the firm.
4
Finally, in treatment Face each worker communicates her satisfaction with her
wage on a five-point scale by sending a face to the consumer(s) (see Figure 3.1).
The consumers receive this information together with the price for the good. This
condition mirrors cases in which workers may send imperfect signals, for example,
on their poor working conditions. Firms are also informed about the workers’
signals.
4In the experiment the minimum wage was set to 4 and the cost for acquiring a label was set
to 1. It was determined such that the total cost of 5 for a label firm was (slightly) higher
than the average voluntary wage payment observed in the no competition baseline treatment
(which is 4.7).
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Figure 3.1: Scale of worker satisfaction
3.4 Experimental implementation
The orthogonal variation of the two competition and the five information condi-
tions establishes our ten experimental treatments. To account for learning effects,
the stage-game market is repeated for 30 periods. Every market consists of fixed
groups of three (no competition) or six (competition) subjects. Roles and firm
composition remain identical throughout the entire experiment. In the duopoly
market, firms are distinguished by assigned letters A and B and consumers by
assigned letters X and Y. Table 3.1 provides an overview over the number of in-
dependent observations and the number of subjects in each treatment. We strived
for ten independent observations in each treatment. Due to no-shows we collected
only nine in some treatments. For manager competition in Label, we decided to
double the number of independent observations to allow for a sufficient number
of observations for the endogenously occurring choices for having or not having a
label. In total 492 subjects took part in the experiment.
At the end of the experiment subjects answered a questionnaire concerning their
attitude towards SR.5 The main body of the questionnaire uses questions of the Eu-
robarometer 47.0 (Melich, 2000). We complemented those questions with specific
questions concerning our experimental setup. The different sessions of the experi-
ment were conducted between November 2012 and February 2014 at the Cologne
Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER). Interaction was computerized using
the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Participants were recruited with ORSEE
(Greiner, 2004). At the beginning of the experiment written instructions6 were
distributed and read aloud. Sessions lasted between 75 and 105 minutes. Subjects
received an initial endowment of 40 points and additional 5 points at the beginning
5See Section 3.8.3 for the questions asked and the statistical analysis of the answers.
6English translations can be found in Section 3.8.4.
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Table 3.1: Number of independent observations (and subjects) in each treatment
Baseline Full Info Label Choice Face
No Competition 9 (27) 9 (27) 10 (30) 10 (30) 10 (30)
Competition 9 (54) 9 (54) 20 (120) 10 (60) 10 (60)
of every round.7 After the experiment all points were converted into e and paid
in cash with an exchange rate of 40 points for 1e and an additional show-up fee
of 2.50 e. Average total earnings are 13.29e in the monopoly (with a minimum
of 6.03e and a maximum of 22.23e) and 14.61e in the duopoly sessions (with a
minimum of 3.53e and a maximum of 28.25e).
3.5 Theoretical considerations on CSR in our
experimental game
3.5.1 Stage game equilibria under selfish preferences
Without competition, the stage game is strategically equivalent to an ultimatum
game with a bystander. By setting wage and price, the manger makes a proposal
(w, p) how to divide the gains of trade (i.e., 30) between the three players. When
the consumer accepts (buys), the 30 points are divided as follows: the manager
gets p− w, the worker gets w and the consumer gets 30− p. When the consumer
rejects, the manager receives −w, the worker w and the consumer receives 0.
Under common knowledge of selfish preferences, a profit maximizing consumer
just considers p, since the wage w does not influence her profit. The consumer
accepts any (w, p) with p < 30 and is indifferent between accepting and rejecting
p = 30. The manager’s best response to the consumer’s behavior is to charge the
highest price that is accepted by the consumer and to pay a wage of zero. Thus,
we derive two subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies: 1. the manager
proposes (w = 0, p = 30) and the consumer accepts all manager proposals; 2. the
7The initial endowment and the roundly endowment could cover potential losses which are
possible for subjects in the roles of managers (from not trading or trading at prices lower
than costs). It never happened that a subject had a negative account in one point of time.
32
3 Consumer Social Responsibility
manager proposes (w = 0, p = 30 − ε) and the consumer accepts all offers with
p = 30− ε, where ε > 0 is the smallest money unit (which is 1 in our experimental
setting). Hence, the manager has the market power to receive (almost) the entire
rent.
Under competition each firm may serve both consumers. When prices differ,
selfish consumers buy the cheaper good. If both firms set the same price, assume
that consumers randomly choose where to buy. Again, selfish consumers do not
care for wages, so that selfish managers pay zero wages. Then there is a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium with p = w = 0 for both firms and consumers that
always buy. This results in zero profits for managers and workers and the entire
market surplus going to consumers. Since our design only allows for integer prices,
there are two additional subgame perfect equilibria, one where both firms set
(w = 0, p = 1) and another where both firms set (w = 0, p = 2).8
Hypothesis 3.1 (Selfish preferences).
No competition: With selfish preferences the manager pays zero wage, sets the
maximal price and the consumer buys. The manager earns the entire market rent
while the worker and the consumer make zero profits. Competition: Under selfish
preferences managers pay zero wages, set the minimal price and the consumers
buy the cheaper good. The consumers earn all the market rent while managers and
workers make zero profits.
In the experiment we repeat the stage game for 30 periods. Under common
knowledge of selfish preferences this does not change the results. Backward induc-
tion predicts equilibrium behavior in every period.
Related experiments that also use a market framing (Bartling et al., 2015; Rode
et al., 2008; Etilé & Teyssier, 2012; Feicht et al., 2014) have shown that subjects’
allocation behavior is not as extreme as expected under common knowledge of
selfish preferences and that deviations may be explained by social preferences. The
next section will discuss the predictions of prominent social preference theories for
our setups.
8p = 1 occurs in an equilibrium, since any deviation (decreasing the price to zero or increasing
the price) would reduce the manager’s profit from one to zero. If both managers charge a
price of p = 2 they receive expected profits of 2. A price increase would lead to zero profits
and a decrease to p = 1 would keep the deviating manager a profit of two.
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3.5.2 Stage game equilibria under non-selfish preferences
Devinney et al. (2006) understand consumer social responsibility as “one com-
ponent of the complex consumer decision-making process” and define it as “the
conscious and deliberate choice to make certain consumption choices based on
personal and moral beliefs” (p. 32). According to their definition, it may show
up as the “expressed activity in terms of purchasing or non-purchasing behavior”
(p. 32). In our simple experimental model, we strongly reduced the complexity of
the consumer decision-making process. In case of monopoly, the consumer’s pur-
chasing decision determines the payoff allocation between the three players. For
manager determined (w, p), the consumer decides between (w, p − w, 30 − p) (in
case of buying) and (w,−w, 0) (in case of not buying) as payoffs to the worker,
the manager, and the consumer, respectively.9 This decision situation is close to
the Güth and van Damme (1998) ultimatum game with a bystander, however,
with the difference that in their game a rejection leads to zero payoffs for all three
players. Güth and van Damme observe very low bystander payoffs, low rejection
rates and no single rejection that can be attributed to a low bystander share.
(Bolton & Ockenfels, 1998) show that the low bystander payoffs in Güth and
van Damme are in line with the inequality aversion model ERC, introduced in
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). This model assumes that individuals are motivated
by their absolute and their relative monetary payoff within the group. Applied
to our situation, the ERC model would predict the worker’s wage not to be rele-
vant for the consumer’s purchasing decision, since solely the price determines the
consumer’s absolute as well as relative payoff. The wage just distributes payoff
between manager and worker, but changes neither the absolute nor the relative
payoff of the consumer.
Another prominent model of allocative preferences is the inequity aversion model
by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In this model, a player receives utility from her mon-
etary payoff and disutility from advantageous as well as disadvantageous payoff
differences to each of the other players. In particular, this means that the con-
sumer compares her payoff also to the worker and may gain disutility from too
9Notice, that the worker’s wage is not influenced by the purchasing decision. This is meant to
reflect the fact that the good is already produced and an immediate benefit to the worker
cannot be the reason for acceptance or rejection (as, for example, in Bartling et al., 2015).
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large deviations between the two payoffs. In Section 3.8.2, we calculate the stage
game equilibria depending on different levels of inequity aversion. We show, that
for low inequity averse consumers, Fehr-Schmidt equilibria still specify a wage of
zero. However, if consumers are highly inequity averse, positive wages occur in
equilibrium, even when the manger is selfish.
Consumer social responsibility may not only come as distributional preferences
between the participants. The consumer’s “personal and moral beliefs” may also
address more general aspects, like an aversion to having certain members of so-
ciety with very low payoffs or a concern for the overall payoff of all participants.
Charness and Rabin (2002) include these concerns in their model of quasi-maximin
preferences, which describes that a participant is motivated by the own monetary
payoff, but also by the lowest payoff in the group and the sum of all payoffs. When
facing a given proposal (w, p), a consumer would never reject, since this would re-
sult in a personal payoff of zero, a minimum payoff of −w and a joint payoff of
zero. Thus, rejecting would yield an overall negative value, while accepting a given
proposal would lead to a positive utility. Hence, a consumer with quasi-maximin
preferences would never reject an offer, irrespective of the wage.
With competition, the strategic situation gains complexity. Nonetheless, con-
sumers with inequality aversion as modelled in ERC (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000)
would only be concerned about the price and not the workers’ wage, as the wage
does not influence the consumer’s relative payoff standing. Consumers with Fehr-
Schmidt preferences in contrast take the wage into account. They are concerned
about inequity not only to the workers, but to all market participants, including
the managers and the other consumer. In duopoly, inequity averse consumers pre-
dominantly buy at the cheaper firm, but it may also occur that they buy at the
more expensive firm (see Section 3.8.2 for a more detailed discussion). However,
in that case the motivation is not only the worker’s wage, but also inequity con-
cerning the manager of the more expensive firm, who would make a loss of −w if
both consumers buy at the cheaper firm. Similarly, consumers with quasi-maximin
preferences (Charness & Rabin, 2002) may accept the more expensive offer, driven
by a concern for the manager of the more expensive firm and not by a concern
for the worker. A manager’s loss of −w, which is the minimal payoff among all
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participants in case both consumers buy at the other firm, strongly reduces the
consumer’s utility.
Hypothesis 3.2 (Non-selfish preferences).
No competition: Without competition, models of other-regarding preferences leave
only little room for consumers rejecting offers due to too low wages. While the
models of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Charness and Rabin (2002) exclude
refusals to buy due to too low wages, consumers with Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
preferences may forego “extreme” allocations, in particular those with a too high
price that do not come with a high wage, only if they are highly inequity averse.
Competition: With competition, the situation changes in the Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) and Charness and Rabin (2002) models. Consumers may indeed buy the
more expensive good, however, they are not only motivated by concerns for the
workers, but also for the managers.
The considerations leading to hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2 have shown that in our
stage game we cannot expect consumer social responsibility in the sense of banning
products with low wages on large grounds. In the experiment, we repeat the
stage game for 30 periods. SR consumers, who aim at positively influencing the
wage in the longer run, may accept instantaneous losses in payoff or utility to
achieve their long-term goal. In the repeated setting, managers may learn the
demanded level of SR and consumers may signal their preferences through their
consumption behavior. Obviously, this signaling and learning process may depend
on the precision of the provided wage information, discussed in the next section.
3.5.3 Information treatment effects
In the analyses so far, we have focused on full wage information. An important
aspect of our study is that the treatments vary the wage information, inspired by
market settings in which CSR is an issue. In this section, we discuss how these
variations in information may influence behavior.
In the Baseline treatment the price of the good is the only available character-
istic. Managers know that consumers cannot condition their purchase on wages
and thus do not condition their wage decision on potential consumer preferences.
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Consequently, we expect wages to be rather low. Hence, any observed positive
wages in Baseline should be attributed to inequity aversion, altruism or warm
glow (Andreoni, 1989) of managers rather than SR concerns of consumers.
In all other treatments, more (potentially implicit) information is available. Con-
sumers intending to include SR information in their consumption decision should
value any piece of information they can achieve about the worker’s wage. In Full
Information, SR consumers may not only base their consumption decision on the
price but also on the worker’s wage. Anticipating this, managers will pay higher
wages to workers than in Baseline.
In the Choice condition, a consumer may acquire the wage information at no
cost. A consumer who includes workers’ wage info into her consumption decision
acquires this information. However, it has to be expected that not all consumers
choose to acquire information. Recent experimental findings show that deliberate
ignorance occurs in different environments (for example, Conrads & Irlenbusch,
2013; Dana et al., 2007; Grossman & van der Weele, 2013) and suggests that con-
sumers might prefer to not learn the wages. Managers anticipating this pay higher
wages than in Baseline, however, consumers’ possibility of remaining ignorant may
lead to lower wages than in Full Info.
In Label a manager who is intrinsically motivated to pay a wage of at least 4
may do so without acquiring a label. However, the label provides the opportunity
of credibly signaling SR production. The signal is particularly strong, as the
exogenously determined level “certifies” a sufficient SR level and thus removes any
uncertainty of what is an appropriate wage level, which may be present in Full
Info. If managers expect SR consumers to include the fact whether or not the firm
has a label into the consumption decision, they will acquire a label to increase
their expected revenue if the fraction of SR consumers is sufficiently high. Thus
in Label we expect wages to be higher than in Baseline and not lower than in Full
Info.
In Face workers send signals about their satisfaction with the wage. Consumers
know that these signals do not have to correlate with the actual wage and it may
be that workers (mis-)use the signal to achieve an “excessive” wage. Experimental
findings show however, that subjects can be quite trustworthy even in situations
where they can manipulate such information (for example, Gneezy, 2005; Cai &
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Wang, 2006). Yet, since there is no objective scale to convert wage into satisfaction
level and vice versa, the satisfaction level might be a weaker SR indicator than
the wage in Full Info. Managers anticipate this and pay wages lower than in Full
Info.
Hypothesis 3.3 (Information treatment effects). Wages are highest in Full Info
and lowest in Baseline. Wages in Label are higher than in Baseline and not lower
than in Full Info. Wages in Choice and Face are lower than in Full Info.
3.6 Results
This section presents the results of our experiment. In Section 3.6.1 we analyze the
treatment effects on wages, our proxy for SR production. We study consumers’
buying decisions in Section 3.6.2 to ask whether consumer behavior makes SR pro-
duction profitable for firms in Section 3.6.3. In Section 3.6.4, we connect subjects’
behavior in the experiment to their willingness to pay for SR products stated in the
questionnaire. In what follows all comparisons between treatments use the Mann-
Whitney u-test (MWT) and all comparisons within treatments use the Wilcoxon
signed-rank test (WSR) on the basis of the independent observations (see Table
3.1), both two-sided. Table 3.2 provides an overview over the aggregated market
outcomes.
3.6.1 Treatment effects on SR production
On average managers pay positive wages in each information treatment of both
competition conditions. Although in the no-competition treatments the average
wage in Baseline (4.70) is lower than the average wages in Full Info (7.39), Choice
(5.55) and Face (6.96), they are not statistically different in non-parametric tests
(see Table 3.11 in in Section 3.8.1). Only in Label (2.39) the average wage is
significantly lower than in Baseline and any other treatment.10 How can we explain
10In Label, there is an extra cost whenever the manager buys the label, which makes Label
different to all other treatments. Including the cost of buying the label, does not change
results. The average wage cost (i.e., wage plus label acquisition cost) of 2.81 in Label is still
significantly lower than the average wages of the other treatments.
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Table 3.2: Aggregated market outcomes
No Competition Baseline Full Info Choice Label Face
Wage paid 4.70 (1.02) 7.39 (1.49) 5.55 (0.60) 2.39 (0.66) 6.96 (1.05)
Wage in accepted offers 4.69 (1.11) 7.25 (1.47) 5.52 (0.65) 2.38 (0.68) 6.70 (1.10)
Wage in rejected offers 6.59 (1.66) 8.94 (2.07) 5.95 (0.67) 2.34 (0.62) 8.03 (0.92)
Price offered 19.21 (0.61) 19.27 (1.36) 19.29 (1.03) 18.37 (0.82) 19.39 (0.78)
Price in accepted offers 18.71 (0.69) 18.88 (1.40) 18.62 (1.12) 17.86 (0.88) 18.89 (0.79)
Price in rejected offers 23.46 (1.07) 22.02 (1.09) 20.92 (0.77) 20.49 (0.99) 21.73 (0.81)
Units sold per firm 0.89 (0.02) 0.82 (0.05) 0.74 (0.04) 0.79 (0.03) 0.81 (0.04)
Payoff Manager 11.96 (1.58) 7.96 (1.41) 8.38 (1.44) 11.37 (1.33) 8.31 (1.03)
Payoff Consumer 10.00 (0.61) 9.31 (1.43) 8.37 (0.88) 9.42 (0.60) 9.03 (0.78)
Competition Baseline Full Info Choice Label Face
Wage paid 2.86 (0.38) 5.34 (0.92) 5.46 (0.59) 3.29 (0.46) 6.06 (0.71)
Wage in accepted offers 2.71 (0.43) 5.48 (0.99) 5.65 (0.62) 3.41 (0.50) 6.13 (0.71)
Wage in rejected offers 3.06 (0.40) 5.18 (0.83) 5.16 (0.60) 3.12 (0.43) 5.94 (0.71)
Price offered 11.12 (1.20) 12.41 (1.32) 9.89 (1.37) 11.04 (0.74) 8.08 (0.99)
Price in accepted offers 9.45 (1.23) 11.12 (1.63) 9.28 (1.37) 9.95 (0.71) 7.27 (0.94)
Price in rejected offers 13.02 (1.19) 14.49 (0.93) 11.04 (1.47) 12.72 (0.86) 9.36 (1.02)
Units sold per firm 0.97 (0.02) 0.99 (0.01) 0.99 (0.01) 0.99 (0.01) 1.00 (0.00)
Payoff Manager 6.13 (1.27) 5.56 (1.27) 3.66 (1.22) 5.79 (0.54) 1.27 (0.82)
Payoff Consumer 20.02 (1.31) 18.82 (1.61) 20.68 (1.36) 19.95 (0.74) 22.62 (0.94)
Notes: The table reports averages and standard errors (in parentheses) based on independent observations
(see Table 5.1). Rejected offers are offers where no consumer buys and accepted offers are those where at
least one consumer buys. A more detailed overview over prices and payoffs is provided in Figure 3.5 and the
Tables 3.10 and 3.12-3.14 in Section 3.8.1.
this difference in the Label treatment? Mangers choose the label in 42.0% of the
cases. The possibility of acquiring a label seems to strongly separate managers
into two groups: Managers who acquire a label pay a wage of exactly 4 in 68.3% of
the cases (average wage of 4.57), while managers without a label pay a wage of 0 in
78.7% of the cases (average wage of 0.81) (see Figure 3.3 in Section 3.8.1). These
wages are significantly different (p=0.036). Thus, the label seems to provide an
anchor, signaling the “appropriate” wage and seems to crowd out any voluntary
payment exceeding this benchmark. Managers not acquiring a label seem to feel
“licensed” to pay nothing at all. The observed effect demonstrates a potential
detrimental effect of minimum wages.
Figure 3.2 shows the development of the average wages over time and demon-
strates that the wages in the no competition treatments (except for Choice) slightly
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Figure 3.2: Average wages per treatment
decrease over time (left panel).11 We also find a negative time trend in average
wages under competition (right panel).12 To account for these time trends, we will
control for “period” in the later analyses.
With competition wages vary across treatments: The average wages are highest
in Face (6.06), Choice (5.46) and Full Info (5.34), significantly higher than in
Baseline (2.86) and Label (3.29) (see Table 3.11 in Section 3.8.1).13 In Label we
observe the same effect as in the no-competition setting. Managers choose a label
in 57.6% of the cases. After acquiring the label, managers pay a wage of 4 in 82.8%
of the cases (average wage of 4.56) and without a label managers pay a wage of 0
in 62.7% of the cases (average wage of 1.55, see Figure 3.4 in Section 3.8.1). Wages
without a label are significantly lower than with a label (p=0.001).
The positive wage effect observed in Face is remarkable (compare Hypothesis
3.3). Although vulnerable for manipulations, the stated satisfaction level highly
correlates to the wage (no competition: Spearman’s rho = 0.642, p<0.001; compe-
tition: Spearman’s rho = 0.673, p<0.001). It seems that the direct communication
11Random-effects GLS regression of wage on period with robust standard errors clustered by
manager id, including a coefficient for period: Baseline: -0.143 (p=0.008), Full Info: -0.104
(p=0.012), Choice: -0.067 (p=0.260), Label: -0.047 (p=0.036), Face: -0.142 (p=0.054).
12Random-effects GLS regression of wage on period with robust standard errors clustered by
manager id, coefficient for period: Baseline: -0.166 (p=0.000), Full Info: -0.105 (p=0.021),
Choice: -0.116 (p=0.000), Label: -0.065 (p=0.001), Face: -0.192 (p=0.000).
13Again, adding the costs of acquiring a label does not change the results. The average wage
costs of 3.86 in Label is also not significantly different from the average wage in Baseline, but
significantly lower than the average wages of the other treatments.
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Table 3.3: Treatment effects on wage
Competition −1.848
∗
(1.048)
Full Info 2.689(1.709)
Choice 0.850(1.124)
Label −2.314
∗∗
(1.150)
Face 2.256(1.388)
Competition × Full Info −0.209(1.871)
Competition × Choice 1.753(1.283)
Competition × Label 2.745
∗∗
(1.296)
Competition × Face 0.948(1.590)
Period −0.112
∗∗∗
(0.013)
Constant 6.445
∗∗∗
(0.991)
n 4920
Wald chi2 60.06
R2 0.1294
Notes: Random-effects GLS regression. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses, clustered by manager id: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Dependent
variable: Wage.
between workers and consumers reduces the social distance (Hoffman, McCabe, &
Smith, 1996; Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Rankin, 2006; Charness & Gneezy, 2008) and
triggers social concerns of the consumers for the workers (van Dijk & van Winden,
1997; Malmendier & Schmidt, 2012), which results in high wages for the work-
ers. Moreover, explicitly showing the satisfaction may reduce the uncertainty of
whether or not the wage is acceptable for the worker and thus reduces consumers’
“moral wiggle room” (Dana et al., 2007).
Wages in the competition settings are not significantly different from the re-
spective no-competition setting (see Table 3.11 in Section 3.8.1). In Table 3.3,
we present a random-effects GLS regression using factorial interactions between
the competition and information conditions. The coefficient “Competition” shows
that competition has a weakly significant negative effect on wages in Baseline (not
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identified in the non-parametric tests in 3.11 in Section 3.8.1). The next four co-
efficients capture the effects of the four information treatments in no competition.
Here, we find a significantly lower wage in Label. The interaction terms capture
the competition effect in the different treatments compared to the competition
effect Baseline.14 While there is no significant effect in Full Info, Choice and Face,
there is a significantly positive effect for Label. The wage in Label is higher under
competition than under no competition.
Result 3.1. Without competition there are no information treatment effects on
wages, except the negative effect in Label. However, with competition information
significantly increases wages: In Full Info, Choice, and Face wages are significantly
higher wages than in Baseline.
3.6.2 Consumers’ decision to buy
The no-competition condition
Without competition, consumers have only two choices: accept the monopolist’s
offer (buy) and reject (do not buy). Consumers buy in roughly 80% of the cases
(see Units sold per firm in Table 3.2). When do consumers refuse to buy? In each
of the information treatments, the prices of the accepted offers are significantly
lower than the prices of the rejected offers (see Table 3.2).15 Except for Baseline,
consumers may base their consumption decision not only on the price but also on
the wage information they have. The regression presented in Table 3.4 tests how
the different attributes of a good affect the consumers’ propensity to buy. We
use a conditional fixed-effects logistic regression to meet the panel structure of the
data. The dependent variable is Buy, which equals 1 when the consumer accepts a
monopolist’s offer and 0 otherwise. Consumers may reject an offer to signal their
dissatisfaction, for example, with the price being too high. Since the value of such
a signal might be lower in later periods, we add the variable period to control for
time effects.
14That means the average absolute wage decrease between competition and no-competition
in the information treatments is compared to the average absolute wage decrease between
competition and no-competition in Baseline.
15WSR test on the difference between prices of accepted and rejected offers: Baseline p=0.012,
Full Info p=0.018, Choice p=0.017, Label p=0.005, Face p=0.005.
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Table 3.4: Consumers’ propensity to buy, no competition
Baseline Full Info Choice Label Face
Price −0.640
∗ −0.553∗∗∗ −0.414∗∗∗ −0.270∗∗∗ −1.390∗∗∗
(0.348) (0.135) (0.159) (0.062) (0.348)
Wage 0.208 0.141(0.139) (0.227)
Label 1.303(0.827)
Satisfaction 0.354
∗∗
(0.178)
Period 0.022 0.040 −0.003 0.030 0.017(0.033) (0.044) (0.057) (0.039) (0.043)
n 240 210 300 300 300
log pseudol -47.60 -69.71 -120.84 -109.46 -64.94
Wald chi2 4.35 91.92 13.66 22.82 38.22
Notes: Conditional fixed-effects logistic regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by
consumer id: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable: Wage. Dependent variable: Buy.
In Choice, we include all cases, independent of whether or not the consumer revealed the wage to keep it
comparable to Full Info where we cannot control whether or not the consumer actually looked at the wage.
The regression shows the strong negative effect of the price on the consumers’
propensity to buy. Strikingly, in Full Info, when consumers are perfectly informed
about the worker’s wage, the paid wage does not influence their purchasing de-
cision. Also in Choice the paid wage does not influence the consumers’ buying
decision. The lacking influence of the label choice in Label is also reflected in
the non-parametric analyses. In the Label treatment there is no difference in the
label choices for accepted and rejected offers (44.3% accepted vs. 38.2% rejected,
WSR: p=0.797) and no difference in the average acceptance rate between offers
with label and offers without label (69.9% with label vs. 61.5% without label,
WSR: p=0.779). Only in treatment Face the stated satisfaction does influence
consumers, although there is no significant difference in satisfaction between ac-
cepted and rejected offers (satisfaction in accepted offers = 2.89, satisfaction in
rejected offers = 2.53, WSR: p=0.285).
Result 3.2. Without competition, we observe positive wages, in contrast to the
predictions by purely selfish preferences (compare Hypothesis 3.1). However, the
positive wages cannot be attributed to consumer behavior. As suggested by ERC
(compare Hypothesis 3.2), consumers predominantly care for the price. There are
no indications, except for treatment Face, that SR (wage or wage indicators) affects
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consumers’ decisions. Rejected offers are due to high prices and not due to low
wages.
The competition condition
In duopoly consumers may or may not buy, and when they buy, they can choose
between two potentially different offers. In contrast to the monopoly, it almost
never happens that consumers do not buy at all: they buy in about 99% of the
cases (see Table 3.2). As in the cases of no competition, in each of the information
treatments the prices of the accepted offers are considerably and significantly lower
than the prices of the rejected offers (see Table 3.2).16 To investigate whether
and if so how consumers trade off their own payoff against the worker’s wage in
their purchasing decisions we report an alternative-specific conditional logit model
(McFadden, 1974) for the cases in which consumers buy (see Table 3.5). The choice
model reflects the specific situation that consumers accept one of two potentially
different offers. We specify a case as a single decision of a single consumer in a
period. Each case consists of two single observations (alternatives) which are the
two firms’ offers. Alternative-specific variables are the attributes of an offer, i.e.,
price and SR information. The dependent variable is Buy, which equals one for
the accepted offer. As a case-specific variable, we include Period, which is not
significant.17
The regressions in Table 3.5 show that in Baseline as well as in all information
conditions the price has a highly significant negative influence. In all information
treatments the paid wage (in Full Info and Choice18) or the imperfect information
on the wage (in Label and Face) has a significant positive influence on consumer
choices. However, in Full Info and Choice the negative effect of the price is by far
stronger than the positive effect of the wage. In Label, having a label has a highly
significant positive effect on consumers’ propensity to accept an offer. In Face
16WSR test on the difference between prices of accepted and rejected offers: Baseline p=0.008,
Full Info p=0.021, Choice p=0.0005, Label p<0.001, Face p=0.005.
17Period and the constant term are insignificant in all treatments. This means that there is no
propensity to prefer the first alternative (firm A) to the second (firm B) in general or over
time.
18In Choice consumers disclose at least one wage in 95.8% of the cases and disclose both wages
in 95.0% of the cases.
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Table 3.5: Consumers’ buying decision, competition
Baseline Full Info Choice Label Face
Price −1.707
∗∗∗ −0.751∗∗∗ −0.605∗∗∗ −0.488∗∗ −0.541∗∗∗
(0.529) (0.229) (0.129) (0.200) (0.129)
Wage 0.298
∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.066)
Label 1.376
∗∗∗
(0.524)
Satisfaction 0.584
∗∗∗
(0.129)
n 1044 1070 1132 2368 1198
cases 522 535 566 1184 599
log pseudol -139.50 -261.92 -298.13 -589.91 -302.13
Wald chi2 15.96 13.57 59.63 10.85 38.64
Notes: Alternative-specific conditional logit model (McFadden’s choice model) for the cases in which con-
sumers buy. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by consumer id: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05,
∗∗∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable: Buy. Case-specific variables (not reported): Period. In Choice only
cases where consumer is fully informed, because only in these cases the consumer can compare both offers.
workers’ satisfaction influences consumers’ choice positively. Since price, label and
satisfaction are on different scales, they are not directly comparable.
Table 3.6 indicates how subjects trade off the price against worker’s wage when
the prices of the two firms differ. In all treatments consumers predominantly buy at
the firm with the lower price. These firms pay (an about 4) lower wage. Consumers
rarely buy at the firm with the higher price. But if they do, they predominantly
buy at the firm that pays the higher wage, and the wage difference is about 2.5. If
both firms set the same price, the majority of consumers buy at the firm with the
higher wage. Thus, it seems that consumers follow a lexicographic decision rule:
The first priority is to buy cheap, but if prices do not differ too much, the worker’s
wage guides the decision.
Result 3.3. With competition, wages are positive (in contrast to Hypothesis 3.1).
The price has a significant negative influence and the wage information has a
significant positive influence on consumers’ buying decisions. Consumers buy the
more expensive good if it has a higher level of SR and the mark-up is not too high.
This behavior is in contrast to the predictions by ERC (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000),
but not with the predictions by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Charness and Rabin
(2002), compare Hypothesis 3.2.
45
3 Consumer Social Responsibility
Table 3.6: Consumer choices on competition markets with different prices
Buying at low price firm (LF) Buying at high price firm (HF)
LF higher Avg. price HF higher Avg. price
SR diff SR diff
Baseline 96.8% 4.06 3.2% 2.07
Full Info 82.8% 28.6% 4.82 17.2% 94.2% 2.43
Choice 77.0% 31.6% 3.40 23.0% 92.9% 2.89
Label 82.7% 16.0% 4.38 17.3% 70.5% 3.04
Face 72.2% 30.6% 3.39 27.8% 78.7% 1.99
Notes: The table shows consumer choices on markets with different prices: how often do they buy at the
cheap or expensive firm, how often is this firm better in terms of social responsibility and the price difference
to the other firm.
3.6.3 Is socially responsible production profitable?
The study of both market sides, consumers and producers, allows for explicitly fo-
cusing on the drawbacks of consumer decisions on producers and analyzing whether
consumer behavior makes SR production profitable. First, consider the monopoly
case. The manager’s profit is ΠManager = −w + p · sales. The regression pre-
sented in Table 3.4 already showed that consumers’ purchasing decisions (sales)
are – except for treatment Face – not influenced by the wage paid. Thus, the
results presented in Table 3.7 come as no surprise. The regression’s dependent
variable is manager’s sales with the manager’s strategic parameters price, wage,
and label acquisition as independent variables. Since increasing the wage does not
increase the probability of selling the good, the wage is just a production cost for
the manager and therefore decreases profits, except for Face. Although, in Face,
the stated satisfaction has a positive effect on consumers’ propensity to buy, it
does not increase manager’s profit. A regression shows that the higher wage costs
to increase satisfaction are not covered by the increased propensity to sell.19
For duopoly, Table 3.5 has shown that SR positively influences consumers’ pur-
chase decisions in all information conditions. The question is whether this suffices
to make SR production profitable for managers. Since the consumers in the com-
petition condition almost always buy and select one of the two offers, not the
absolute level of prices and SR but the differences between the two firms do de-
19Fixed-effects (within) regression of manager profit with price, wage and period as independent
variables: price (-1.430∗∗∗), wage (-0.937∗∗), period (0.198∗∗∗) and constant (39.496∗∗∗).
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Table 3.7: Manager’s sales, no competition
Full Info Choice Label Face
Price −0.553
∗∗∗ −0.414∗∗∗ −0.280∗∗∗ −1.367∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.159) (0.085) (0.340)
Wage 0.208 0.141 0.061
∗∗
(0.139) (0.227) (0.026)
Label 1.201(2.380)
Wage with label 0.106(0.178)
Wage without label 0.073(0.357)
Period 0.040 −0.003 0.033 0.034(0.044) (0.057) (0.042) (0.041)
n 210 300 300 300
log pseudol -69.71 -120.84 -109.46 -65.54
Wald chi2 91.92 13.66 181.71 58.11
Notes: Conditional fixed-effects logistic regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by
consumer id: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable: Sales.
termine consumers’ choices. Nine possible constellations of product differentiation
on the duopoly market are possible: A firm may be lower, equal or higher in price
than the competitor and a firm may be lower, equal or higher in SR than the
competitor. Table 3.15 in Section 3.8.1 shows the average sales and the resulting
payoff for the information treatments in duopoly.
In Table 3.8, we estimate the effects on the manager’s payoff using a linear panel
regression where the categories of price and SR differentiation are interacted as
independent variables. The base category is the case of two homogeneous goods:
both mangers offer the same price and the same level of SR. All other categories
represent a deviation from that case. The first line shows that offering a product
with the same level of SR than the competitor, but at a lower price significantly
increases the manager’s profit in all treatments. Not surprisingly, a higher price
at the same level of SR as the competitor decreases the manager’s profit (second
line). The last three categories represent a positive product differentiation in SR.
A manager can significantly increase her payoff by offering goods with a higher
level of SR at a lower or equal price (compared to two identical goods). Under Full
Info, a higher level of SR offered at a higher price significantly reduces profits. In
the other treatments, when SR information is more indirect, the effect on manager
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Table 3.8: Manager profit for all cases of price and SR differences, competition
Full Info Choice Label Face
Equal SR × Lower Price 10.507
∗∗∗ 7.258∗ 7.445∗∗∗ 4.687∗∗∗
(2.201) (3.638) (1.005) (1.432)
Equal SR × Higher Price −9.747
∗∗∗ −8.156∗∗ −8.860∗∗∗ −4.527∗∗
(1.977) (3.384) (1.100) (1.695)
Lower SR × Equal Price −6.841
∗∗∗ −3.761 −3.738∗∗∗ −2.738∗∗
(2.112) (2.867) (1.285) (1.163)
Lower SR × Lower Price 4.614
∗∗ 4.085 5.039∗∗∗ 3.377∗
(1.837) (3.042) (1.440) (1.649)
Lower SR × Higher Price −7.742
∗∗ −5.415∗ −8.711∗∗∗ −8.242∗∗∗
(2.973) (3.082) (1.194) (1.436)
Higher SR × Equal Price 7.712
∗∗∗ 5.401∗ 6.889∗∗∗ 4.434∗∗∗
(2.453) (2.821) (1.479) (1.481)
Higher SR × Lower Price 8.211
∗∗∗ 6.948∗∗ 9.828∗∗∗ 8.560∗∗∗
(2.215) (3.300) (1.663) (2.153)
Higher SR × Higher Price −5.968
∗∗∗ −4.124 −2.300 −1.387
(2.032) (3.008) (1.570) (1.745)
Period −0.157
∗ −0.071 −0.097∗∗ −0.035
(0.084) (0.055) (0.047) (0.055)
Constant 8.132
∗∗∗ 4.530 7.17∗∗∗ 1.280
(1.653) (2.660) (1.102) (1.247)
n 540 600 1200 600
F Ratio 10.02 13.30 25.81 12.66
R2 0.3391 0.2577 0.3654 0.2509
Notes: Fixed-effects (within) regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by manager id:
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable: manager payoff. The regression uses two categorical
variables indicating Price and SR differences: SR is lower (equal, higher) if a manager pays a lower (equal,
higher) wage than the competitor in Full Info and Choice. SR is lower (equal, higher) if a manager has lower
(equal, higher) satisfied worker than the competitor in Face. In Label, the SR is higher (lower) if a manager
has (no) Label but the competitor does not (does) have one. The SR is equal if both firms have or do not
have a label.
profit is insignificant. Thus, consumer behavior not only results in higher sales for
the firm with the higher level of SR, it may also result in higher profits.
Result 3.4. Monopolists lose profit by offering goods with increased SR, while this
is not true under supplier competition. In all treatments, duopolists with the higher
level of SR have significantly higher profits as long the price is not higher. If the
price is higher, a higher level of SR is only detrimental under Full Info.
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3.6.4 Stated preference and actual behavior
After the experiment, subjects answered a questionnaire with various questions
on SR behavior. The questionnaire and the statistical analyses of the answers
are provided in detail in Section 3.8.3. The questionnaire allows us to map the
stated preferences with the actual actions in the experiment on an individual level.
Specifically, we may ask whether those who state that they value SR in the ques-
tionnaire actually act in such a way in the experiment. The questionnaire contains
the two questions “Would you be willing to pay an additional price for convenience
goods that have been produced demonstrably under better social conditions than
competing products?” and “Would you be willing to pay an additional price for
convenience goods that are demonstrable more climate-friendly / more ecologically
than competing products?”. Subjects answer each question on the following 5-point
scale: 0 (I would not accept a premium.), 1 (I would accept a premium of up to
10%), 2 (. . . up to 20%), 3 (. . . up to 30%), 4 (. . . more than 30%). The answers
to the two questions are highly correlated (Spearman’s rho = 0.6742, p<0.001,
n = 492). We take the sum of both answers as a subject’s overall willingness
to pay for SR (variable WTP with 0 ≤ WTP ≤ 8). The regression presented
in Table 3.9 considers all instances in the experiment in which a consumer may
choose between two products that differ in the SR level in the duopoly markets.
In Full Info this means that they were produced under different wages, in Label
it means that one product is produced by a labeled firm, while the other is not,
etc. The dependent variable is the share of SR-products bought, i.e. the number
of cases where a consumer buys the product with the higher level of SR divided
by the number of cases where the two offers differ in the SR level.
The regression shows a weakly significant positive effect of the subject’s stated
WTP on subject’s likelihood to buy the product that was produced more socially
responsible. This means that subjects’ questionnaire responses are consistent with
their experimental behavior: subjects who state to value SR in the questionnaire
are actually more likely to act in an SR way as a participant in the experiment.
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Table 3.9: Purchase of and willingness to pay for SR products
Dependent variable: Rate of buying the product with the higher level of SR
WTP 0.034
∗
(0.019)
Full Info 0.500
∗∗∗
(0.067)
n 98
R2 0.041
Notes: OLS regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05,
∗∗∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable: The rate of buying the product with the higher level of
SR (if products differ). All consumers of Full Info, Choice, Label and Face in competition.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter analyzes the emergence of social responsibility (SR) in production
through consumer behavior. In small laboratory economies, our experimental
treatments vary the availability and opaqueness of the information on SR in the
production process and the competitiveness on the supplier side of the market. We
find that absent competition consumers are predominantly interested in buying
cheap and do not care for the SR in production, irrespective of the information on
SR. Consequently, socially responsible production significantly reduces the profit
of monopolistic supplier. However, when suppliers compete, consumers take SR in
production as a decision criterion, whenever the price premium for SR is not too
high. Accordingly, in competitive settings SR production is no longer detrimental
for the producer.
Two aspects are particularly noteworthy. The first being the strong effect of the
treatment Face. Here workers directly communicate with the consumers by show-
ing their satisfaction with their wage. Although this is an imperfect information
transmission that is highly vulnerable to strategic manipulations it turns out that
this direct communication is highly effective by directly addressing consumers’
responsibility (compare van Dijk & van Winden, 1997; Malmendier & Schmidt,
2012). Our second noteworthy finding is the profit enhancing effect of SR produc-
tion under competition. When consumers face a monopolistic supplier, the costs
of banning goods with low SR in production is very high. By refusing to buy, they
forego the gains from trade and consumers as well as managers are left with zero
or negative payoffs. If however an alternative product exists, consumers can ban
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non-SR products at lower personal costs. By purchasing the SR product, they may
lose some fraction, but not their entire profit. In the experiment, consumers use
this power. With competition, SR production significantly increases consumers’
propensity to buy. In our experiment, this not only results in an increase in sales.
A firm can significantly increase its profit if it offers a product with a higher level
of SR than the competitor, as long the price premium is not too high. Thus, SR
can be used as a profit enhancing means in product differentiation. In this aspect,
our results demonstrate a positive effect of competition on fostering consumer so-
cial responsibility. This is in line with Bartling et al. (2015) and demonstrates
that market interaction does not lead to more immoral behavior per se (Falk &
Szech, 2013). Yet, at the same time it becomes clear that a regulatory focus on
the producers seems necessary to increase the overall level of SR in production.
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3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Figures and Tables
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Figure 3.5: Prices per treatment
Figure 3.5 shows the development of average prices over time. In each of the
five no-competition treatments the average price is slightly below 20, with no
statistical difference between the treatments (see Table 3.10 below). Prices start
above 20 and slightly decrease below 20 in period 30. A regression of prices on
period finds a negative time trend for Baseline, Choice and Label.20 In each of
the five competition treatments the average prices are around 10 and significantly
lower than in the corresponding no-competition treatment (see Table 3.10). With
competition the average charged price in Face is significantly lower than in Full Info
and Label. There is no statistical difference between the treatments in any other
pairwise comparison (see Table 3.10). Prices under competition start slightly below
20, quickly decrease and end up below 10 in all treatments. Using a regression
confirms the time trend.21
20Random-effects GLS regression of price on period with robust standard errors clustered by
manager id, coefficient for period: Baseline: -0.114 (p=0.055), Full Info: -0.064 (p=0.298),
Choice: -0.102 (p=0.088), Label: -0.159 (p=0.000), Face: -0.021 (p=0.385).
21Random-effects GLS regression of price on period with robust standard errors clustered by
manager id, coefficient for period: Baseline: -0.235 (p=0.000), Full Info: -0.280 (p=0.000),
Choice: -0.225 (p=0.000), Label: -0.165 (p=0.000), Face: -0.248 (p= .000).
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Table 3.10: Average prices
No competition Competition Comparison
Baseline 19.211 (0.612) 11.119 (1.195) 0.0005
Full Info 19.274 (1.363) 12.407 (1.320) 0.0031
Choice 18.370 (0.825) 11.041 (0.744) 0.0009
Label 19.287 (1.027) 9.887 (1.372) 0.0000
Face 19.393 (0.783) 8.083 (0.986) 0.0002
Treatment comparison No Competition Competition
Base vs. Full 0.2692 0.0092
Base vs. Choice 0.8065 0.0043
Base vs. Label 0.0411 0.5555
Base vs. Face 0.2055 0.0033
Full vs. Choice 0.2203 0.5954
Full vs. Label 0.0025 0.0083
Full vs. Face 0.9673 0.2530
Choice vs. Label 0.0113 0.0056
Choice vs. Face 0.2568 0.4272
Label vs. Face 0.0025 0.0024
Notes: Averages on group means, standard errors on group means in parentheses. Equality-tests using MWU.
Table 3.11: Average wages
No competition Competition Comparison
Baseline 4.704 (1.020) 2.856 (0.384) 0.1711
Full Info 7.393 (1.489) 5.335 (0.915) 0.1999
Choice 5.553 (0.604) 5.458 (0.588) 0.9097
Label 2.390 (0.655) 3.287 (0.458) 0.5093
Face 6.960 (1.047) 6.060 (0.705) 0.4497
Treatment comparison No Competition Competition
Base vs. Full 0.2692 0.0092
Base vs. Choice 0.8065 0.0043
Base vs. Label 0.0411 0.5555
Base vs. Face 0.2055 0.0033
Full vs. Choice 0.2203 0.5954
Full vs. Label 0.0025 0.0083
Full vs. Face 0.9673 0.2530
Choice vs. Label 0.0113 0.0056
Choice vs. Face 0.2568 0.4272
Label vs. Face 0.0025 0.0024
Notes: Averages on group means, standard errors on group means in parentheses. Equality-tests using MWU.
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Table 3.12: Average manager payoff
No competition Competition Comparison
Baseline 11.963 (1.577) 6.126 (1.266) 0.0092
Full Info 7.963 (1.412) 5.565 (1.266) 0.1223
Choice 11.373 (1.330) 5.787 (0.545) 0.0191
Label 8.380 (1.444) 3.663 (1.220) 0.0008
Face 8.307 (1.033) 1.272 (0.823) 0.0009
Treatment comparison No Competition Competition
Base vs. Full 0.1023 0.8253
Base vs. Choice 0.1207 0.1025
Base vs. Label 0.8703 0.6886
Base vs. Face 0.2207 0.0055
Full vs. Choice 0.7439 0.2885
Full vs. Label 0.0864 0.7061
Full vs. Face 0.8703 0.0143
Choice vs. Label 0.1123 0.0822
Choice vs. Face 0.7054 0.1509
Label vs. Face 0.1736 0.0005
Notes: Averages on group means, standard errors on group means in parentheses. Equality-tests using MWU.
Table 3.13: Average consumer payoff
No competition Competition Comparison
Baseline 10.000 (0.609) 20.019 (1.310) 0.0003
Full Info 9.311 (1.434) 18.822 (1.608) 0.0009
Choice 9.417 (0.598) 19.950 (0.741) 0.0002
Label 8.367 (0.884) 20.678 (1.355) 0.0000
Face 9.033 (0.775) 22.618 (0.941) 0.0002
Treatment comparison No Competition Competition
Base vs. Full 0.6587 0.6587
Base vs. Choice 0.1651 0.6831
Base vs. Label 0.7750 0.9249
Base vs. Face 0.4142 0.1651
Full vs. Choice 0.7440 0.3475
Full vs. Label 0.6532 0.3704
Full vs. Face 0.9025 0.1208
Choice vs. Label 0.3643 0.4032
Choice vs. Face 0.6775 0.4497
Label vs. Face 0.6775 0.0430
Notes: Averages on group means, standard errors on group means in parentheses. Equality-tests using MWU.
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Table 3.14: Payoff comparisons
No competition M vs. W M vs. C W vs. C
Baseline 0.0176 0.3424 0.0090
Full Info 0.1229 0.6350 0.4764
Choice 0.1141 0.5751 0.0218
Label 0.0051 0.2839 0.0051
Face 0.2411 0.3074 0.1688
Competition M vs. W M vs. C W vs. C
Baseline 0.0382 0.0109 0.0077
Full Info 0.6784 0.0077 0.0077
Choice 0.2026 0.0069 0.0051
Label 0.0017 0.0001 0.0001
Face 0.0166 0.0051 0.0051
Notes: Equality-tests of payoffs between types in all treatments and conditions using WSR.
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Table 3.15: Managers’ sales and payoff, competition
Full Info
Lower Price Equal Price Higher Price
Lower SR Sales 1.52 (0.12) 0.39 (0.13) 0.00 (0.00)Payoff 11.30 (2.33) 0.13 (1.47) −3.76 (1.29)
Equal SR Sales 1.86 (0.08) 0.97 (0.03) 0.12 (0.08)Payoff 16.23 (4.10) 5.60 (2.09) −4.27 (1.25)
Higher SR Sales 1.98 (0.02) 1.59 (0.13) 0.47 (0.13)Payoff 15.23 (3.81) 12.01 (3.43) −1.19 (1.26)
Choice
Lower Price Equal Price Higher Price
Lower SR Sales 1.38 (0.09) 0.22 (0.08) 0.09 (0.07)Payoff 7.71 (2.10) −1.80 (0.80) −3.16 (0.93)
Equal SR Sales 1.93 (0.07) 0.92 (0.08) 0.07 (0.07)Payoff 11.19 (2.72) 3.03 (2.00) −6.00 (0.76)
Higher SR Sales 1.91 (0.07) 1.78 (0.08) 0.62 (0.09)Payoff 12.40 (2.76) 10.41 (2.90) −0.96 (0.90)
Label
Lower Price Equal Price Higher Price
Lower SR Sales 1.31 (0.13) 0.19 (0.10) 0.00 (0.00)Payoff 11.20 (1.41) 2.37 (1.65) −1.90 (0.73)
Equal SR Sales 1.82 (0.06) 0.98 (0.02) 0.13 (0.06)Payoff 13.08 (1.08) 5.47 (0.69) −2.91 (0.87)
Higher SR Sales 2.00 (0.00) 1.79 (0.10) 0.69 (0.13)Payoff 12.76 (2.44) 13.58 (2.87) 2.34 (1.80)
Face
Lower Price Equal Price Higher Price
Lower SR Sales 1.11 (0.19) 0.23 (0.11) 0.02 (0.02)Payoff 4.83 (1.74) −2.49 (1.19) −6.65 (0.84)
Equal SR Sales 1.77 (0.12) 1.00 (0.00) 0.23 (0.12)Payoff 5.61 (1.36) 0.34 (0.97) −3.40 (1.22)
Higher SR Sales 1.98 (0.02) 1.77 (0.11) 0.89 (0.19)Payoff 7.86 (2.06) 4.61 (2.07) −1.77 (2.28)
Notes: Averages on group means, standard errors on group means in parentheses. Managers’ sales and payoff
depending on offering a lower, equal or higher price and on SR. SR is lower (equal, higher) if a manager pays
a lower (equal, higher) wage than the competitor in Full Info and Choice. SR is lower (equal, higher) if a
manager’s worker has lower (equal, higher) satisfaction level than the competitor’s worker in Face. In Label,
the SR is higher if a manager has a label but the competitor does not and vice versa. The SR is equal if both
firms have or do not have a label.
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3.8.2 Predictions assuming inequity aversion
Consider individuals with Fehr and Schmidt (1999) preferences and an information
condition as in Full Info. A consumer in the no competition condition has the
following utility from buying (x = 1) or not buying (x = 0) a given offer (w, p):
ubuyC (w, p) = (30− p)−
α
2 · (max {0, 2p− w − 30}+ max {0, w + p− 30})
−β2 · (max {0, 2p− w − 30}+ max {0, w + p− 30})
unot buyC (w, p) = 0−
α
2w −
β
2w
In both equations the first term corresponds to the monetary payoff, while the
other two terms resemble the disutility from inequity. The α-term captures the
disutility from disadvantageous payoff comparisons, i.e. the cases where other
player(s) have a higher payoff. The β-term captures the disutility from advanta-
geous payoff comparisons, i.e. the cases where other player(s) have a lower payoff.
The assumption α ≥ β expresses that disadvantageous inequity looms larger than
advantageous inequity. For a given allocation, a consumer chooses to buy or not
to buy (accept or reject), which provides the highest utility. For simplicity we
assume that the consumer accepts if and only if ubuy(w, p) ≥ unot buy(w, p). Using
the argument of backward induction the manager will propose the allocation that
provides her with the highest utility, where
ubuyM (w, p) = (p− w)−
α
2 · (max {0, 2w − p}+ max {0, 30 + w − 2p})
−β2 · (max {0, p− 2w}+ max {0, 2p− 30− w})
unot buyM (w, p) = −
(3α
2 + 1
)
w
In order to calculate the subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) for individuals
with Fehr-Schmidt preferences in the stage game of no competition in Full Info,
we have to specify assumptions on the parameters α and β. We consider the
case of selfish individuals (α = 0, β = 0), which only care for their monetary
payoff and three different levels of inequity aversion:22 low (α = 1, β = 0.25),
medium (α = 4, β = 0.6), and high (α = 4, β = 1). By varying these four
“types” for the consumer and the manager, we receive 16 different cases. Table
3.16 displays the Fehr-Schmidt equilibria of these cases and Figure 3.6 graphically
22Comparable parameters have been assumed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). The “high”-type
represents an extreme kind of inequity aversion. For experimental results on the distribution
of α and β (see, for example, Blanco, Engelmann, & Normann, 2011).
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shows the outcomes for two of those cases. These examples show that inequity
avers consumers may refuse to buy when a high price does not come with a positive
wage (red areas in the lower right corners of Figure 3.6). In equilibrium, this
induces even selfish managers to pay positive wages if consumers are highly inequity
avers (see right panel of Figure 3.6).
Table 3.16: Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium outcomes for (price,wage) with dif-
ferent levels of inequity aversion (IA), no competition
Selfish
Consumer
α = 0, β = 0
Low IA
Consumer
α = 1, β = 0.25
Medium IA
Consumer
α = 4, β = 0.6
High IA
Consumer
α = 4, β = 1
Selfish Manager
α = 0, β = 0
(30,0) (22,0) (17,0),
(18,1),(19,2),
(20,3),(21,4),
(22,5), (23,6)
(20,3), (21,4),
(22,5), (23,6)
Low IA
Manager
α = 1, β = 0.25
(30,0) (22,0) (17,0),
(18,1), (19,2),
(20,3), (21,4),
(22,5), (23,6)
(20,3), (21,4),
(22,5), (23,6)
Medium IA
Manager
α = 4, β = 0.6
(30,0) (22,0) (17,0),
(18,1), (19,2),
(20,3), (21,4),
(22,5), (23,6)
(20,3), (21,4),
(22,5), (23,6)
High IA
Manager
α = 4, β = 1
(20,10) (20,10) (20,10) (20,10)
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(a) medium IA manager, low IA consumer (b) selfish manager, high IA consumer
Figure 3.6: Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium outcomes for different levels of in-
equity aversion, no competition
The competition analysis is far too complex to provide a closed form solution. To
get an intuition about how inequity aversion affects consumer choices in duopoly,
we calculate the best responses of a consumer facing the two offers (wA, pA) and
(wB, pB). Note, that the best response of a consumer depends also the choice of
the other consumer. To simplify matters we make the following assumptions: the
other consumer has selfish preferences and always buys at the cheaper firm. In
case of identical prices, she buys at firm B. The inequity averse consumer prefers
to buy at firm A over firm B over not to buy in case of indifference. Table 3.17
provides the average choices of the inequity averse consumer depending on the
differences in price and wages between the two firms. The table shows that an
inequity avers consumer mostly buys at the firm with the lower price (about 90
percent in all cases) and that the likelihood to buy at the lower price firm increase
with the firm’s wage. It is however possible that the inequity avers consumer buys
at the firm with the higher price to reduce inequity.
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Table 3.17: Likelihood to buy for an inequity averse consumer, competition
Low IA Consumer α = 1, β = 0.25
Lower Price A Equal Price Higher Price A
Lower Wage A
Buy A 0.932 0.900 0.019
Buy B 0.063 0.028 0.971
Buy Not 0.005 0.072 0.010
Equal Wage
Buy A 0.952 0.949 0.040
Buy B 0.040 0.000 0.952
Buy Not 0.008 0.051 0.008
Higher Wage A
Buy A 0.971 0.971 0.063
Buy B 0.019 0.000 0.932
Buy Not 0.010 0.029 0.005
Medium IA Consumer α = 1, β = 0.6
Lower Price A Equal Price Higher Price A
Lower Wage A
Buy A 0.887 0.865 0.030
Buy B 0.101 0.027 0.948
Buy Not 0.012 0.108 0.022
Equal Wage
Buy A 0.918 0.922 0.064
Buy B 0.064 0.000 0.918
Buy Not 0.018 0.078 0.018
Higher Wage A
Buy A 0.948 0.953 0.101
Buy B 0.030 0.000 0.887
Buy Not 0.022 0.047 0.012
Low IA Consumer α = 4, β = 1
Lower Price A Equal Price Higher Price A
Lower Wage A
Buy A 0.873 0.870 0.035
Buy B 0.117 0.027 0.943
Buy Not 0.010 0.104 0.022
Equal Wage
Buy A 0.909 0.928 0.075
Buy B 0.073 0.000 0.908
Buy Not 0.018 0.072 0.018
Higher Wage A
Buy A 0.943 0.961 0.119
Buy B 0.035 0.000 0.871
Buy Not 0.022 0.039 0.010
Notes: Averages choices of an inequity averse consumer for all (price, wage) combinations.
3.8.3 Questionnaire Results
The following demographic variables were retrieved: age, sex, semester, experience
in experiments (dummy) and experience in market experiments (dummy), expe-
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rience (number of participations in experiments). The following questions were
asked:
What role did the wage of a worker play in the purchase decision?
1: no . . . 7: a very big
Baseline Full Info Label Choice Face
No competition 2.000 3.333 2.567 3.333 2.567
Competition 1.741 3.333 3.342 4.500 3.833
The role of the wage is significantly lower in Baseline in than in the other
treatments in No Competition (MWT: Baseline vs. Full (p=0.004), vs. Choice
(p=0.003), vs. Label (p=0.044), vs. Face (p=0.012)). There are no significant
differences in other pairwise comparisons. In Competition, Baseline values are
also significantly lower (MWT on subject level: Baseline vs. Full (p=0.000),
vs. Choice (p=0.000), vs. Label (p=0.000), vs. Face (p=0.000)) and Choice
values significantly higher (MWT on subject level: Choice vs. Full (p=0.001),
vs. Label (p=0.000), vs. Face (p=0.042)). There are no significant differences in
other pairwise comparisons. Between competitions conditions we find significant
differences for Choice (MWT on subject level: p=0.007), Label (MWT on subject
level: p=0.029) and Face (MWT on subject level: p=0.027).
What do you think? Which role (manager or consumer) in this
experiment had more “market power”? The market power lay with...
1: the manager only . . . 7: the consumer only
Baseline Full Info Label Choice Face
No competition 4.074 4.556 4.533 4.133 4.733
Competition 5.185 5.444 5.200 5.392 5.650
There is no statistical difference between the treatments within competition con-
ditions (Chi-squared test, no competition: p=0.690, competition: p=0.461), but
between competition conditions (Chi-squared test, treatments pooled, p=0.000).
By manufacture, transport, use and disposal of a product greenhouse
gases are released. Would it affect your purchase decision when
products were labeled with a corresponding value of the amount of
greenhouse gases?
1: Yes, a labeling of the climate impact would affect my purchasing behavior.
0: No, a labeling of the climate impact would not affect my purchasing behavior.
-1: I do not know
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There is no statistical difference between the treatments and competition condi-
tions (Chi-squared test, no competition: p=0.146, competition: p=0.202, between
competition conditions: p=0.674), so results are pooled:
Do not know Yes, a labeling of
the climate impact
would affect my
purchasing behavior.
No, a labeling of
the climate impact
would not affect my
purchasing behavior.
20% 11% 70%
The following questions are modified versions from the Eurobarometer 47.0
(Melich, 2000) about fair trade consumption (Question Q66 etc., pp. 419).
Some products from developing countries have a label (e.g., Fair trade,
Organic certification, GOTS, RugMark). Such labeled products
guarantee that during their manufacture certain social and sometimes
environmental criteria are met. Do you know these or similar labels?
If so, have you already purchased products that were labeled?
0: No, not known.
1: Yes, known, but not purchased.
2: Yes, known and already purchased.
3: Yes, known and regularly purchased.
There is no statistical difference between the treatments and competition condi-
tions (Chi-squared test, no competition: p=0.688, competition: p=0.623, between
competition conditions: p=0.960), so results are pooled:
No, not known Yes, known, but
not purchased
Yes, known
and already
purchased
Yes, known
and regularly
purchased
6% 18% 62% 15%
Do you, in general, feel sufficiently informed about the production
conditions when making a purchasing decision?
0: No . . . 1: Yes
There is no statistical difference between the treatments and competition condi-
tions (Chi-squared test, no competition: p=0.498, competition: p=0.386, between
competition conditions: p=0.433), so results are pooled:
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No Yes
86% 14%
Would you be willing to pay a premium for convenience goods that
have a comparable performance but have been demonstrably produced
under better social conditions than competing products?
0: I would not accept a premium.
1: I would accept a premium of up to 10%
2: I would accept a premium of up to 20%
3: I would accept a premium of up to 30%
4: I would accept a premium of more than 30%
There is no statistical difference between the treatments (Chi-squared test,
no competition p=0.692, competition: p=0.422, between competition conditions:
p=0.883), so results are pooled:
I would not
accept a
premium
I would
accept a
premium of
up to 10%
I would
accept a
premium of
up to 20%
I would
accept a
premium of
up to 30%
I would
accept a
premium
of more
than 30%
8% 42% 35% 11% 4%
Would you be willing to pay premium for convenience goods that have
a comparable performance but that are demonstrably produced more
climate-friendly/ more ecologically than competing products?
0: I would not accept a premium.
1: I would accept a premium of up to 10%
2: I would accept a premium of up to 20%
3: I would accept a premium of up to 30%
4: I would accept a premium of more than 30%
There is no statistical difference between the treatments (Chi-squared test,
no competition p=0.504, competition: p=0.314, between competition conditions:
p=0.384), so results are pooled:
I would not
accept a
premium
I would
accept a
premium of
up to 10%
I would
accept a
premium of
up to 20%
I would
accept a
premium of
up to 30%
I would
accept a
premium
of more
than 30%
12% 49% 29% 7% 3%
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3.8.4 Instructions
In this section we present the instructions for the treatments No competition -
Choice and Competition - Label. They serve as examples as all instructions are
formulated in a similar way. The instructions of the other treatments may be
obtained from the authors upon request. The original instructions were in German
and the ones listed below are translations into English.
Instructions for treatment No competition Choice
Instructions for the experiment
General information We welcome you to this economic experiment. It is very important
that you read the following explanations carefully. If you have any questions, please direct them
to us. In this experiment, you can earn money depending on your own decisions and the decisions
of the other participants.
During the experiment, you are not allowed to talk with other participants of the experiment.
Non-compliance with this rule results in exclusion from the experiment and all payments. All
decisions are taken anonymously, i.e., none of the other participants learns the identity of the
participant who has taken a specific decision. Payment is anonymous as well, i.e., no participant
learns the payments of the other participants. During the experiment, your entire income is
calculated in points. In the end of the experiment, the total number of points that you earned
during the experiment is converted into Euro, where
40 points = 1 Euro.
At the end of today’s experiment, you receive the number of points earned during the experiment
plus 2.50 e show-up fee. In addition, at the beginning of the experiment, you receive an initial
endowment of 40 points. On the following pages, we will explain to you the detailed procedure
of the experiment.
Information about the experiment
Course of the experiment
• The experiment consists of 30 rounds, and each round has the same structure.
• You are part of a group with 3 members. During the entire experiment, you exclusively
interact with the members of your group. The composition of the group remains the same
across all rounds.
Company, manager, worker, and consumer
• There is a company and a consumer.
• The company consists of a manager and a worker.
• Which role you are assigned to is randomly determined at the beginning of the experiment,
and remains unchanged during the entire course of the experiment. Please note that your
role allows for no conclusions about your identity.
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Good, price, value, and trade
• In the company, the worker produces a units of a good.
• The manager of a company sets:
– the wage of the workers of the company (integer between 0 and 30 points), and
– the price at which the company offers the good (integer between 0 and 30
points).
• The consumer can buy up to one unit of the good, and decides whether he buys the
good or not. The good has a value of 30 points for the consumer.
• If the consumer buys the good, he pays the price set by the manager of the company. By
a purchase, the consumer receives 30 points minus the price paid. A consumer who does
not buy receives 0 points.
• Whether the company sells a unit of the good depends on the purchasing decision of the
consumer. Therefore, the company can sell none or one unit.
Income in a round Each participant receives an endowment of 5 points per round.
The remaining income depends on decisions in the following way:
• Income of participants in one round
Manager: endowment - wage of the worker + price × number of units sold
Worker: endowment + wage
Consumer: endowment + number of units purchased × (30 - price of the good)
Course of the experiment Before the start of the first round, you are informed about
your role. All rounds take place according to the following scheme:
• Step 1: Actions of the worker and the manager
– The worker produces the unit of the good.
– The manager sets the wage of the worker, and the price of the good.
• Step 2: Actions of the consumer
– The consumer gets informed about the price of the good.
– The consumer decides whether he wants to get informed about the wage of the
worker.
– The consumer decides whether to buy a unit of the good.
• Step 3: Information
– The worker gets informed about his wage, and the price of the good.
– The manager and the worker get informed about the purchasing decision of the
consumer.
– Each participant learns his round income.
Total income
Your total income is the sum of the incomes of all rounds plus the initial endowment of 40
points.
Good luck!
66
3 Consumer Social Responsibility
Instructions for treatment Competition Label
Instructions for the experiment
General information We welcome you to this economic experiment. It is very important
that you read the following explanations carefully. If you have any questions, please direct them
to us. In this experiment, you can earn money depending on your own decisions and the decisions
of the other participants.
During the experiment, you are not allowed to talk with other participants of the experiment.
Non-compliance with this rule results in exclusion from the experiment and all payments. All
decisions are taken anonymously, i.e., none of the other participants learns the identity of the
participant who has taken a specific decision. Payment is anonymous as well, i.e., no participant
learns the payments of the other participants. During the experiment, your entire income is
calculated in points. In the end of the experiment, the total number of points that you earned
during the experiment is converted into Euro, where
40 points = 1 Euro.
At the end of today’s experiment, you receive the number of points earned during the experiment
plus 2.50 e show-up fee. In addition, at the beginning of the experiment, you receive an initial
endowment of 40 points. On the following pages, we will explain to you the detailed procedure
of the experiment.
Information about the experiment
Course of the experiment
• The experiment consists of 30 rounds, and each round has the same structure.
• You are part of a group with 6 members. During the entire experiment, you exclusively
interact with the members of your group. The composition of the group remains the same
across all rounds.
Companies, managers, workers, and consumers
• There are two companies (A and B) and two consumers (X and Y).
• Each of the two companies consists of a manager and a worker. At the beginning of the
experiment, it is randomly determined which manager and which worker form company
A, and which manager and which worker form company B. This assignment remains
unchanged over the entire course of the experiment.
• Which role you are assigned to is randomly determined at the beginning of the experiment,
and remains unchanged during the entire course of the experiment. Please note that your
role allows for no conclusions about your identity.
Good, price, value, and trade
• In both companies, the worker produces several units of an identical good.
• The manager of a company sets:
– the wage of the workers of the company (integer between 0 and 30 points), and
– the price at which the company offers the good (integer between 0 and 30 points).
• Every consumer can buy up to one unit of the good, and decides whether he buys the
good from company A, from company B, or whether he does not buy the good at all. The
good has a value of 30 points for each of the two consumers.
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• If a consumer buys the good from company A, he pays the price set by the manager of
company A. If a consumer buys from company B, he pays the price set by the manager
of company B. By a purchase, a consumer receives 30 points minus the price paid. A
consumer who does not buy receives 0 points.
• How many units a company sells depends on the purchasing decisions of the consumers.
Therefore, a company can sell none, one or two units. Certificate
• The managers can buy a certificate for their company. A company with a certificate must
pay its worker a wage of at least 4 points. If the company has acquired a certificate,
both the consumers and the other company receive the information: “A wage of at least
4 points is paid”. The costs for the certificate are 1 point.
• If the company does not buy a certificate, the manager can set the wage for the worker
of his company freely between 0 and 30 points. In both cases, neither the consumers nor
the other company receive information about the actual wage.
Income in a round Each participant receives an endowment of 5 points per round. The
remaining income depends on decisions in the following way:
• Income of participants in one round
Manager: endowment - wage of the worker + price × number of units sold
-1 (if certificate was purchased)
Worker: endowment + wage
Consumer: endowment + number of units purchased × (30 - price of the good)
Course of the experiment Before the start of the first round, you are informed about
your role (manager A, worker A, manager B, worker B, consumer X or consumer Y). All rounds
take place according to the following scheme:
• Step 1: Actions of the workers and managers
– The workers produce the units of the good.
– The managers decide whether to buy a certificate.
– The managers set the wage of the worker of their company, and the price of the
good.
• Step 2: Actions of the consumers
– The consumers get informed about the price of the good of company A, and the
price of the good of company B.
– They receive the information: “A wage of at least 4 points is paid “ if the respective
manager has bought the certificate, and they receive no information about the wage
otherwise.
– The consumers decide whether and from which company to buy a unit of the good.
• Step 3: Information
– Every worker gets informed about his own wage and the prices set by the two
managers.
– Both managers get informed about the price of the other company.
– Both workers and both managers receive the information about the wage of the
other company: A wage of at least 4 points is paid " if the manager of the other
company has bought the certificate, and they receive no information about the wage
of the other company otherwise.
68
3 Consumer Social Responsibility
– Both managers, both workers and both consumers get informed about the purchas-
ing decisions of both consumers.
– Each participant learns his round income.
Total income
Your total income is the sum of the incomes of all rounds plus the initial endowment of 40
points.
Good luck!
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4 The Competitive Advantage of
Honesty
4.1 Introduction
Consumer social responsibility is “the conscious and deliberate choice to make
certain consumption choices based on personal and moral beliefs”, which may
show up as “expressed activity in terms of purchasing or non-purchasing behav-
ior” (Devinney et al., 2006, p. 32). The impact of consumer social responsibility
on total consumption decisions and its drawbacks to producers is a widely debated
issue in consumer research (for an overview, see, for example, Smith, 2007). In
recent years, these questions have also been addressed in controlled experimental
frameworks. In the experiments of Rode et al. (2008), Etilé and Teyssier (2012),
and Feicht et al. (2014) consumers are willing to pay (slightly) higher prices to buy
a product which implies a donation to an NGO. Bartling et al. (2015) find that
consumers accept a price premium for goods that do not harm a third person. In
chapter 3 we study the effect of consumer social responsibility in different compe-
tition conditions. We find no indications for consumer social responsibility when
the supplier is a monopolist. In competitive markets, however, when consumers
can choose between different offers, consumers’ purchasing behavior may make
social responsible production profitable for suppliers. These experiments focus
on payoff allocations as a proxy for social responsibility. Although distributional
consequences are an important aspect, it is for sure not the only one influencing
consumers’ “moral beliefs”. Companies’ compliance, for example, to human rights,
animal rights, environmental protection, political rights, tax laws, and workers’
rights are important factors in the recent discussions of corporate social respon-
sibility and are triggers for boycott calls of “ethical consumers”. O’Connor and
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Meister (2008) ask subjects to rank-order different measures commonly found in
corporate social responsibility communication and identify honesty as the most
important attribute of a corporation.1 In this chapter, we follow up on this and
examine the role of a corporation’s honesty on consumer’s purchasing behavior in
an experimental setup where we disentangle honesty and distributional concerns.
We study the effects of a corporation’s honesty (towards her employees) on
consumers’ purchasing decisions. In an experimental market, firms offer a good
with a fixed induced monetary value to the consumers. The firms determine the
product’s price and may save overall production costs by being dishonest to their
workers. Workers have either a high or a low ability for the production process.
High (low) ability workers entail low (high) production costs and “deserve” a high
(low) wage. The worker’s ability is observed by the firm, but not by the worker.
The firm communicates the ability to the worker and the resulting wage (high
wage for high ability and low wage for low ability worker). This communication
does not have to be truthful. A dishonest firm may lie by communicating a low
ability to her high ability worker and thus benefit from the low production cost of
the high ability worker, but only pay the low wage, appropriate for a low ability
worker. Do consumers honor honesty of the firm towards her worker? Specifically,
would consumers pay a higher price to buy at an honest firm? And if so, what
are the conditions that make honesty a competitive advantage in a competitive
market?
We address these questions in an experimental Bertrand duopoly market with
two firms and two consumers. The experimental treatments vary the consumer’s
information on the managers’ honesty towards their workers and allow us to test
for consumers’ preferences for within-firm honesty. In the Baseline treatment
consumers have no information on the workers ability and the paid wage and thus
are not able to make any inference about firms’ honesty. In the second treatment,
Wage Info, consumers learn the wage of the firms’ workers, but are not informed
about the workers’ abilities. Thus, consumers are not able to verify whether the
wage paid to the worker is actually the wage he deserves according to his ability.
1“I think a corporation should be honest” ranked prior to “produces quality products and ser-
vices”, “treat employees fairly”, “give back to the community through philanthropic activities”
and “conduct business in an environmentally friendly manner”.
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In the final treatment, Full Info, the consumers have full transparency. Consumers
see the wages and whether or not the firms are honest towards their workers.
We find that absent any wage and honesty information (Baseline), honesty is
very low, resulting in low wages for workers. When consumers see wages (Wage
Info), honesty as well as wages increase and the wage level is a significant determi-
nant in consumers’ purchasing decisions. If consumers are additionally informed
about firms’ honesty (Full Info), consumers on top of the wage level also take firms’
honesty as a significant criterion in their purchasing decisions. As a result, honesty
generates a competitive advantage for firms. Honest firms make higher profits by
selling more units, albeit not at higher prices. We complement the experimental
findings by testing a simple model for consumers’ purchasing decisions, which in-
corporates social preferences as well as moral preferences for honest transactions.
Our data show that apart from allocative preferences, preferences for buying at an
honest firm play a crucial role in consumers’ purchasing decisions.
4.2 The market model
In our experiment, we study a bilateral Bertrand duopoly with two firms (A and B)
and two consumers (X and Y ). Firms offer a good on the market, consumers may
purchase at most one unit of the good, and each firm may potentially serve both
consumers. Each consumer has a fixed valuation v for the good (v = 30). Both
firms consist of one manager and one worker each. The manager determines the
price p for the units of the good her firm offers (p ∈ {0, 1, . . . , v}) and determines
the wage w of the worker (see below). The worker produces the firm’s units of the
good. Before the market starts, a “state of the world” S ∈
{
S, S
}
is randomly
drawn, both realizations equally likely. You may think of the state S as a proxy
for the production environment of the firm. A firm’s worker does not know the
exact production environment, i.e. the realization of S, but provides a guess Sˆ
for S. The accuracy of the worker’s guess is a proxy for the worker’s ability and
determines the production costs c he entails for his firm. If the worker guessed right
(Sˆ = S), the worker is a “high ability worker” who entails low production costs
c1 (c1 = 0) for his firm. Otherwise, if Sˆ 6= S, the worker entails high production
costs c0 > c1 (c0 = 6) for his firm. The firm’s manager has complete information
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on the production environment and the worker’s guess, i.e. knows both S and Sˆ.
The manager informs her worker whether he guessed right or wrong, i.e. sends
information I ∈ {guessed right, guessed wrong}. This information does not have
to be true: it can be honest, i.e. (Sˆ = S and I = guessed right) and (Sˆ 6= S and
I = guessed wrong), or dishonest. The information sent perfectly determines the
worker’s wage. If a manager informs her worker that he guessed right, she has to
pay a high wage w1 (w1 = 7) to the worker. If a manager informs her worker that
the guess was wrong, she has to pay a low wage w0 < w1 (w0 = 3) to the worker.
The manager has no further discretion to change this exogenously fixed wages for
high and low ability workers. Hence, payoffs are:
ΠConsumer =
 v − p = 30− p if consumer buys one unit of the good0 if consumer does not buy (4.1)
ΠWorker = w =
 w0 = 3 if manager informs that guess is wrongw1 = 7 if manager informs that guess is right (4.2)
ΠManager = p · number of units sold− (c+ w), with (4.3)
c+ w =

c1 + w1 = 7 if guess is right and manager is honest
c1 + w0 = 3 if guess is right and manager is dishonest
c0 + w0 = 9 if guess is wrong and manager is honest
c0 + w1 = 13 if guess is wrong and manager is dishonest
(4.4)
Obviously, the manager profits from having a high ability worker (a worker who
guessed right). She has the lowest overall costs c1 + w0 = 3, if her worker guessed
right and she is dishonest by informing her worker that he guessed wrong.
4.3 A model of consumer choice
Our research is motivated by the question of whether consumers’ purchasing de-
cisions in a competitive market environment are influenced by honest behavior
within the firm they may buy from. To think of the question in a more struc-
tural way, we propose a simple model of consumer choice. When making the
purchasing decision, a consumer in the duopoly market faces the market condition
m = (S, gA, iA, pA, gB, iB, pB), with the realization S of the state of the world,
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the guesses gA, gB ∈
{
S, S
}
of the workers of firms A and B, the information
iA, iB ∈ {guessed right, guessed wrong} sent by managers of firms A and B and
finally the prices pA, pB ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 30} asked by the firms A and B. The pro-
duction costs cA, cB ∈ {0, 6}, the wages wA, wB ∈ {3, 7} and the mangers’ honesty
can be derived from S, gA, gB, iA and iB. Each consumer maximizes her utility
u(m,x) by choosing an action x ∈ {0, A,B}, where 0 represents the decision not to
buy, and A and B represent buying at firm A and B, respectively.2 With respect
to our research focus, we allow the consumer’s utility function u to depend on
the monetary consequences of action x as well as on the honesty of the firm the
consumer is buying from. The utility function has the form:
u(m,x) = M(m,x) + P (m,x), (4.5)
where the functionM(m,x) captures the monetary consequences of the consumer’s
decision. If the consumer just cares for her own monetary payoff, M(m,x) =
ΠConsumer (see equation (4.1)). More generally, the consumer may have social
preferences and also cares for the monetary payoffs of the interaction partners.
We propose a utility function based on Fehr and Schmidt (1999) preferences with
inequity aversion towards the firm they are purchasing from.3 Hence,
M(m,x) =

0 if x = 0
(30− pA)
if x = A−12α ((2pA − wA − cA − 30)+ + (wA + pA − 30)+)
−12β ((30 + wA + cA − 2pA)+ + (30− wA − pA)+)
(30− pB)
if x = B−12α ((2pB − wB − cB − 30)+ + (wB + pB − 30)+)
−12β ((30 + wB + cB − 2pB)+ + (30− wB − pB)+)
(4.6)
2For simplicity, we assume that the consumer’s utility does not depend on the actions of the
other consumer. We do not propose an equilibrium model, but a model of consumer choice.
3We assume that a consumer does not care for all agents on the market, but only for those
she directly or indirectly interacts with. Thus, we ignore payoff comparisons to market
participants not involved the consumers’ trade. See, for example, van Dijk and van Winden
(1997), Malmendier and Schmidt (2012) for models with different utility weights for agents
from a reference group.
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If the consumer does not buy (x = 0), she only cares about her own monetary
income that is zero. If the consumer buys, she cares about the income distribution
within the firm. The α-term captures the disutility from disadvantageous payoff
comparisons, i.e. the cases where other players have a higher payoff. The β-
term captures the disutility from advantageous payoff comparisons, i.e. the cases
where other players have a lower payoff. The assumption α ≥ β expresses that
disadvantageous inequity looms larger than advantageous inequity.
Importantly, the function M(m,x) just incorporates the monetary payoffs, in-
dependent of how these allocations came about. In our model of consumer choice,
consumers may care for the process that led to the payoff allocation and poten-
tially experience disutility when buying from a firm in which the manager lied to
the worker. This disutility is captured in the function P (m,x). To acknowledge
that “lying costs” have found to be proportional to the “size of the lie” (Gneezy,
2005) we assume that the disutility of buying at a dishonest firm is proportional
to the consequences of the lie. In our market, managers may tell a “black lie”
by paying a low wage to a worker who guessed right. Or, managers may tell an
(altruistic) “white lie” by paying a high wage to a worker who guessed wrong (for a
categorization of lies see Erat & Gneezy, 2012). In both cases, we assume that the
disutility from buying at a firm that lied to the worker is proportional to result-
ing wage difference |w1 − w0| = 4, however, we allow that black lies are weighted
differently than white lies. Thus, in case of buying from a firm with a black lie,
the consumer achieves a disutility of −λb · 4, and when buying from a firm with a
white lie, the consumer achieves a disutility of −λw · 4, with λb ≥ λw ≥ 0:
P (m,x) =

0 if buying from an honest manager
−λb · 4 if buying from a dishonest manager telling a black lie
−λw · 4 if buying from a dishonest manager telling a white lie
(4.7)
The predictions of our model on consumer choice depend on the parameters α
and β weighting the disutilities in the Fehr and Schmidt model and the parameters
λb, λw, weighting the disutility from buying at a firm with a dishonest manager.
In Figures 4.1 - 4.4 in Section 4.7.1, we visualize consumer choice for different
exemplary parameter constellations. Figure 4.1 features (α = 0, β = 0, λb = λw =
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0), i.e. the case of a purely selfish consumer who just cares for the own payoff and
is neither inequity averse nor averse to buying from a firm whose manager lied.
As expected, this consumer always buys the cheaper good.
Figure 4.2 shows the choices of a selfish consumer who experiences disutility
from buying from a dishonest firm (α = 0, β = 0, λb = 0.5, λw = 0.1).4 In this case
the disutility of dishonesty is just an add-up to the price. Consider for example
the figure in the last row and third column of Figure 4.2. It displays consumer
decisions when both workers guessed right, but firm A is honest and firm B is
dishonest. The upwards-shift of the diagonal (compared to the same situation in
Figure 4.1) shows that the consumer buys at the honest firm A, as long the firm’s
mark-up is small. Only if the mark-up is too high, the firm buys at the dishonest
firm B.
Figure 4.3 displays the consumer decisions for an inequity averse consumer
who experiences no disutility from buying at a firm with a dishonest manager
(α = 1.5, β = 0.5, λb = λw = 0).5 The figure shows that consumers do not buy if
both prices are relative high, since the disutility of disadvantageous inequality is
higher than the own monetary payoff. Otherwise, if both firms have the same pro-
duction costs (either both workers guessed right or both workers guessed wrong),
the consumer buys at the firm which offers the lower price (see the figures with the
rows 1-2 and columns 1-2, or rows 3-4 and columns 3-4). Thus, in these cases, and
under the ranges expected in a Bertrand duopoly, the inequity averse consumer
does not behave different from the selfish consumer. When firms differ in their
production costs, i.e. when one firm has a worker who guessed right, while the
other firm has a worker who guessed wrong, the consumer prefers to buy at the
firm with the lower production costs (i.e. the one where the worker guessed right),
if the price is not too high (lower than 17 and the price difference lower than 6).
Importantly, note that the consumer’s decision is not affected by honesty, but just
by inequity concerns. It is easy to see that whenever p < 16.5, the consumer has
the highest payoff of all three transaction partners and thus experiences disutil-
4Since there are no obvious parameter choices for λb and λw, we exemplarily present λb = 0.5,
λw = 0.1. We did the calculations for a wide range of parameter choices; however, the results
do not change qualitatively.
5As inequity aversion parameters, we chose α = 1.5, β = 0.5, which is well in the range of
experimentally observed values (for example, Blanco et al., 2011).
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ity from advantageous inequity vis-à-vis the worker and the manager. Honesty
only distributes income between the manager and the worker, but keeps the to-
tal disutility from advantageous inequity constant and thus has no effect on the
consumer’s decision.
Finally, Figure 4.4 displays the decisions of a consumer, who is both inequity
averse and averse to buying at a firm with a dishonest manager (α = 1.5, β =
0.5, λb = 0.5, λw = 0.1). To see how consumers’ dishonesty aversion affects choices,
focus on the interesting cases that the two firms only differ with respect to the
manager’s honesty. Consider, for example, the graph in the last row and the
third column of Figure 4.4. This resembles the situation that both firms have
workers that guessed right, while the two firms differ with respect to their honesty.
Firm A honestly informs her worker and pays the high wage, while firm B lies
to her worker and pays the low wage. The graph shows a strong asymmetry in
the consumer’s purchasing behavior. In most cases, the consumer accepts a price
premium between 5 and 10 for the honest firm A. As already seen in Figure 4.3, if
both firms ask for very high prices, the consumer refrains from buying at all, due
to her inequity aversion. A different pattern in asymmetry can be seen in other
figures off diagonal, as for example, when both managers pay the low wage, but
one firm by honestly informing a worker with a wrong guess and the other firm
by dishonestly informing a worker with a right guess (first row & third column
and third row & first column). The figures show that consumers who are averse
to buying from dishonest firms, buy at the honest firm as long as the mark-up is
not too high, where the honest firm bears higher production costs, which lead to
higher inequity.
An important prediction following from our simple model of consumer choices
is that under selfish preferences as well as under Fehr and Schmidt preferences,
but absent any aversion from buying at a dishonest firm, dishonest firms are not
expected to sell fewer units. However, we expect honest firms to sell more units,
if consumers are averse from buying at dishonest firms (as long as λb > 0).6
To test for consumers’ aversion from buying at dishonest firms, we conduct an
experimental study with treatments allowing us to disentangle the different effects.
6As shown in Section 4.7.2, this prediction also holds if we assume inequality aversion in the
spirit of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
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4.4 Experimental treatments, hypotheses, and
implementation
4.4.1 Experimental treatments
In our main treatment Full Info, consumers are fully informed about the state
S, the workers’ guesses and the managers’ information to their workers. Thus,
consumers know the payoffs of all market participants and can derive the hon-
esty of the managers. Note, that we avoided calling mangers’ decisions “honest”
or “dishonest”, to avoid loaded language and potential experimenter demand ef-
fects. Yet, consumers could infer a manger’s honesty by comparing the state S,
the worker’s guess and the manager’s information. To investigate the effects of
honesty on consumers’ choices, we additionally conducted two control treatments
varying consumers’ information necessary to infer the wages and the managers’
honesty. In Baseline (No Info), consumers just see the prices the two firms ask
for. The workers’ guesses and the mangers’ information to the workers are pri-
vate information of the firms. Thus, consumers are neither able to infer the wages
nor the managers’ honesty. In treatment Wage Info, consumers are partially in-
formed. For each firm they see the manager’s information to the worker and thus
the wage paid. However, since the workers’ guesses are not revealed, consumers
cannot (directly) infer on managers’ honesty and thus whether the firm bears high
or low production costs.7 Table 4.1 summarizes the information conditions in the
different treatments.8
7Although no direct inference on honesty is possible, the incentive structure of the game may
allow some indirect inference. Since paying the high wage is costly for the manager, consumers
may infer that those managers are likely to be honest. A low wage, on the other hand, may
result from a dishonest manager or an honest manager with a worker who guessed wrong
8Please note that in our setting a treatment, where consumers are informed about honesty, but
not about the wages is not possible. As mentioned above we avoided the terms “honest” and
“dishonest” in the experiment and consumers could infer honesty by comparing S, the guess
and the information. Consequently, the information necessary to detect honesty (S, guess,
and information) automatically reveals the wage.
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Table 4.1: Information conditions in the experimental treatments
Consumers receive information on . . . Consumers may thus infer . . .
S
managers’ workers’ workers’ managers’
information guesses wages honesty
Baseline yes no no no no
Wage Info yes yes no yes no
Full Info yes yes yes yes yes
4.4.2 Hypotheses
In Baseline, consumers can neither infer the worker’s wage nor infer the manager’s
honesty. Thus, managers have strong incentives to lie to reduce their wage costs.
In Wage Info, honesty cannot directly be detected, while in Full Info, honesty is
perfectly observable. In the light of the recent literature, we should not expect
all managers to lie to their workers, even if consumers cannot detect it. Various
studies show that subjects are averse to lying (Gneezy, 2005; Lundquist et al.,
2009; Gneezy et al., 2013) and that the propensity to lie depends on the monetary
consequences of lying and is highly heterogeneous among subjects (Gibson et al.,
2013). Some subjects are even found to be “pure” lying averse, independent of the
monetary benefits from lying (Erat & Gneezy, 2012; López-Pérez & Spiegelman,
2013; Abeler et al., 2014). This leads to:
Hypothesis 4.1. Not all managers lie when the worker guessed right, independent
of the treatment.
The treatments may influence mangers’ honesty. The better consumers can
infer mangers’ honesty, the more honest managers can be assumed to be. Two
effects pointing in the same direction nurture this hypothesis. First, managers
having image concerns may be the more reluctant to lie, the more transparent
lying becomes (see, for example, Andreoni & Bernheim, 2009; Ariely, Bracha, &
Meier, 2009; Bénabou & Tirole, 2006). Second, managers that deem it possible
that consumers may react to honesty, may increase honesty, the better honesty
can be detected (see below). This leads to:
Hypothesis 4.2. Honesty increases in the information consumers receive (Full
Info > Wage Info > Baseline).
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There is experimental evidence that subjects are sensitive not only to the final
payoff allocation, but also to the procedure that produced the allocation (Frey
et al., 2004; Frey & Stutzer, 2005; Bolton et al., 2005). Ohtsubo et al. (2010)
show that “dishonesty provokes costly third-party punishment”.9 Thus, we may
expect that consumers not only take the final payoff distribution into account,
but also whether or not the allocation was achieved by dishonest actions. Even if
the dishonesty is vis-à-vis another participant, consumers may prefer not to buy
from a dishonest manager, to avoid participating in immoral behavior and to keep
a positive (self-) image while consuming (Bénabou & Tirole, 2006, 2011). These
considerations are reflected in positive λb, λw in our simple model of consumer
choice in Section 4.3 and lead to the following:
Hypothesis 4.3. Consumers with honesty concerns prefer to buy from an honest
manager, as long as the price is not too high. As a result, honest managers may
sell significantly more units than dishonest mangers (compare Section 4.3).
The effects described in hypotheses 4.2 and 4.3 impact on the wages paid. Since
increased honesty rates, in particular concerning the black lie (informing a worker
who guessed right that he guessed wrong), lead to increased wages, it follows:
Hypothesis 4.4. Wages increase in the information consumers receive (Full Info
> Wage Info > Baseline).
4.4.3 Experimental implementation
To account for learning effects, the stage-game market was repeated for 30 periods
with fixed roles and partner matching. During the experiment, assigned letters
A and B distinguished firms and consumers were assigned letters X and Y . We
framed the market by using the words “manager”, “worker”, “consumer”, “wage”,
“buying”, etc. But, as already mentioned in the treatment descriptions, we avoided
9The authors study trust games with uninvolved observers, who can costly punish the trustee.
The lower the trustee’s transfer, the higher is the punishment he receives. For all non-maximal
transfers, the punishment is higher when the trustee had signaled to send the maximal transfer
than when sending no signal.
80
4 The Competitive Advantage of Honesty
terms like honesty or lying.10 The state was called “state of the period” and was
the same for all groups in the same session.
We conducted six sessions of the experiment in November 2014 at the Cologne
Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER). We recruited subjects using ORSEE
(Greiner, 2004). Thirty subjects participated in every session, leading to 180
participants overall and ten independent observations (markets of six subjects)
for every treatment. At the beginning of the experiment, written instructions11
were distributed and read aloud. The experimental interaction was computerized
using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Sessions lasted between 95 and 120
minutes. Subjects received an initial endowment of 100 points and additional 5
points at the beginning of every period.12 After the experiment all points were
converted into Euro and paid in cash with an exchange rate of 1e for 30 points
plus an additional show-up fee of 2.50e. Average total earnings are 19.86e.
4.5 Results
We present the results of our experiment in this section. First, we analyze the
treatment differences regarding the managers’ honesty (Section 4.5.1), before we
present a deeper analysis of consumers’ decisions (Section 4.5.2). In Section 4.5.3,
we finally ask whether consumers’ behavior results in higher payoffs for honest
managers. In the following, all comparisons between treatments use the two-sided
Mann-Whitney U test (MWU) and all comparisons within treatments use the
two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test (WSR), unless stated otherwise. Table 4.2
provides an overview on the aggregated market outcomes.
10The managers were instructed to send information to the worker, whether the guess was right
or wrong and that this signal does not have to be true.
11English translations can be found in Section 4.7.3.
12The initial endowment and the roundly endowment could cover potential losses which are
possible for subjects in the roles of managers (from not trading or trading at prices lower
than costs). It never happened that a subject had a negative account in one point of time.
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Table 4.2: Aggregated market outcomes
Baseline Wage Info Full Info
Wage paid 3.65 (0.19) 4.40 (0.22) 4.60 (0.18)
Price offered 12.22 (2.14) 10.42 (1.04) 11.46 (1.21)
Worker is right 0.52 (0.02) 0.51 (0.02) 0.53 (0.02)
Manager signals “right” 0.16 (0.05) 0.35 (0.06) 0.40 (0.06)
Manager’s honesty (overall) 0.63 (0.06) 0.79 (0.05) 0.81 (0.05)
Manager’s honesty (if worker is wrong) 0.99 (0.01) 0.95 (0.03) 0.93 (0.02)
Manager’s honesty (if worker is right) 0.31 (0.10) 0.65 (0.10) 0.70 (0.09)
Units sold per firm 0.99 (0.01) 1.00 (0.00) 0.99 (0.00)
Payoff Manager 4.26 (1.96) 1.63 (0.94) 2.91 (1.07)
Payoff Consumer 18.97 (2.06) 21.02 (1.12) 19.42 (1.04)
Notes: The table reports averages and standard errors (in parentheses) based on independent observations.
4.5.1 Treatment effects on wages and honesty
Since guessing right is pure chance, we should expect that workers guess correctly
in about 50% of the cases. As row 3 in Table 4.2 shows, this is indeed the case.13
Thus, in half of the cases workers “deserve” a low wage of 3, while in the other
half they “deserve” a high wage of 7, resulting in an average wage of 5. As shown
in the first row of Table 4.2, wages are lower than 5 and increase with the amount
of information provided in the treatment. The average wage is lowest in Baseline
(3.65), significantly lower than in Wage Info (4.40, p=0.034) and Full Info (4.60,
p=0.007). There is no statistical difference between the wages in Wage Info and
Full Info (p=0.325). Thus, we partly confirm Hypothesis 4.4.
As shown in the sixth row of Table 4.2, the wage effects are not driven by the
cases in which the worker guessed wrong. In these cases, managers almost always
inform honestly and pay the low wage.14 Thus, we hardly observe any white lies.
The main treatment difference is in the black lies, where honesty is “expensive”
for the manager. If the worker guessed right, the managers honestly pay the high
wage in only 31% of the cases in Baseline. This is significantly lower than in Wage
13Workers guesses are statistically not different from chance, two-sided binomial probability test:
Baseline p=0.307, Wage Info p=0.713, Full Info p=0.153.
14Differences between honesty if worker guessed wrong: Baseline vs. Wage Info p=0.478, Base-
line vs. Full Info p=0.075, Wage Info vs. Full Info p=0.518.
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Info (65%, p=0.049) and Full Info (70%, p=0.023). There is no difference between
Wage Info and Full Info (p=0.734). Thus, we partly confirm Hypothesis 4.2.15
Honesty rates differ between managers (see Figure 4.5 in the Section 4.7.1).
In all three treatments, there are managers who are always honest if the worker
guessed right and managers who are always dishonest in that case. In Baseline
when honesty cannot be observed by consumers, about 15% of all mangers are
always honest. Although it looks as if the more information consumers receive,
the lower is the fraction of managers that always lie and the higher is the fraction
of managers that are always honest, these effects are not significant.16 Thus, we
see lying aversion, as formulated in Hypothesis 4.1.
A logistic panel regression on managers’ honesty in Table 4.3 summarizes the
effects from the non-parametric analysis. Independent variables are the interac-
tion of the treatment condition and the worker’s guess. The base category is a
wrong guess in Baseline, where the manager is honest with about 99% probability
(see Table 4.2). The first two coefficients show the decrease in the likelihood of
the manager’s honesty if the worker guessed wrong in the two treatments, here
also weakly significant for Wage Info. It might be that managers assume that
paying a high wage is a competitive advantage when consumers can observe it, so
that managers lie in this case to pay a high wage. However, as will be shown in
Table 4.6, a white lie does not increase consumers’ likelihood to buy. The next
three coefficients show a highly significant decrease in the likelihood of honesty if
the worker guesses right in all three treatments. But, this effect is significantly
stronger in Baseline, while the coefficients between Wage Info and Full Info are
not statistically different.17
Result 4.1. In all treatments, there is some degree of honesty and a fraction
of mangers that never lies (compare Hypothesis 4.1). Information significantly
15Of course, our design does not allow to strictly separate pure lying aversion, since every signal
is connected to the wage and therefore has a distributional implication.
16The share of managers who never tells a black lie is 15% in Baseline, 30% in Wage Info and
35% in Full Info. There is no statistical difference between treatments (Fisher’s exact test
2-sided, “always honest” vs. “not always honest” if worker guesses right): Baseline vs. Wage
Info p=0.451, Baseline vs. Full Info p=0.273, Wage Info vs. Full Info p=1.000.
17Wald test: Worker guesses right × Baseline=Worker guesses right × Wage Info, p=0.0015;
Worker guesses right × Baseline=Worker guesses right × Full Info, p=0.0001; Worker guesses
right × Wage Info=Worker guesses right × Full Info, p=0.4665.
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Table 4.3: Managers’ likelihood to be honest
Worker guesses wrong × Wage Info −1.660
∗
(0.892)
Worker guesses wrong × Full Info −1.765
∗∗
(0.891)
Worker guesses right × Baseline −6.689
∗∗∗
(0.635)
Worker guesses right × Wage Info −4.535
∗∗∗
(0.856)
Worker guesses right × Full Info −4.062
∗∗∗
(0.859)
Period −0.017
∗
(0.009)
Constant 5.771
∗∗∗
(0.740)
n 1800
groups 60
log l -572.87
chi2 250.26
Notes: Random-effects logistic regression, standard errors in parentheses,
clustered by manager id: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Dependent
variable: Honest.
increases the overall honesty compared to Baseline (compare Hypothesis 4.2). Due
to the increased honesty, wages are higher in the information treatments, compared
to the Baseline (compare Hypothesis 4.4). Interestingly, there are no differences
between the two information conditions regarding honesty or wages. The partial
information on honesty that may be inferred in Wage Info seems sufficient to
increase wages and honesty over Baseline.
4.5.2 Consumer choices
The two consumers may or may not buy, and when they buy, they can choose
between two potentially different offers. Table 4.4 shows the difference between
offers that are accepted (at least one consumer buys) and offers that are rejected
(no consumer buys). In all treatments, prices of accepted offers are considerably
and significantly lower than the prices of rejected offers. While there is no difference
between wages of accepted and rejected offers in Baseline and Full Info, the wages
of accepted offers are weakly significantly higher in Wage Info. In Full Info, the
average honesty is significantly higher for accepted than for rejected offers.
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Table 4.4: Average managers’ offers dependent on sells
Treatment Variable Accepted Rejected Differences(sold 1 or 2) (sold nothing) (WSR)
Baseline
Price 10.92 (2.07) 14.02 (2.25) p=0.005 (n = 10)
Wage 3.59 (0.20) 3.74 (0.22) p=0.285 (n = 10)
Honesty 0.60 (0.06) 0.67 (0.06) p=0.028 (n = 10)
Wage Info
Price 8.89 (1.11) 12.71 (0.99) p=0.005 (n = 10)
Wage 4.69 (0.29) 3.94 (0.20) p=0.075 (n = 10)
Honesty 0.79 (0.06) 0.79 (0.05) p=0.959 (n = 10)
Full Info
Price 10.42 (1.08) 13.14 (1.44) p=0.005 (n = 10)
Wage 4.68 (0.19) 4.38 (0.29) p=0.333 (n = 10)
Honesty 0.85 (0.04) 0.72 (0.07) p=0.032 (n = 10)
Notes: The table reports averages and standard errors (in parentheses) based on independent observations.
Table 4.5 provides information on market constellations that deserve special
attention. In Baseline, we focus on the cases in which the two firms ask for different
prices. In those cases, consumers buy the cheaper good in 96% of the cases. In
Wage Info, we focus on situations where firms pay different wages. Although one
firm pays the low and the other firm pays the high wage, the prices asked are
almost identical. Yet, the firm paying the high wage sells more units and has a
higher profit. In Full Info, we focus on two interesting cases, which provide first
impressions on whether consumers reward honesty. We already discussed these
cases in the interpretation of Figure 4.3. The first case features the situation that
both workers guessed right; yet one manger honestly pays the high wage, while the
other manager is dishonest and pays the low wage. The table shows that the honest
manager, who has to bear the higher wage costs, asks for a considerably higher
price (9.29) than the dishonest manger (6.71). Nonetheless, the honest manager
sells considerably more units (1.46) than the dishonest manager (0.54), sufficient to
make a considerably higher profit (5.00) than the dishonest manager (1.50). The
second case features the situation that both managers pay the low wage. While
one manager is honest and pays the low wage to a worker that guessed wrong,
the other manger dishonestly pays the low wage to a worker who guessed right.
Both managers ask for very similar prices (11.16 and 12.21, respectively), despite
their different total production costs (9 and 3, respectively). The table shows
that the honest manager sells considerably more units (1.42) than the dishonest
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Table 4.5: Consumer choices for special market constellations
Baseline Price Sells Market share Payoff
low price vs. 12.12 (0.44) 1.90 (0.02) 96 % 16.55 (0.87)
high price 15.66 (0.48) 0.08 (0.02) 4 % −5.52 (0.35)
Wage Info Price Sells Market share Payoff
high wage vs. 11.53 (0.52) 1.27 (0.08) 64 % 5.83 (1.14)
low wage firm 11.51 (0.59) 0.73 (0.08) 36 % −1.32 (0.91)
FullInfo Price Sells Market share Payoff
right guess, honesty vs. 9.29 (1.08) 1.46 (0.12) 73 % 5.00 (1.60)
right guess, dishonesty 6.71 (0.84) 0.54 (0.12) 27 % 1.50 (1.40)
wrong guess, honesty 11.16 (0.80) 1.42 (0.11) 74 % 6.05 (1.65)
right guess, dishonesty vs. 12.21 (1.23) 0.51 (0.10) 26 % 1.30 (1.07)
Notes: The table reports averages and standard errors (in parentheses) based on individual observations.
manager (0.51), sufficient to make a considerably higher profit (6.05) than the
dishonest manager (1.30). Both examples already indicate that consumers reward
manager’s honesty.
The statistical analysis of this observation is provided in Table 4.6. Here, we re-
port an alternative-specific conditional logit model (McFadden, 1974). The choice
model specifies for every single decision of a consumer in a period (called case) the
available alternatives for the consumer, represented by the two potentially different
offers.18 Alternative-specific variables are the attributes of an offer, i.e., price and
the information about wage and honesty. The dependent variable is Buy, which
equals one for the accepted offer. As a case-specific variable, we include period,
which is not significant and not reported.
In all treatments, the price has a highly significantly negative influence. In Wage
Info the wage has a significant positive influence on consumer choices. The high
wage may be interpreted as a strong signal for honesty. In Full Info, we compare
the four different constellations of manager’s honesty and worker’s guess. The base
category is a wrong guess and a manager that honestly pays the low wage. The
third row of Table 4.6 shows that consumers’ propensity to buy is not increased
if a manager dishonestly pays the higher wage. Hence, consumers’ propensity to
18We exclude the theoretical third alternative, not buy, form the analysis since it is almost never
chosen.
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Table 4.6: Consumers’ likelihood to buy
Baseline Wage Info Full Info
Price −1.664
∗∗ −0.964∗∗∗ −0.949∗∗∗
(0.765) (0.260) (0.201)
High wage 1.624
∗∗∗
(0.436)
Wrong guess & dishonesty −0.012(0.706)
Right guess & dishonesty −2.313
∗∗∗
(0.573)
Right guess & honesty 0.845
∗∗∗
(0.262)
n 1190 1200 1190
cases 595 600 595
log pseudol -197.05 -226.86 -270.47
Wald chi2 5.35 23.34 73.33
Notes: Alternative-specific conditional logit model (McFadden’s choice model) for the cases in which con-
sumers buy. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by consumer id: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05,
∗∗∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable: Buy. High wage is a binary variable that is one (w=7), when the manager
sends the signal that the worker guessed right and it is zero (w=3), when the manager send the signal that
the guess is wrong. Case-specific variables (not reported, not significant): Period.
buy is not increased by telling a white lie. But, consumers strongly react to black
lies. Consumers’ propensity to buy is significantly decreased if managers lie to
pay the low wage (compare line 4) and significantly increased if they honestly pay
the high wage (compare line 5). Notice that this strong reaction to lying is the
more remarkable as we deliberately did not use morally loaded wordings as “lying”
or “dishonesty” in the experiment. Consumers received information on the true
state S, the worker’s guess and the manager’s information, and by comparing this
information, they could detect manager’s dishonesty. It may well be that the effect
gets even stronger when using a morally loaded wording.
Result 4.2. In Full Info when managers’ honesty is fully transparent, consumers
reward honest and punish dishonest managers in case the worker “deserves” the
high wage (compare Hypothesis 4.3). In Wage Info when only wage information is
provided, the high wage significantly increases the consumers’ likelihood to buy.
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4.5.3 Profitability of being honest
This section sheds light on the question whether the observed consumer behavior
makes honesty profitable for managers. Table 4.7 analyzes the cases where honesty
is expensive, i.e. paying a high wage to a worker who guessed right. The table
shows that in none of the treatments, an honest manger asks for a higher price
than a dishonest manager does. In Baseline, honesty significantly reduces the
manager’s profit. When there is only wage information (Wage Info), being honest
neither reduces nor increases the payoff compared to a dishonest manager. Under
Full Info, however, honest managers not only sell significantly more units, they
also make significantly higher profits.19 The fact that under Full Info honest
managers sell significantly more units than dishonest managers, yields support for
the assumption of an aversion of being involved in a dishonest trade (i.e. λb > 0
in equation 4.7).
The analyses of the previous subsections showed that wages as well as honesty
levels are not significantly different between the two information treatments Wage
Info and Full Info. We explained this by the strong honesty signal a high wage
sends in Wage Info. Indeed, the payoffs of honest mangers in Wage Info and Full
Info are not significantly different (p=0.821). The difference lies in the dishonest
managers: in Full Info dishonest managers receive a significantly lower payoff
than honest ones, while this is not the case in Wage Info. The explanation may
be as follows. In Full Info, a dishonest manager is unambiguously identified and
“punished” by dishonesty averse consumers. In Wage Info, however, a low wage is
not a clear signal of dishonesty. A low wage may be the appropriate wage for the
worker who guessed wrong or resulting from a lie to the worker who guessed right.
It seems that this ambiguity is sufficient to preclude dishonest mangers from being
punished by dishonesty averse consumers (in dubio pro reo). This observation is
in line with experimental findings that punishment is reduced if norm-violators
cannot be identified unambiguously (Feess, Schramm, & Wohlschlegel, 2014) and
that subjects with a social value orientation underestimate norm violation of others
(Irlenbusch & Ter Meer, 2013).
19Compared to Table 4.6, in Table 4.7 we compare only honest versus dishonest behavior in all
cases (independent of the competitor’s choice). See Table 4.8 in Section 4.7.1 for the average
sales and the resulting payoffs regarding different competition conditions.
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Table 4.7: Average managers’ profit when workers guessed right
Treatment Variable Low wage High wage Differences(lying) (honesty) (WSR)
Baseline
Price offered 12.22 (2.24) 13.76 (2.10) p=0.169 (n = 10)
Units sold 1.12 (0.06) 0.70 (0.12) p=0.028 (n = 10)
Profit 9.81 (2.69) 1.70 (1.90) p=0.005 (n = 10)
Wage Info
Price offered 9.86 (1.44) 10.81 (1.04) p=0.594 (n = 9)
Units sold 0.84 (0.14) 1.17 (0.08) p=0.441 (n = 9)
Profit 3.34 (1.62) 4.15 (2.04) p=0.767 (n = 9)
Full Info
Price offered 10.27 (1.87) 11.41 (1.36) p=0.594 (n = 9)
Units sold 0.67 (0.14) 1.14 (0.08) p=0.021 (n = 9)
Profit 2.11 (1.10) 4.31 (0.94) p=0.066 (n = 9)
Notes: The table reports averages and standard errors (in parentheses) based on independent observations
when the worker guesses right. There is a high variance of honest behavior if the worker guesses right. In
Wage Info and Full Info there is one group each where both managers are always honest, so there are only 9
independent observations.
Result 4.3. Honesty is highly unprofitable when it is not observed by consumers
(Baseline). In Wage Info, the profits of honest and dishonest managers are not
different. When consumers have Full Info on managers’ honesty, however, being
honest is significantly more profitable for suppliers than being dishonest.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we experimentally study the influence of producers’ honesty on
consumers’ purchasing decisions. We find that when consumers have full trans-
parency on producers’ honesty, being honest provides a competitive advantage.
Honest firms make higher profits by selling more units, albeit not at higher prices.
The synopsis of the treatments shows that this result only holds when producers’
honesty is fully transparent. When the market provides strong signals for honesty,
but leaves consumers with some uncertainty (as in Wage Info), being honest is not
more profitable than being dishonest, but also not less profitable. When honesty
information is completely absent, honesty is detrimental for the firm’s profit (as
in the case of Baseline). The competitive advantage of honesty in Full Info is
consistent with the assumption of a disutility from being involved in a dishonest
transaction that is independent of any social preferences concerning the final payoff
allocation, as assumed in our simple model of consumer choice.
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Our findings extend the literature on consumer social responsibility by showing
that a firm’s honesty – apart from allocative preferences – is an important decision
criterion in consumer choice. Yet, they show that in order to exploit the competi-
tive advantage of honesty, the firm (or any party interested in promoting honesty)
has to strive for full transparency on the honesty of the market participants.
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Figures and Tables
Figure 4.1: Consumption decisions for (α = 0, β = 0, λb = λw = 0)
Figure 4.1 displays the consumer decisions for a consumer with utility function
(4.5) and selfish preferences (α = 0, β = 0, λb = λw = 0). Every square represents
all price combinations of a specific market situation, for example, in first row,
fourth column: “A: RH, B: WH” means that the worker of firm A guessed right
(R) and manager A honestly (H) paid the high wage, and in firm B the worker
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guessed wrong (W) and the manager honestly (H) paid the low wage. The figure
shows that the consumers do simply buy at the low price firm.
Figure 4.2: Consumption decisions for (α = 0, β = 0, λb = 0.5, λw = 0.1)
Figure 4.2 displays the consumer decisions for a consumer with utility function
(4.5), who is interested in his own monetary income and is dishonesty averse (α =
0, β = 0, λb = 0.5, λw = 0.1). Dishonesty makes the product more "expensive" for
the consumer and has the same effect as a price increase by 4 ·λb in case of a black
lie and 4 · λw in case of a white lie.
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Figure 4.3: Consumption decisions for (α = 1.5, β = 0.5, λb = λw = 0)
Figure 4.3 displays the consumer decisions for a consumer with utility function
(4.5), assuming very high inequity aversion and no disutility from buying at a firm
with a dishonest manager (α = 1.5, β = 0.5, λb = λw = 0).20 The figure shows
that consumers do not buy if both prices are relative high, since the disutility of
disadvantageous inequality is higher than the own monetary payoff. The consumer
buys at the firm which offers the lower price, if both firms have the same produc-
tion costs (both workers guessed right or both workers guessed wrong). Note, in
these cases with price ranges expected in a Bertrand duopoly, the inequity averse
20For experimental results on the distribution of α and β see, for example, Fehr and Schmidt
(1999); Blanco et al. (2011).
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consumer does not behave different from the selfish consumer. In case of different
production costs, the consumer prefers there firm were the worker guessed right,
if the prices are not too high (lower than or equal to 16.5) and price differences
not higher than 6. In these cases the consumer has the highest payoff and inequity
is reduced in firms with lower production costs. Note, again the consumer does
not care for honesty. When the consumer has the highest payoff, “honesty” only
distributes income between manager and worker, but does not influence the total
disutility from inequity
Figure 4.4: Consumption decisions for (α = 1.5, β = 0.5, λb = 0.5, λw = 0.1)
Figure 4.4 displays the consumer decisions for a consumer with utility function
(4.5), assuming inequity aversion as well as disutility from buying at a firm with
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a dishonest manager (α = 1.5, β = 0.5, λb = 0.5, λw = 0.1). The figure shows that
the consumer does not buy when both prices are very high and buying would result
in highly unequal payoffs between consumer, manager and worker. If two offers
are similar regarding wage and honesty, consumers choose the cheaper offer. But,
consumers prefer honest firms over dishonest firms, see for example fourth row,
third column. The honest (high wage) firm A even sells at considerably higher
prices than the dishonest firm B.
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of managers’ honesty if worker guesses right
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Table 4.8: Managers’ sales and payoffs
Wage Info
Lower Price Equal Price Higher Price
Lower Wage Sales 1.40 (0.14) 0.43 (0.16) 0.04 (0.04)Payoff 5.41 (2.13) −4.07 (1.04) −7.29 (0.75)
Equal Wage Sales 1.93 (0.03) 1.00 (0.10) 0.07 (0.03)Payoff 10.31 (1.51) 1.34 (1.11) −6.76 (0.62)
Higher Wage Sales 1.96 (0.04) 1.57 (0.16) 0.60 (0.14)Payoff 10.73 (2.51) 7.30 (2.45) −2.28 (1.72)
Full Info Info
Lower Price Equal Price Higher Price
Lower Wage Sales 1.27 (0.15) 0.64 (0.14) 0.00 (0.00)Payoff 5.78 (1.79) −1.61 (1.77) −9.00 (0.00)
Equal Wage Sales 1.59 (0.10) 1.00 (0.13) 0.37 (0.10)Payoff 7.95 (1.60) 2.25 (1.42) −3.87 (1.05)
Higher Wage Sales 2.00 (0.00) 1.36 (0.14) 0.73 (0.15)Payoff 10.60 (3.04) 5.66 (2.20) −0.69 (2.27)
Full Info Info
Lower Price Equal Price Higher Price
Lower Honesty Sales 1.12 (0.15) 0.38 (0.18) 0.01 (0.01)Payoff 3.02 (1.66) −1.19 (0.90) −8.34 (2.22)
Equal Honesty Sales 1.74 (0.08) 1.00 (0.08) 0.25 (0.08)Payoff 10.40 (1.57) 2.54 (1.37) −5.89 (0.88)
Higher Honesty Sales 1.94 (0.04) 1.63 (0.18) 0.87 (0.15)Payoff 8.57 (2.45) 4.19 (3.04) 1.35 (2.18)
Notes: The table reports averages and standard errors (in parentheses) based on independent observations.
Managers’ sales and payoff depending on offering a lower, equal or higher price and on the differences in wage
and honesty.
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4.7.2 The consumer’s choice model with ERC preferences
In Section 4.3, we assume that consumers with social preferences have preferences
of the Fehr and Schmidt type. In the following we show that we achieve qualita-
tively similar results, if we instead assume that consumers have ERC-preferences
(Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000) towards the firm the consumer purchases from.21 For
formulating the ERC-preferences, we assume a utility function of the functional
form as proposed in Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). Assume a consumer’s utility
from the monetary allocation to be as follows:
M(m,x) =

0 if x = 0
(30− pA)− 13γ
(
30−pA
30−cA
)2
if x = A
(30− pB)− 13γ
(
30−pB
30−cB
)2
if x = B
If the consumer does not buy (x = 0), she only cares about her own monetary
income that is zero. If the consumer buys at firm A, (30−pA) is the own monetary
payoff from buying at firm A and the term (30− cA) is the total monetary payoff
from buying at firm A. The γ-term expresses the disutility from comparing the
consumer’s relative monetary payoff to the equal split. Exemplarily, we choose
γ = 30, as this is the highest possible total payoff (if the worker guessed right).
Figure 4.6 visualizes consumer decisions for consumers with ERC-preferences
without any disutility from buying at a dishonest firm. If both firms have the
same production costs, the total monetary output from buying is independent of
where the consumer buys and thus the consumer prefers the cheaper offer. Only if
both firms offer the maximal price, the consumer prefers not to buy to avoid the
disutility from inequity. If both firms have different production costs, the consumer
prefers the low cost firm and accepts a price premium if both prices are very low
to reduce disutility from inequity (similar to Fehr and Schmidt preferences). The
honest or dishonest behavior of managers does not influence consumers’ decisions
since this does not change the consumers’ payoff shares.
Figure 4.7 shows consumer decisions for an ERC consumer with a disutility
from buying at a dishonest firm. If the consumer additionally has preferences for
buying at an honest firm, there are two differences. First, the “area of rejection”
at high prices is increased due to the disutility from buying at dishonest firms.
Second, consumers accept a price premium for honest firms. See, for example, row
4-column 3, the consumer prefers the offer of (honest) firm A even if the price is
a little higher than the price of (dishonest) firm B.
21For simplicity, we assume again that a consumer does not care for all agents on the market,
but for those she interacts with.
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Figure 4.6: Consumption decisions for (γ = 30, λb = λw = 0)
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Figure 4.7: Consumption decisions for (γ = 30, β = 0.5, λb = 0.5, λw = 0.1)
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4.7.3 Instructions
Here we present the instructions for the treatment Full Info. It serves as examples
as all instructions are formulated in a similar way. The only treatment differences
are the information conditions (given by bullet 1 in “Step 4: Actions of the Con-
sumers”). The original instructions were in German and the one listed below is a
translation into English.
Instructions for the experiment
General information We welcome you to this economic experiment. It is very important
that you read the following explanations carefully. If you have any questions, please direct them
to us.
In this experiment, you can earn money depending on your own decisions and the decisions
of the other participants.
During the experiment, you are not allowed to talk with other participants of the experiment.
Non-compliance with this rule results in exclusion from the experiment and all payments. All
decisions are taken anonymously, i.e., none of the other participants learns the identity of the
participant who has taken a specific decision. Payment is anonymous as well, i.e., no participant
learns the payments of the other participants.
During the experiment, your entire income is calculated in points. In the end of the experiment,
the total number of points that you earned during the experiment is converted into Euro, where
40 points = 1 Euro.
At the end of today’s experiment, you receive the number of points earned during the experiment
plus 2.50 e show-up fee in cash. In addition, at the beginning of the experiment, you receive
an initial endowment of 100 points. On the following pages, we will explain to you the detailed
procedure of the experiment.
Information about the experiment
Course of the experiment
• The experiment consists of 30 rounds, and each round has the same structure.
• You are part of a group with 6 members. During the entire experiment, you exclusively
interact with the members of your group. The composition of the group remains the same
across all rounds.
Companies, managers, workers, and consumers
• There are two companies (A and B) and two consumers (X and Y).
• Each of the two companies consists of a manager and a worker. At the beginning of the
experiment, it is randomly determined which manager and which worker form company
A, and which manager and which worker form company B. This assignment remains
unchanged over the entire course of the experiment.
• Which role you are assigned to is randomly determined at the beginning of the experiment,
and remains unchanged during the entire course of the experiment. Please note that your
role allows for no conclusions about your identity.
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Production
• In both companies the worker produces several units of an identical good.
• Each round is randomly assigned a state: “Red” or “Blue” with a probability of 50%
each. At the beginning of each round, the company’s worker guesses the current state.
If the worker’s guess is correct, the company has no production costs. If the worker’s
guess is wrong, the company has production costs of 6 points. The workers do not
learn the true state of the round.
Production Costs
State “Red” State “Blue”
Worker guesses “Red” 0 6
Worker guesses “Blue” 6 0
• A company’s manager learns the true state of the round. The manager informs the worker
if his guess was correct or wrong. This information can be, but it does not have to be
true. If the manager informs the worker that his guess was correct, he will pay him a
wage of 7 points. If the manager informs the worker that his guess was wrong, he
will pay him a wage of 3 points.
Wage
Manager informs the worker that his guess was correct 7
Manager informs the worker that his guess was wrong 3
• A company’s manager determines the price at which the company offers the good (integers
between 0 and 30 points).
Purchase
• Each consumer can buy up to one unit of the good and decides whether he buys the
goods from company A, from company B or whether he does not buy the good. The good
has a value of 30 points to each of two consumers.
• If a consumer buys the good from company A, he will pay the price set by the manager of
company A. If a consumer buys at company B, he will pay the price set by the manager of
company B. By a purchase, a consumer receives 30 points less the price paid. A consumer
who does not buy a good receives 0 points.
Consumer Profit
Consumer buys a unit of the good 30 - price
Consumer does not buy a unit 0
• The number of goods a company sells depends on the purchasing decisions of the two
consumers. Therefore, a company can sell none, one or two units.
Income in each round Each participant receives a round endowment of 5 points in
each round. The rest of the income depends on the decisions as follows:
• The number of goods a company sells depends on the purchasing decisions of the two
consumers. Therefore, a company can sell none, one or two units.
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Income of the participants in a round
Manager:
Income = Round endowment
+Price of the good × Number of units sold
-Productions costs
{
0 if the worker guessed correctly
6 if the worker guessed wrong
-Wage
{
7 if the manager informs the worker that he guessed correctly
3 if the manager informs the worker that he guessed wrong
Worker:
Income = Round endowment
+Wage
{
7 if the manager informs the worker that he guessed correctly
3 if the manager informs the worker that he guessed wrong
Consumer:
Income = Round endowment
+Consumer Profit
{
30− Price if the consumer buys
0 if the consumer does not buy
Course of the experiment Before the start of the first round, you are informed about
your role (manager A, worker A, manager B, worker B, consumer X or consumer Y). All rounds
take place according to the following scheme:
• Step 0: State of the round
– The state of the round is randomly drawn. With a probability of 50%, it is “Red”
and with a probability of 50%, it is “Blue”.
• Step 1: Actions of the workers
– The workers guess the state of the round.
– The workers produce the units of the good.
• Step 2: Actions of the workers and the managers
– The managers learn the state of the round and the guess of their worker.
– The managers inform the workers whether their guess was correct or not (this in-
formation can be, but it does not have to be true) and about the resulting wage.
– The managers determine the price of the good.
• Step 3: Actions of the consumers
– The consumers learn the state of the round, the workers’ guesses as well as the
information sent by the managers to the workers whether their guesses were correct
or not and the resulting wages.
– The consumers learn the price of the good of company A and the price of the good
of company B.
– The consumers decide whether and at which company they buy a unit of the good.
• Step 4: Information
– The workers receive the information from their managers whether their guess was
correct or not as well as the resulting wage.
– Both managers learn the guess of the respective other worker and receive the infor-
mation sent by the other manager to the worker whether the guess was correct or
not.
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Total income
Your total income is the sum of the incomes of all rounds plus the initial endowment of 100
points.
Good luck!
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5 Reward Power and Lying in
Self-Reports
5.1 Introduction
Teamwork is characterized by the use of individual inputs to build a joint output.
Since it involves a tension between individual and collective interest, teamwork
is prone to the same crucial problem as a social dilemma: potential cooperation
breakdown due to free riding of some teammates on others’ contributions or efforts
(for a comprehensive review of social dilemmas see van Lange, Joireman, Parks,
& van Dijk, 2013). Performance-contingent rewards offer a possible solution to
overcome shirking in teams (Lazear, 1995). Indeed, organizations often pay their
employees performance-based salaries, as many of Fortune 500 companies (Boyle,
2001). Abundant evidence shows that rewards like performance pay have a positive
effect on employees’ effort if they are closely related to individual performance (for
an overview, see, for example, Milkovich & Newman, 2008).
In most firms, it is the supervisors’ task to link individual effort and payment.
Evaluating individual performance accurately, however, is often difficult or even
impossible. Consider, for instance, a supervisor, who has to evaluate the members
of a creative team. In such teams, many ideas and solutions arise from sessions of
brainstorming and it is difficult to judge who contributed what amount of effort
and what the corresponding value is. One possible way to gather information
about individual efforts is to ask the teammates for their self-assessments. Indeed,
self-reports are frequently used in performance evaluations complementary to other
sources, for example in multi-source or 360-degree feedback processes (Campbell
& Lee, 1988; Chen & Kemp, 2012).
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The empirical evidence from the organizational literature is inconclusive about
the effectiveness of self-reports (for a review see Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004)
and poses the question of whether self-reports really do add any value to an effec-
tive performance evaluation. Furthermore, it is not clear as to how self-reports
ultimately affect a team’s performance (Shore & Tashchian, 2002). Previous
questionnaire-studies from the organizational literature show that teammates tend
to overestimate their own efforts or even deliberately lie about their actual efforts
(Campbell & Lee, 1988). Recent experimental studies show that a substantial
amount of people does indeed lie if self-reports have monetary consequences and
cannot be verified (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). On the other hand, many
people show a lying aversion that varies to different extents (see, for example,
Erat & Gneezy, 2012; Gibson et al., 2013; Gneezy et al., 2013; Hoffmann, Lauer,
& Rockenbach, 2013). A recent representative survey confirms the existence of
lying costs in the population (Abeler et al., 2014). The stylized facts from the em-
pirical studies mentioned above is that lying behavior is heterogeneous and context
dependent.
In this study, we systematically investigate the effectiveness of self-reports in
team production. Our main research question is to what extent the existence and
the reward allocation power of a supervisor induces teammates to state more truth-
ful self-reports, compared to a situation in which the supervisor lacks such reward
power. To answer our research question, we consider two different mechanisms,
which vary with respect to supervisor’s reward power. The first mechanism forces
the supervisor to allocate performance pay according to an exogenously given rule,
which is publicly known ex-ante. One could consider this mechanism as a primitive
form of a forced distribution system (FDS). The former CEO of General Electric
Jack Welch popularized the use of the FDS that contain rigid instructions how to
allocate rewards, for example, “fire the least productive 10% of your personnel”.
The empirical findings on the effectiveness of such systems, however, are mixed
(Stewart, Gruys, & Storm, 2010). While FDS can provide powerful incentives for
high performers, they may unsecure middle and low performers and damage their
working morale. Another possible detrimental effect of an FDS is that it may
render the team supervisor ineffective as a “lame-duck” who has only to follow a
rule created by a higher-level authority (“firm policy”). When the reward scheme
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is “written in stone” this may lead low performers to cheat heavily in order to
avoid an unfavorable classification.
We hypothesize that giving the supervisor (strong) reward power might increase
her effectiveness in obtaining more truthful self-reports. In order to investigate
this, we consider a second mechanism that enables the supervisor to allocate re-
wards at his or her own discretion without sending any signals in advance. In
this case, it is not straightforward how payment is linked to effort. The uncer-
tainty about the monetary consequences of self-reports reduces the incentives to
lie and may lead to more truthful self-reports. Thus, the detrimental effects of
self-reports may be less problematic in a setting with a supervisor provided with
reward power compared to a setting in which rewards allocation is hard-wired.
With the following four steps, we systematically investigate our main research
question. (i) To what extent do teammates exaggerate their efforts when the al-
location of performance pay is exogenous (forced distribution)? (ii) Is teammates’
reporting behavior different when a supervisor with reward power endogenously
decides on performance pay compared to a situation when the allocation rule is
exogenous (and the supervisor is only an observer)? (iii) Are supervisors able to
allocate incentive-compatible payments when receiving self-reports as effectively
as when they are able to monitor true individual efforts? (iv) Finally, what is the
ultimate effect of self-reports on team performance?
We find: (i) Teammates systematically exaggerate their efforts when reporting.
(ii) They exaggerate less when the supervisor has reward power than when the
payments are allocated exogenously. (iii) The supervisor’s rewarding behavior does
not change, irrespective of whether the supervisor observes true individual efforts
or self-reports. (iv) The exaggerations in self-reports have detrimental effects on
team performance. These effects are less pronounced if the supervisor has reward
power and allocates performance pays endogenously than when the payments are
distributed exogenously.
In this study, we utilize a controlled laboratory setting to investigate our research
question. Laboratory experiments allow the unveiling of casual relationships be-
tween the variables of interest. Since previous non-laboratory studies lacked the
possibility to observe true efforts, they could not quantify the frequency and mag-
nitude of the exaggerations in self-reported effort information. To understand the
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effects and the value of self-reports, however, it is important to know the direction
and amount of deviances from true (actual) efforts. We designed this experimen-
tal study to detect truthfulness in self-reports in a quantifiable way. To our best
knowledge, this is the first experimental study concerning the effects of self-reports
on team performance. Additionally, our study contributes to the growing exper-
imental literature on lying and other unethical behavior in the workplace. While
there are many papers investigating lying, the literature on lying in team context
is scarce. Hence, this study contributes to the lying literature showing lying in a
team setting. Finally, the findings of this study are also relevant for the leadership
literature.
5.2 A simple model of team production
We consider a work team pretty much in the spirit of Alchian and Demsetz (1972),
consisting of three productive teammates and a supervisor. To capture the tension
between individual and collective interest in a work team, we utilize a slightly
modified public goods game. Each teammate i is endowed with ET tokens and
decides how many tokens to contribute to the team project, i.e., his or her effort
choice ei (with 0 ≤ ei ≤ ET ). The tokens not contributed, ET − ei, go into
the own private account of teammate i. Each token contributed to the team
project is multiplied by the productivity factor M , with M3 < 1 < M . The team
output, R, is the sum of the efforts W = ∑3i=1 ei, multiplied by the productivity
factor M , i.e., R = M ·W . To conduct a committed observation and action, the
supervisor receives a compensation that partly depends on the team output. The
team output is allocated among the three teammates and the supervisor as follows:
R is divided into three parts: αR, βR and γR, with α + β + γ = 1. The first
part, αR, describes a variable team payment that depends on the overall team
performance, and is equally distributed to the teammates. Hence, independent
of the individual effort, each teammate receives α3R. One could interpret αR as
the non-separable part of team output, which the supervisor cannot attribute to a
single teammate. One could interpret αR also as a group-based reward honoring
the group’s performance as a whole. Firms utilize such rewards frequently (see, for
example, Zenger &Marshall, 2000). The second part, βR, represents the individual
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Figure 5.1: Basic model of efforts and payoff in our teamwork setting
performance-contingent pay, the individual reward. Each teammate receives a
share si of βR, with
∑3
i=1 si = 1. The last part, γR, is used to compensate the
supervisor. Additionally, the supervisor receives a fixed payment of ES tokens.
Since the compensation of the supervisor depends partly on the team output, the
supervisor has an interest in the team output being as large as possible. Figure 5.1
visualizes our model. Equations (5.1) and (5.2) state the payoffs for a teammate
and the supervisor respectively:
Πi = ET − ei + 13αR + siβR, i = 1, 2, 3 (5.1)
ΠS = ES + γR. (5.2)
In our design, we set the parameters as follows: M = 2, α = γ = 14 , β =
1
2 ,
ET = 20 and ES = 10.1 With these parameters, we can re-formulate the payoffs
as follows:
Πi = 20− ei + 16
3∑
j=1
ej + si
3∑
j=1
ej, i = 1, 2, 3 (5.3)
ΠS = 10 +
1
2
3∑
j=1
ej. (5.4)
1We choose these parameter values for two reasons. First, they allow us to keep the marginal
per capita return (MPCR) close to the value of most previous experiments on public good
provision. In our setup, the MPCR amounts to (α+β)·M3 = 12 . Second, our set of parameters
eases the task of the supervisor. Since the endogenously distributed part of the team-output
equals the sum of efforts, the appropriate (incentive-compatible) proportional share is equal
to each teammate’s effort.
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From (5.4), it is easy to see that the supervisor’s payoff is maximized if all team-
mates contribute their full endowment to the team project, i.e., if each teammate
exerts full effort. The supervisor can induce maximum efforts by distributing the
variable part, βR, of the team output proportional2 to the teammates’ relative
efforts, i.e., by choosing the shares such that si = eiW . In this case, a teammate’s
payoff is
Πi = 20 +
1
6
3∑
j=1
ej. (5.5)
As can be seen in 5.5, full effort is a strictly dominant strategy for every teammate.
Hence, assuming full information, there is a Nash equilibrium (of the stage game),
where the supervisor should allocate a performance pay share to each teammate
proportional to his or her effort rate (compared to the team’s total effort). A
supervisor who simply distributes rewards equally among the teammates, si = 13 ,
would change each teammate’s profit in (5.3) to Πi = 20 − ei + 12
∑3
j=1 ej. This
change transforms the strategic situation in a public good game with a marginal
per capita rate of 12 and a unique Nash equilibrium in which all teammates con-
tribute zero. In public good experiments, however, subjects do contribute positive
amounts (Chaudhuri, 2011). Thus, under equal distribution of βR, we expect
effort levels comparable to previous public good experiments. The positive exter-
nality of contributions on the supervisor’s payoff in our setting, however, might
have an effect on teammates’ efforts. Engel and Rockenbach (2011), for instance,
find that in a public good experiment with a non-contributing bystander, efforts
were lower than in the standard setting without a bystander.
5.3 Experimental design and procedures
The experiment consists of 20 rounds, in which subjects play the game explained
above. Before the first round, subjects are randomly allocated into groups of four.
2The proportional distribution scheme is not the only scheme that incentivizes the teammates
to high effort levels, for example, “the winner takes it all” is another incentive-compatible
payment scheme. Yet we consider the proportional allocation to be the most obvious one
under the given parameters. The results in section 5.5 show that the great majority of
supervisors stick to the proportional distribution rule.
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In each group, one subject is randomly assigned as the supervisor and three sub-
jects as teammates.3 The subjects’ roles as well as the group matching remain
unchanged during the experiment. Each group constitutes an independent obser-
vation.
5.3.1 Treatments
In order to investigate our research questions, we apply a 2× 2 full fractional de-
sign. First, we vary the information that the supervisor receives. The supervisor
is informed about either the true individual efforts or the teammates’ self-reports.
Second, we manipulate how the performance pay βR is distributed. In the exoge-
nous treatments Forced and Forced-SR, rewards are distributed exogenously
and proportionally to the actual or reported amounts. In the endogenous treat-
ments Free and Free-SR, the supervisor allocates βR at her own discretion.
This means, in the Forced treatments, the supervisor is an observer with no
distributive power, and is paid according to the supervisor’s payoff function (com-
pare Equation (5.4)). The performance pay shares si are determined proportional;
either according to the self-reports or to the actual efforts. In the treatment we
name Forced, the supervisor observes the true individual efforts, ei, so the pro-
portional distribution mechanism implies: si = eiW . In the treatment Forced-SR,
the si, are determined according to the self-reports, i.e., si = ri∑3
i=1 ri
, with r being
the self-report of player i and ∑3i=1 ri being the sum of the reported efforts. In the
Free treatments, the supervisor discretionally decides about si. In the treatment
we name Free, before deciding, the supervisor is informed about the true efforts,
while in the treatment Free-SR the supervisor receives the self-reports. Table
5.1 displays our 2× 2 experimental design.
In addition to the four treatments introduced above, we conduct a “baseline”
treatment named Equal, which uses a simple equal split as a FDS, i.e., each
teammate’s performance pay share equals si = 13 . This transforms the game into a
standard public-goods game, with the supervisor as bystander, since αR as well as
3We are aware of the relevance of legitimating the supervisor by implementing some sort of
selection process. However, considering different forms of appointment would have added
another dimension to our design. Therefore, we use a random selection process, from which
we expect the smallest impact on actual efforts and allocation decisions.
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Table 5.1: Treatment design
Supervisor’s information based on
Distribution mechanism Self-reports Actual efforts
Free allocation: Free-SR FreeSupervisor has reward power
Forced distribution: Forced-SR ForcedSupervisor is only an observer
βR is allocated equally to the teammates. The Equal treatment is relevant as it
describes an alternative allocation when the supervising authority cannot observe
individual efforts. In Equal, instead of relying on self-reported information, the
teammates are paid equally independent of their (relative) contribution.
5.3.2 Timing of a period
A period starts with the elicitation of subjects’ beliefs about the other teammates’
effort decisions. After the belief elicitation, each teammate chooses his or her own
effort.4 Then, teammates are informed about the actual (true) efforts of fellow
teammates. Following that, except in Equal, each teammate states his or her
own preferred reward distribution, i.e., each teammate suggests a distribution of
the partial team output βR. In the FREE treatments, teammates then provide
self-reports about their own effort. Following this, depending on the treatment, the
supervisor is either informed about the individual self-reports or the actual efforts.
In the two Free treatments, teammates additionally state their beliefs about the
supervisor’s distribution decision. In all treatments, the supervisor is informed
about the true value of the team’s total effort. After receiving the information,
in the Free treatments, the supervisor decides about the individual shares, si,
while in the exogenous Forced treatments, the shares are allocated exogenously
as described above.5 At the end of each period, each teammate receives feedback
4Subjects had to choose their effort level, as well as the self-report, from the set {0, 5, 10, 15, 20}.
This restricted set simplifies the task for the supervisor and makes exaggerations meaningful.
The belief elicitation was not incentivised.
5To simplify the allocation decision, the supervisor enters the individual payoff, siαR, directly
instead of calculating si for each teammate.
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Table 5.2: Timing of a period
Stage Teammates Supervisor
1 input: beliefs about teammates’ efforts
2 decision: own effort
3 feedback: individual efforts feedback: total effort
4 input: preferred allocation of βR
5 decision: self-report (SR-treatments) feedback: efforts or self-reports (dep.
on treatment)
6 input: belief about supervisor’s allo-
cation (Free-treatments)
allocation: si (dep. on treatment
proportional, Forced, or by super-
visor, Free)
7 feedback: payoffs
about his or her own payoff in the current period. Table 5.2 summarizes the timing
of a period.
5.3.3 Procedures
The experiment was conducted in September 2012 and February 2013 in the
Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER). In total, 156 students from
different disciplines participated. We collected eight independent observations
(matching groups) per treatment for the treatments Forced, Forced-SR, Free,
and Free-SR, and seven for Equal6. On their arrival, we informed subjects
about the experimental procedure.7 The experiment was programmed with z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007), and the subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
Each experimental session lasted about 90 minutes, and subjects earned about
18e on average.
6Since some subjects did not show up, we had to run this session with seven groups.
7See subsection 5.7.2 for a translation of the instructions. Original instructions are written in
German.
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5.4 Predictions
Do teammates exaggerate in self-reports?
The accuracy of self-reports in teamwork situations is subject to at least two
problems (Campbell & Lee, 1988). First, individuals may not be able to evaluate
and report their own efforts objectively and reliably (overestimation). Second,
they may deliberately misreport their efforts. In our study, we rule out by design
the existence of (unintended) overestimation, since an individual is always able
to evaluate his or her own effort perfectly. Hence, in our setting, if a teammate
misreports, he or she must do so deliberately. To answer the question of whether
teammates do indeed lie about actual efforts, we utilize our treatment, Forced-
SR, in which there is a strong incentive to do so. As explained before, in Forced-
SR, the supervisor has to pay the teammates proportionally according to self-
reports. This forced proportional distribution maximizes the incentives to lie. In
other words, for a teammate, it is strictly dominant to report maximum effort. On
the other hand, for each teammate, it is rational to set one’s actual effort to zero.
In light of previous experimental studies, one should expect that the actual efforts
will be higher than zero (Ledyard, 1995) and people will not lie to full extent
(see, for example, Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). Given that, it is unlikely to
observe extreme decisions of zero contributions and maximum reports. Hence, we
state our first hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 5.1. In Forced-SR and Free-SR, the average level of self-reports
are higher than the actual efforts.
Do teammates lie to a lesser extent if the supervisor has reward power?
Next, we ask whether teammates’ reporting behavior might be different when the
supervisor is free to decide about the performance pay shares. To investigate
this question, we contrast the reporting behavior from the Forced-SR treatment
explained above with the behavior from the Free-SR treatment in which the
supervisor allocates the rewards at her own discretion after receiving self-reports.
Should we expect a different behavior in Free-SR how teammates’ choose their
reports and actual effort levels, compared to Forced-SR? The answer depends
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on teammates’ expectations of the supervisor’s reward distribution in Free-SR. If
teammates believe that the supervisor in Free-SR will deviate from the propor-
tional distribution, for example, if she decides to choose an egalitarian distribution,
then the teammates no longer have an incentive to report maximum effort. In this
case, in fact, teammates are indifferent between reporting the maximum or any
other amount. If, however, teammates expect the supervisor to stick to the propor-
tional allocation, then they have an incentive to report maximum efforts – exactly
as in the Forced-SR treatment.
Indeed, the supervisor in the Free-SR treatment has no reason to apply any
other distribution than the proportional one, since all other distributions would
decrease her expected payoff compared to the proportional distribution. Why
exactly should the supervisor choose a proportional distribution of the performance
pay βR? Assume that the supervisor observes that the sum of the reported efforts
is higher than the actual total contribution. Since there is no possibility to identify
the exact amount of individual deviations in reports from the actual efforts, the
supervisor is not able to discriminate between the teammates who lied and those
who stated their true effort. By design, the supervisor is also not able to sanction
the team as a whole by withholding payments, because the supervisor must allocate
the entire amount of βR. An egalitarian allocation of βR is also not feasible, since
the equal allocation would transform the game into a public goods game. In public
goods games, it is very likely that the team output will be low or decrease over
time, thus lowering the supervisor’s payoff. Hence, for the supervisor, with a very
high probability, deviating from the proportional distribution would lead to worse
outcomes than if she applied the proportional allocation. Hence, the teammates in
Free-SR may correctly anticipate the proportional distribution and exaggerate
their own efforts maximally.
Hypothesis 5.2. We expect no differences, either in the average level of reported
efforts or in the average level of actual efforts between the treatments Forced-SR
and Free-SR. Thus, we do not expect a different level of lying (exaggeration) in
Free-SR and in Forced-SR.
Recent experimental studies show that some people have a lying aversion that
varies to different extents as laboratory studies (Vanberg, 2008; Gneezy et al., 2013;
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Conrads, Irlenbusch, Rilke, Schielke, & Walkowitz, 2014) as well as a study with
a representative sample suggests (Abeler et al., 2014). These “lying costs” could
be more salient in the Free-SR treatment, i.e., when the supervisor deliberately
decides on rewards than in the Forced-SR treatment in which the supervisor
does not make such a decision. Hence, subjects might have a stronger reluctance
to lie to a supervisor with reward power as in Free-SR, than to a “lame-duck”,
observing-only supervisor, as in Forced-SR. Thus, we formulate an alternative
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5.3. Teammates exaggerate less in Free-SR than in Forced-SR.
Are supervisors able to allocate incentive compatible payments when
receiving self-reports as effective as when they are informed about the true
individual efforts?
As explained above, to maximize her own payoff, the supervisor should allocate
the payments proportional to individual efforts. To conduct an efficient allocation,
the supervisor must know the true individual efforts. In the Free treatment, we
provide the supervisor with true information about the individual efforts. Hence,
in Free, the supervisor is able to motivate the teammates to contribute by setting
siβR = ei.
In the Free-SR treatment, the supervisor receives individual self-reports as
feedback. If teammates exaggerate their own efforts, the supervisor is faced with
uncertainty. For two reasons, this uncertainty might render her reward allocation
ineffective. First, if teammates exaggerate their efforts, then the proportional
allocation of payments is not incentive-compatible. Second, since the supervisor is
not able to monitor the actual efforts, she cannot condition the payments on efforts
in any other incentive compatible way. Hence, with self-reports, we expect the
supervisor will be less effective in distributing incentive compatible performance
pay than with true effort information. This ineffectiveness might lead to lower
actual efforts in Free-SR than in Free, in which the supervisor is able to monitor
true efforts.
Hypothesis 5.4. When receiving self-reports, supervisors are less effective in us-
ing incentive-compatible rewards than when they receive true effort information.
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What is the net effect of self-reports and supervisor’s reward power on
team performance?
We expect the highest team performance in the Forced treatment and the lowest
in the Forced-SR. If the supervisor in the Free treatment is able to allocate
the payments proportional to the individual contributions, the team performance
can be expected to be as high as in the Forced. Otherwise, if the supervisor
choses a non-incentive compatible distribution, then the teammates do no longer
have an incentive to contribute their full endowment. This may lead to a lower
team performance in the Free treatment. In contrast to that, the supervisor’s
ability to depart from the proportional distribution may have positive effects in
the Free-SR treatment as compared to the Forced-SR treatment. This positive
effect is twofold. First, the level of reported efforts should be lower, since maxi-
mum reports are no longer automatically rewarded. Second, this could encourage
honest teammates to contribute, because they are less likely to be exploited by
exaggerating teammates. For given beliefs about others’ contributions, the Free-
SR treatment may reduce the perceived risk of exploitation, since the supervisor
is able to detect extreme exaggerations and may distribute βR accordingly. At
the same time, those teammates who exaggerate their effort take the risk of being
identified as a liar. This is all the more important, since the supervisor in the
Free-SR could remember previous exaggerations, in contrast to the supervisor
in the Forced-SR, who does not have this possibility.
5.5 Results and Discussion
Subjects exaggerate self-reports when under forced distribution of rewards
We start our analysis by looking at the reporting behavior in the Forced-SR. Re-
member, the proportional allocation of performance pay according to self-reports
in the Forced-SR treatment provides a strong incentive to exaggerate. As the
left panel of Figure 5.2 shows, teammates in Forced-SR do indeed exaggerate
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Figure 5.2: Actual and reported efforts
their efforts when reporting.8 Actual efforts amount on average to 13.4, while self-
reports amount to 16.5. The difference between the reported and the actual efforts
is of considerable magnitude (3.1) and statistically significant (Pitman-Fisher per-
mutation test9, one-sided, p=0.008). These numbers provide clear support for our
Hypothesis 5.1.
Result 5.1. If performance payments are allocated exogenously according to the
self-reported effort information, then self-reported efforts are significantly higher
than the actual efforts.
Subjects exaggerate self-reports less when rewards are allocated
endogenously by the supervisor
Do teammates report differently when the supervisor discretionarily decides on
the allocation of performance pay, as in Free-SR? We see in the right panel of
8There is no case, in which a teammate exaggerated her effort when the actual sum of efforts
in the group was zero, i.e., there is no case, in which a supervisor was able to detect an
individual exaggeration for sure.
9We decided to use the Fisher-Pitman test instead of the Wilcoxon rank sum test. While
both tests are permutation tests, the Wilcoxon test is based on ranks and therefore ignores
a substantial part of the information in the sample data. The Pitman-Fisher permutation
test (FPP test) uses the more powerful approach based on the original sample values without
transformation (compare Kaiser, 2007).
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Figure 5.2, the pattern of reporting behavior is similar to the Forced-SR, as
predicted in our Hypothesis 5.2. As in Forced-SR, in the Free-SR treatment,
self-reported efforts (16.3) are significantly higher than the actual efforts (14.9,
FPP test, one-sided, p=0.008). The magnitude of the exaggeration in Free-SR,
however, is clearly smaller than in Forced-SR (1.4 versus 3.1). Teammates, on
average, exaggerate to a lesser extent if the supervisor has reward power than
when she is just an observer. However, based on non-parametrical tests, neither
the averages of reports nor the means of efforts, nor the average extent (amount)
of exaggerations differ significantly between the Forced-SR and the Free-SR
treatments.
Result 5.2. The overall pattern of reporting behavior, the average level of actual
efforts as well as of the reports are not statistically different between the Free-SR
and the Forced-SR (FPP test, two-sided, p=0.625 for actual efforts and p=0.936
for reported efforts).
Nevertheless, a closer look at the exaggerations uncovers some substantial dif-
ferences in reporting behavior between the Free-SR and the Forced-SR. Panel
(a) of Figure 5.3 presents the frequency of exaggerations as the ratio of the actual
untruthful self-reports to the number of cases with exaggeration possibilities, i.e.,
to all cases in which actual efforts are below 20. There are 218 such possible exag-
geration cases in Forced-SR and 197 in Free-SR. On average, teammates exag-
gerate more often in Forced-SR than in Free-SR (62.8% versus 47.7%). This
difference is significant according to Fisher’s exact test (p = 0.002).10 Moreover, if
we consider only those teammates who lied and not those who reported truthfully,
then we see that teammates in Forced-SR inflate their efforts considerably more
than the teammates in Free-SR. Panel (b) of Figure 5.3 presents the average
amount of exaggeration for the cases in which the reported effort is strictly higher
than the actual effort.11 The average deviation in these cases amounts to 13.2
10We are aware of the fact that Fisher’s exact test does not consider clustering within groups.
However, since we are primarily interested in the overall difference between the two treat-
ments, we decided to use this test.
11We exclude the cases, in which subjects reported lower amounts than their actual efforts.
There are two such cases in Forced-SR and 12 in Free-SR. If we include these cases,
the frequency of untruthful self-reports increases to 63.8% in Forced-SR, and to 53.8% in
Free-SR.
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Figure 5.3: Frequency and amount of exaggeration in Free-SR and Forced-SR
in Forced-SR, whereas it is 8.2 in Free-SR. The difference is weakly signifi-
cant according to the FPP test (p=0.076). A random Tobit regression reveals a
highly significant negative effect of the supervisor with reward power on team-
mates’ extent of exaggeration (see Table 5.4 in subsection 5.7.1 of the appendix).
The coefficient of the “Supervisor with reward power” is -3.370, the robust stan-
dard error is 1.184 and the p-value is 0.005. This fact confirms the difference in
reporting behavior between the Forced-SR and Free-SR.
Result 5.3. In Forced-SR, teammates exaggerate more often and stronger than
in Free-SR.
Taken Result 5.2 and Result 5.3 together, we find some substantial support
for the Hypothesis 5.3 that teammates lie to a lesser extent in Free-SR than in
Forced-SR.
Supervisors are able to allocate incentive compatible payments when
receiving self-reports as effectively as when they are informed about actual
individual efforts
We conducted the treatment Free, in which the supervisor is informed about
teammates’ true efforts, to investigate whether supervisors are able to allocate
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performance pay in an incentive-compatible12 way. Indeed, in Free, in 97.7%
of the cases supervisors allocate incentive compatible rewards. In the Free-SR
treatment, the respective number is 95.5% with respect to reports (89.7% with
respect to actual efforts). The difference between both treatments is statistically
not significant.
Result 5.4. Supervisors in Free-SR receiving self-reports are able to apply an
incentive compatible reward allocation as effectively as supervisors in Free who
are informed about actual efforts.
This result is not surprising, considering that we used a design that made it
easy for the supervisor to pay incentive compatible rewards. By doubling the
contributions and distributing one half of the result as the variable payoff, the
incentive compatible share is always equal to each teammates’ contribution.
The effect of self-reports on team performance
How do self-reports ultimately affect team performance? The answer depends on
which setting we compare. We could compare self-report treatments to an ideal
setting of perfect monitoring and perfectly incentivizing performance pay alloca-
tions. In the Forced treatment, we set up such an ideal setting. As Figure
5.4 shows, compared to the Forced treatment, both self-report treatments have
detrimental effects on team performance. The clear difference in average efforts
between Forced (19.3 on average) and Forced-SR is statistically significant
(13.4, FPP test, one-sided p=0.033). The other extreme situation we set up is
that of a standard public goods setting in the Equal treatment. Compared to
Equal, in which average effort amounts to 11.1, both self-report treatments per-
form considerably better, although the differences are not significant according to
FPP test (p=0.236 for Forced-SR and p=0.117 for Free-SR).
12We measure a supervisor’s performance as the deviation from the proportional distribution
benchmark. As mentioned above, the proportional distribution is not the only incentive-
compatible allocation rule. However, the results from the Free treatment show that almost
all chosen distributions were proportional. Formally, the supervisors’ “quality” is defined by
the normed geometric distance from the perfect proportional allocation 1− 1√2
∑3
i=1(si−s∗i )2
where s∗i is memberi’s share in the proportional distribution based on contributions
(
s∗i = eiW
)
or on reported contributions in Free-SR.
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Figure 5.4: Average team performance
Result 5.5. Compared to an ideal situation in Forced, self-reports have detri-
mental effects.
The comparison of average efforts in Free and Free-SR shows that there is no
significant detrimental effect of self-reports when the supervisor has reward power.
Although the average efforts tend to be smaller in Free-SR (14.9) than in Free
(18.1), this difference is statistically not significant (FPP test, one-sided p=0.107).
Result 5.6. Self-reports have no significant detrimental effect on team perfor-
mance if the supervisor has distributive power.
The positive effect of having a supervisor with distributive power under self-
reports becomes obvious when we focus on the average distances between Forced
and Forced-SR, and between Free and Free-SR, respectively. Whereas self-
reports reduce the average efforts by about 5.94 tokens if the distribution of per-
formance pay is exogenous (Forced minus Forced-SR), the negative effect of
self-reports is only 3.18 tokens between both endogenous treatments (Free minus
Free-SR).
Result 5.7. The detrimental effects of self-reports on team performance are smaller
when the supervisor has distributive power than when the supervisor is forced to
follow exogenous rule to allocate performance pay (compare the tobit regression in
appendix 5.7.1).
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Regression analysis
In a set of random effects panel regressions (see Table 5.3), we can confirm all of
the results that we have presented so far. We assume that the following model(s)
explains the variance in teammates’ efforts. The first explanatory variable that we
add to all three variants of the model is a subject’s belief about the teammates’
average effort in the next period (Belief about others’ average efforts). Similar to
Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) we assume that subjects update this belief depend-
ing on the received feedback in a first step, before they use it to determine their
next period’s effort. The second explanatory variable is a measure for supervisor
performance that we construct as “1 - the average absolute distance” between the
chosen share (reward) for the teammate (by the supervisor) and the reward the
teammate would receive if the shares would be allocated perfectly proportional to
the actual efforts. Since the teammates learn the supervisor’s allocation decision
only at the end of each round, we include the first lag (t − 1) of the supervisor
performance measure. The dummy variable Equal distribution is 1 in the Equal
treatment in which all teammates receive the same performance pay share irre-
spective of their relative effort. The second dummy Self-report is set to 1 in the
Free-SR and the Forced-SR. The dummy Supervisor with reward power is 1
for the treatments in which the supervisor has reward power (Free and Free-
SR). Finally, we include an interaction term between the self-report dummy and
the supervisor with reward power dummy that is set to one only in Free-SR.
The results of the random effects panel regressions with robust standard errors
clustered on groups are presented in Table 5.3.
The belief about others’ average effort has a positive effect on a teammate’s own
effort in each of the three variants of the model, i.e., the higher a teammate’s
expectation of others’ average effort, the more she is willing to contribute. The
regression also shows a large positive effect of Supervisor performance in t − 1
on efforts. The overall effect of supervisor’s ability to match the perfect propor-
tional share is in line with the results obtained with non-parametrical tests for the
comparison between the Free and the Forced treatment.
The negative coefficient for the dummy Equal distribution (see model I in Table
5.3) confirms the positive effect of performance based payments in the exogenous
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Table 5.3: Effects on effort
Dependent variable: Effort in t I II III
Belief about others’ average efforts 1.066
∗∗∗ 1.057∗∗∗ 1.051∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.059) (0.064)
Supervisor performance in t− 1 3.179
∗∗∗ 2.639∗∗ 2.937∗∗
(0.845) (1.256) (1.400)
Equal distribution −2.121
∗∗
(1.056)
Self-reports −1.771
∗∗ −2.429∗∗
(0.708) (1.079)
Supervisor with reward power −0.375(0.303)
Supervisor with reward power×Self-reports 1.306(1.294)
Constant 1.907
∗∗∗ 3.413∗∗ 3.373∗∗
(0.707) (1.607) (1.461)
n 2223 1824 1824
Wald chi2 832.90 712.22 832.89
R2 0.672 0.691 0.693
Notes: Random-effects GLS regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by
matching group: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable: Effort.
(Forced, Forced-SR) and endogenous treatments (Free, Free-SR) compared
to the Equal treatment. The dummies for Self-reports confirm the results of
the nonparametric tests (see model II in Table 5.3). If the payment is mainly based
on self-reports as in the two self-report treatments, the teammate’s effort decreases
by about 1.771. The coefficient for the interaction between the supervisor with
reward power and self-reports (Supervisor with reward power × Self-reports) shows
the positive effect that a supervisor with distributive power has on efforts, i.e., the
detrimental effects of self-reports are much less pronounced if there is an supervisor
with reward power (see model III in Table 5.3).
5.6 Conclusion
Our most important result is that the detrimental effects of self-reports are less
pronounced when a supervisor has distributive power to allocate performance pay
than under an exogenous forced distribution system (FDS) where the supervisor
has limited power. Teammates exaggerate self-reports strongly under a FDS when
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the allocation mechanism of performance pay is exogenous and known ex-ante. If
the supervisor possesses the power to allocate rewards at her own discretion and
ex-post, self-reports are less exaggerated. Interestingly, the uncertainty stemming
from the fact that the supervisors ex-post decide on performance pay shares at their
own discretion seem to increase efforts and decrease the amount of exaggerations.
Translating the main result explained above as a practical implication for reality
would mean the following: In situations where a supervisor must rely (at least
to some extent) on self-reported effort information, it might be better for the
management not to announce hard-wired performance pay ex-ante. Management
should rather, keep the possibility open of determining/adjusting performance pay
until observed the joint outcome and the (possibly exaggerated) self-reports. The
results point to a possible “cost of transparency” when a performance pay scheme
is hard-wired and challenge the suitability and effectiveness of FDS in cases similar
to our setting.
We also experimentally complement the finding from the organizational behavior
literature that one has to be cautious when implementing and evaluating self-
reports in performance appraisals. Compared to an ideal but rather unrealistic
situation of full information, the ultimate effect of self-reports on team performance
is negative. The transferability of this study’s results to reality, however, might
be limited by the fact that we have rather a strong test for self-reporting. In
reality, the detection of false self-reports might be easier. Hence, our findings
may overestimate the (detrimental) effects of self-reports on team performance in
reality. Future research could test different possibilities for detecting false self-
reports.
Evidence from tournament experiments shows that team members invest in ac-
tivities that harm other teammates in order to improve their own relative standing
(Harbring & Irlenbusch, 2011). Future research may also investigate the reporting
behavior in a setting where teammates may not only self-report their own efforts
but are also able to transfer (possibly false) information about their fellows’ efforts.
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5.7 Appendix
5.7.1 Tables
Table 5.4: Tobit regression of exaggeration
Dependent variable: exaggeration in t
Treatment (0=Forced-SR | 1=Free-SR ) −3.365
∗∗∗
(1.306)
Period 0.048(0.050)
Own contribution in t −0.533
∗∗∗
(0.061)
Constant 14.714
∗∗∗
(1.262)
n 231
Wald chi2 108.39
Notes: Random-effects tobit regression. Robust standard errors
in parentheses, clustered by subject id: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05,
∗∗∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable: exaggeration.
5.7.2 Instructions
Here we present the instructions for the treatment Free-SR as example. The
original instructions were in German and the one listed below is a translation into
English.
General information
We welcome you to this economic experiment. It is very important that you read the
following explanations carefully. If you have any questions, please address them to us.
In this experiment, you can earn money depending on your own and other participants’
decisions.
During the experiment, you are not allowed to talk to other participants. Non-
compliance with this rule will result in your being excluded from the experiment and from
all payments. All decisions will be taken anonymously, i.e., none of the other participants
will learn the identity of the participant who has taken a specific decision. Payment is
anonymous as well, i.e., no participant knows the payments of other participants.
During the experiment, your entire income is calculated in points. At the end of the
experiment, the total number of points earned during the experiment are converted to
Euros, where
35 points = 1 Euro.
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At the end of today’s experiment, you will receive the number of points earned during
the experiment plus a 2,50 e show-up fee.
On the following pages, the detailed procedure of the experiment is explained.
Course of the experiment
• The experiment will consist of 20 rounds, each round having the same structure.
• You will be part of a group of 4 members. During the whole experiment, you will
be exclusively interacting with the members of your group. The composition of
the group will remain unchanged across all rounds of the experiment.
Contributors and observer Your group will consist of three contributors and one
observer. Whether you will be assigned to the role of one of the contributors or the
observer will be randomly determined and communicated to you before the first round
begins. Moreover, a letter (A, B, or C) will be randomly assigned to each contributor.
This letter will be visible to the other contributors and to the observer, and will remain
unchanged throughout the whole experiment. At the beginning of each round, each
contributor will receive an endowment of 20 points. The observer will receive an
endowment of 10 points.
Stage 1: Decisions of the contributors
• Each contributor has to decide how many of the 20 points she wants to con-
tribute to the group account. Points which are not contributed to the group ac-
count will be kept by the contributor. Possible contributions are: [0, 5, 10, 15,or20]
points.
• Each point contributed will be multiplied by two, and the sum of the doubled
points is the group result. (sum of contributed points x 2 = group result)
• All contributors will be informed about the individual decisions and the
group result.
• The observer will only be informed about the level of the group result.
• Each contributor will decide what information about the level of her contri-
bution is transmitted to the observer.
Distribution of the group result - see figure below
• The group result is divided into three parts:
– Part I, 14 of the group result, is distributed equally among the 3 contrib-
utors.
– The distribution of part II, 12 of the group result, is carried out by the
observer.
– Part III, 14 of the group result, is given to the observer.
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Part II
Part III
Part I
Group result = sum of contributed points x 2
given to the
observer
distributed equally
among all team
members 
distributed by
the observer
Figure: Distribution of the group result
Stage 2: Decisions of the observer
• The observer cannot contribute her round endowment to the group account.
• The observer has to completely distribute part II among the contributors.
The observer cannot keep any points for herself.
• At her own discretion, the observer assigns a share of part II to each contrib-
utor.
Calculation of the round incomes of the contributors
• The round income of each contributor consists of three parts:
– Share of the round endowment which has not been contributed,
– Share of part I which has been distributed equally among all contributors,
– Share of part II which the observer has assigned to the contributor.
Round income of the contributor =
+ 20 - contribution + part I / 3 + assigned share of part II
Calculation of the round income of the observer
• The round income of the observer consists of two parts:
– Round endowment and
– part III
Round income of the observer =
10 + part III
Stage 3: End of the round
• At the end of each round, all contributors will be informed about the decision of
the observer and about their round incomes.
• The observer will be informed about her round income.
Total income Your total income will be the sum of the incomes from all rounds.
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